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AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE: FROM THE YALE EXPERIENCE*
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL **
We regard the facts as the
prerequisite of reform.
Charles E. Clark & Robert
M. Hutchins t
A s a coherent intellectual force in American legal thought
American Legal Realism simply ran itself into the sand.' If
proof of this assertion be needed one has only to ask a group of law
school faculty members what American Legal Realism was and
what it accomplished. If one gets any but the most cursory of re-
sponses, the answers will range from "a naive attempt to do em-
pirical social science that floundered because of its crude empiri-
cism," through "a movement in jurisprudence that quickly played
itself out because it really had no technical competence and little
0 Copyright @ 1979, John Henry Schlegel.
Research for this article was supported by a Baldy Summer Research Fellowship and,
quite unintentionally, by a Faculty Research Fellowship and Grant-in-aid from the Re-
search Foundation of the State University of New York. I am grateful to the late Leon
Green, the late Robert Maynard Hutchins, Fleming James, Jr., David Kammerman, Emma
Corstvet Llewellyn, the late Mark May, Sylvia Samenow, the late Donald Slesinger, and
the late Dorothy Swain Thomas for having granted me interviews with respect to the
subject of this article; to Saul Richard Gamer, Aaron Nassau, Paul 0. Ritter, and Hon.
J. Joseph Smith for having taken the time to write me about their participation in the
research described below; to Arthur Charpentier of the Yale Law School Library and his
staff, Judith Schiff of the Department of Archives & Records, Sterling Memorial Library,
Yale University and the staff there, the staff at Beinecke Library, Yale University, and
Albert Tannler of the University Archives, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, and
his staff for their kind assistance in my research and their attempts to make my work
both easier and more fruitful; to Elias Clark for permission to quote from a letter of
Charles E. Clark; to Jane Moore for permission to use the papers of W. Underhill Moore;
to George D. Vail, Associate Secretary, Yale University, for permission to use the records
of the Yale Corporation; to Harry Wellington, former Dean, Yale Law School, for per-
mission to use the minutes of the Yale Law School; to Barry, Bliss, Bob, Tom, David,
Joan, Jack, Al, Jack, Duncan, Fred, Janet, Thorne, and Jo, each of whom took the time
to read and comment on, often copiously, previous drafts of this manuscript; and to Ellen
who worked through it with a finely sharpened editorial brown pencil.
* b. 1942. A.B. 1964, Northwestern; J.D. 1967, Chicago. Private practice 1968, Chi-
cago. Teaching fellow 1967, Stanford; asst. prof. 1973, assoc. prof. 1978, prof. 1979,
SUNY/Buff-alo.
j A Program of Research in the Administration of the Law, App. A, at 2 (n.d. sum-
mer 1926?), on file in the Robert M. Hutchins papers at the Regenstein Library, University
of Chicago.
1. Professor Duncan Kennedy supplied me with this felicitous image of the decline
of Realism.
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to say," to "a group of scholars who did much to destroy the 19th
Century doctrinal universe but left nothing in its place. ' 2 Each
of these answers is both wrong and essentially partial. The answers
are wrong because first, the Realists' social scientific research died
out because of the impermanence of the institutionalized circum-
stances in which it was undertaken, the peculiarities of the per-
sonalities of the leaders of the undertaking, and the difficulties in
matching the impulse to do such research with the social science
of the time; second, their jurisprudential activities gave out when,
faced with the implications of their own constructions, the pro-
tagonists lost their nerve; and third, their destruction of the 19th
century legal universe left behind enduring achievements in com-
mercial law, corporations, and procedure that point toward the
largely legislative legal universe in which we live.8 The answers
are notably partial in that they ignore, if not suppress, both the
political coherence of the movement and the more directly po-
litical activities of many of its key members, as well as the extent
to which it reflected, albeit belatedly, similar movements in Ameri-
can academic thought generally-the rise of the social sciences, 4
the destruction of the general formalist universe, and the de-
cline of "pragmatic" political and social thought."
Given these deficiencies in the common legal understanding
of the Realist movement, it is at least curious that each partial un-
derstanding is invariably accompanied by an implicit, fatherly
assertion: "We are all realists now, don't worry about these ques-
tions." While one may speak prose without knowing it, and simi-
larly put forth ideas without knowing their lineage, it is more
2. I see no reason to document these attitudes towards Realism in great detail for
they are ubiquitous. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YAIa LJ. 1037 (1961)
expresses all of them, especially the third. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research
Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 400-01 (1956) expresses the first with his usual degree
of overstatement. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAw 132-44 (1961) expresses the second
with some reserve. H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AM-ERICAN PROPHETS (1951) is an
unusually vituperative presentation of all three.
3. I do not wish to document these assertions here; the series of articles that I plan
to write, of which this is the first, see note 13 infra, will provide all the necessary docu-
mentation.
4. See generally M. FURNER, ADvOCACY AND OBJEcrivrry: A CRISIS IN THE PiOFs-
SIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1865-1905 (1975); T. HASKEL, THE EMERGENCE
OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AmERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORrT (1977); Oberschall, The Institutionalization of Amer-
ican Sociology, in THE EsTABLIsI -mENT OF EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY 187 (A. Oberschall ed. 1972).
5. See generally M. WHIm, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AmERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FOR-
MALISM (new ed. 1957).
6. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATU-
RALISM AND THE PROaLEM OF VALUE (1973).
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difficult to have learned a lesson-to no longer be that young and
foolish, but rather to have grown up, as it were-without having
a rudimentary understanding of the something about which the
lesson was learned. No less curious is the fact that historians, who
have generally paid little attention to narrow legal matters, have
better understood the movement. Not only have they pointed out
the previously enumerated similarities between Realism and other
intellectual movements in the twenties and thirties, but also they
have explicitly noted that the intellectual roots of the movement
can be found in the progressive politics of the pre-war period.
7
These twin curiosities-the failure of understanding by the
lawyers and the relative success of the historians-can be explained,
in part, if one remembers that the common understandings of
Realism are an integral part of the intellectual world of its suc-
cessors, either the more conservative harvardian ones or the less
conservative las-dougalian ones. For the harvardians, deprivation
of the certainty of doctrine by the destruction of the formalist
universe, and of fact by the failure of empirical social science pro-
vided the justification for seeking legitimacy in orderly process; 8
for the las-dougalians, the same two deprivations provided the jus-
tification for seeking legitimacy in a policy analysis based on
assertedly democratic values and the soft facts of experts' opinions.9
And for both groups, the failure of Realist jurisprudence provided
the occasion for their theorizing. Given the successors' stake in
a particular understanding of the Realist movement, and their
near total success in dominating post-Realist legal theory in
America, it is not surprising that the understanding of the move-
ment necessary to post-Realist theorizing is the understanding gen-
erally held in the legal community. Nor is it surprising that the
historians who have a less immediate stake in the fortunes of post-
Realist theory have managed to understand the movement more
fully.
To know that the intellectual world of the successors of Real-
ism has shaped our understanding of that movement is not to
kniow how to respond to that insight, however. And how to re-
7. See generally 0. GRAHAM, AN ENCORE FOR REFORM (1967).
8. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 123
(1974) provides a general list of the members of this school, although I do not agree with
all his choices. The classic work is H. HART & A. SACKs, THE LEGAL PROCEss: BAsic PRoB-
LEms IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAV (1958).
9. See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1952); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943).
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spond is an important question, for it has become an increasingly
pervasive perception that post-Realist legal theory has about run
its course headlong into a dead end. The harvardian search for
legitimacy in orderly process has not succeeded in avoiding trouble-
some questions of value, including those raised by the process it-
self, anymore than the formalist universe had or empirical social
science might have been thought capable.' 0 The las-dougalian
search for legitimacy in policy analysis has not succeeded in avoid-
ing troublesome questions about the source and beneficiaries of
the values assumed and the independence of the experts' opinions
from those values. And so, the question of whose values legal rules
serve, a question highlighted in the Realists' destruction of the
formalist universe and in their attempts at legislative law-making,
and believed to have been put to rest by post-Realist legal thought,
has re-emerged, exactly where it was found forty years ago.
One might respond to the "dead end" feeling accompanying
this re-emergence in several different ways." One that comes im-
mediately to mind, because of its current popularity, is the attempt
to return to the mainstream of European, specifically continental
European, social thought after nearly 200 years of largely ignor-
ing that intellectual force.'2 However, the juxtaposition of the
feeling of being at a dead end and the knowledge that the intellec-
tual world of the successors of Realism has shaped our understand-
ing of that movement in such a way as to suggest that, "We might
all not be Realists now," counsels a different, though related, en-
terprise. One might attempt to recover an understanding of what
10. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1959) makes the deficiencies obvious even as it attempts to argue for the primacy of
"process."
11. One might simply ignore the feeling and build a castle at the dead end as does
B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). Ackerman, who from his
footnotes, though not his other writing, sedms to answer the question "What was American
Legal Realism and what did it accomplish?" with an "American Legal Who?" seems to be
struggling to reunite harvardian and las-douglian thought by stiffening orderly process
with a spine of formalist welfare economics and wrapping up the result in the banner of
scientific policymaking. The echo of Langdell in this use science, see note 34 infra, is
surely no accident, anymore than is the echo of las-dougalian assertedly democratic values.
See, e.g., B. AcKERMAN, supra, at 229 n.3. Of course, Ackerman is not the only contempo-
rary practitioner of the castle builder's art. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RGTrrs SEI-
OUSLY (1977); R. POSNER, ECONomic ANALYSIS OF LAv (2d ed. 1977).
12. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) and R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
(1976) are the best known of such attempts, but others also exist. See, e.g., Balbus, Com-
modity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Anatomy" of the Law, 11 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 571 (1977) (marxist); Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Condi-
tions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1977) (exis-
tential marxist); A. Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and
Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1979) (structuralist)
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Realism was and how and why it ran itself into the sand. Such an
endeavor could be undertaken in order both to learn what went
wrong, if anything, in that particular revolt against legal ortho-
doxy and to regain the mainstream of American legal thought at
some point before it turned into its present dead end, all in the
hope if not to learn from the mistakes of the past, at least to better
understand the way in which the choices of the past inform the
world, and thus the options, of the present.
What follows is the first installment of an attempt to under-
take the second enterprise and thereby recover an understanding
of what Realism was.13 At this level it is simply an excursion into
why and how empirical legal research first came to be done by
some of the Realists at Yale and then died out14 At the same time
this story is not simply about Realism, but has two other prospects,
both aspects of the rise of science to intellectual hegemony in, and
with, the 20th century American university. First, it is an indirect
attempt to capture what it is like to engage in a large multi-disci-
plinary research project that must meet and satisfy numerous
divergent single-disciplinary constituencies. It is thus an example
of the recurrent story about the attempts, largely successful, by
each of the many individual, balkanized intellectual subunits of
the modern intellectual community to dictate the terms on which
it will "recognize" research. Second, it is an episode in the con-
tinuing confrontation between law and the social sciences over the
past fifty years. As such it is an example of a recurrent pattern of
confrontation between the "scientific ideal"1 5 and any of the lib-
13. The following outline of the entire project as presently conceived may perhaps
present a better sense of the relationship of part to whole, and of the significance of this
part:
I. The Intellectual Roots of Realism
II. Realism and Empirical Social Science
A. The Yale Experience
B. The Singular Case of Underhill Moore
C. The Johns Hopkins Institute of Law
III. Realism and the Politics of Law Reform
A. Economic Life and the New Deal
B. The Reform of Federal Procedure
C. The Belated Reform of Commercial Law
IV. The Implicit Jurisprudence of Realism
V. The Intellectual Legacy of Realism.
Because of the vagaries of research this is the first part of the study to be completed.
14. This aspect of Realism is treated inadequately in both of the major reconsidera-
tions of the movement to date: W. RuMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); W. Twi-
NING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). The same is true of G. TARELLO,
IL REALISMO GURIDicO AMERIcANO (1962).
15. I have stolen the notion of the "scientific ideal" in American thought from David
Hollinger who is at work on a book on the growth of that ideal in 20th century America.
See D. HOLLINGER, Momus R. COHEN AND THE SCIENIrC IDEAL (1976).
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eral arts or, on occasion, part of one of the social sciences. But
these are sub-themes, themes for the reader to pick out largely on
his own. It is the main theme to which I wish to turn, that of the
short rise and gentle fall of empirical legal research at Yale as a
part of the Realist enterprise generally.
I. GETTING A LAW SCHOOL MOVING
It is perhaps ironic that the once sleepy Yale Law School
should ever have been in the center of any intellectual movement.
it was a marginal enterprise, at best, for nearly the first century
of its existence, and, as the story is often told, did not fully join
the mainstream of legal education until 1916 when, with the ap-
pointment of Thomas W. Swan, 6 it acquired a Harvard Law School
graduate as its dean to complement its recent adoption of the case
method of teaching.17 Although the transformation began earlier
-Arthur L. Corbin, who began teaching there in 1903, adopted
a version of case method teaching soon after, and Wesley N.
Hohfeld 8 came in 1914-Swan's deanship marked the end of Yale's
career as a backwater law school.'9 Starting from a nucleus of these
two men and Walter Wheeler Cook,20 who also arrived in 1916,
Swan had by 1923 assembled a faculty that included Corbin and
Cook; Edwin M. Borchard, the father of the declaratory judg-
ment;2' Charles E. Clark, soon to be a respected scholar in real
16. b. 1877. A.B. 1900 Yale; LL.B. 1903 Harvard. Chairman, Board of Editors, Har-
vard Law Review. Private practice 1903, Chicago. Dean, 1916, Yale. United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1926. d. 1975. See M. ScHucI, LEARNED HAND'S COURT
19-23 (1970).
17. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSP. Am. Hisv.
405, 439-40, 470-71 and especially 471 n.24 (1971) gives the standard explanation together
with adequate documentation. See also W. TWINING, supra note 14, at 33-34, 40.
18. b. 1879. B.A. 1901, U. Cal.; LL.B. 1904, Harvard. Editor of Harvard Law Review
1903. Lecturer 1905, Hastings College of Law; inst. 1905, asst. prof. 1907, assoc. prof. 1908, prof.
1909, Stanford; Summer School, University of Chicago, 1908, 1910 (where he met Roscoe
Pound). Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YAL L.J. 16 (1913) is his most famous work. d. 1918. See W. TWINING, supra note 14,
at 34-37; Losano, Hohfeld Comes to Yale, 21 YALE L. REP. 16 (1975).
19. G. PmRSON, YALE: THE UNIvERsrr COLLEGE 1921-1937, at 259 (1955). This is the
standard history of Yale for the period.
20. b. 1873. A.B. 1894, LL.M. 1901 Columbia. Instructor 1901, asst. prof. 1902, prof.
1903, Nebraska; prof. 1904, Missouri; prof. 1906, Wisconsin; prof. 1910, Chicago; prof. 1916,
Yale; prof. 1919, Columbia; prof. 1922, Yale; prof. 1928, Johns Hopkins; prof. 1935, North-
western. W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942) is his
best known work. d. 1943. See V. TWINING, supra note 14, at 37-40.
21. b. 1884. LL.B. 1905, New York Law School; A.B. 1908, Ph.D. 1913, Columbia.
Prof. 1917, Yale. E. BORCHARD, GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT (1928); E. BORClARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JuSTICE (1932); E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS (1934); E. BORCHARD & W. LAGE, NEUTRALITY FOR THE UNITED SrATES (2d ed.
19-40) are his principal works. d. 1951.
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property and civil procedure; 2 Karl N. Llewellyn, later, while at
Columbia, the father of the Uniform Commercial Code; Ernest
Lorenzen, a noted scholar in the conflict of laws; 23 Edmund M.
Morgan, who became a famous evidence scholar at Harvard;
2 4
Edward S. Thurston, later a famous torts scholar at Harvard;
25
William R. Vance, an authority on insurance law;26 and George
E. Woodbine, an eminent legal historian.2 7 He had thus created
a respectable and even promising law school attached to what was
otherwise an unintellectual, overgrown college.28
As a practicing lawyer, Swan was perhaps the perfect person
to turn Yale into a copy of Harvard, still a revolutionary thing to
do at staid old Yale in 1916. But, although a missionary from
Harvard, Swan was neither a scholar29 nor an academic, in the
sense of having devoted his life to teaching, as was each member
of the Yale faculty. Thus, under Swan's guidance Yale had come
as far as the Harvard of almost thirty years before.30 What re-
mained was for Yale to become thoroughly academic just as had
Harvard when it selected Ames, a devoted scholar who had never
22. b. 1889. B.A. 1911, LL.B. 1913, Yale. Asst. prof. 1919, assoc. prof. 1922, prof. 1923,
dean 1929, Yale. Reporter to Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure of the Supreme
Court of the United States. d. 1963. See M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 29-32 (1970).
23. b. 1876. Ph.D. 1898, LL.B. 1899, Cornell. Prof. 1903, Maine; prof. 1904, dean 1910,
George Washington; prof. 1911, Wisconsin; prof. 1914, Minnesota; prof. 1917, Yale. d. 1951.
24. b. 1878. A.B. 1902, A.M. 1903, LL.B. 1905, Harvard; A.M. 1919, Yale. Private
practice 1905, Duluth. Prof. 1912, Minnesota; prof. 1917, Yale; prof. 1925, Harvard. d. 1966.
25. b. 1876. A.B. 1898, A.M. 1900, LL.B. 1901, Harvard. Private practice 1901, New
York City. Instr. 1906, Indiana; asst. prof. 1906, prof. 1908, George Washington; prof. 1910,
Illinois; prof. 1911, Minnesota; prof. 1919, Yale; prof. 1929, Harvard. Reporter on parts of
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. d. 1948.
26. b. 1870. A.B. 1892, M.A. 1893, Ph.D. 1895, LL.B. 1897, Washington and Lee. Asst.
prof. 1897, prof. 1898, dean 1900, Washington and Lee; prof. 1903, dean 1905, George
Washington; prof. 1910, Yale; dean 1912, Minnesota; prof. 1920, Yale. VANCE ON INSURANCE
(1904) and CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE (1914) are his major
publications. d. 1940.
27. b. 1876. B.A. 1903, Ph.D. 1909, LL.B. 1919, Yale. Instr. (history) 1906, asst. prof.
(history) 1912, asst. prof. (law) 1919, assoc. prof. (law) 1924, prof. (history) 1927, Yale.
His most important work was editing BRACrON, DELEGIBUT EX CONSUETUDINIBuS ANGLIDE
(trans. BRACrON ON THE LAWS AND CusTozs OF ENGLAND VOlS. I & II (1923)). d. 1953.
28. For a general understanding of Yale in the period, see G. PIERSON, supra note 19.
B. KxLr.ay, YALE: A HISTORY 376-86 (1974) indirectly demonstrates how the college still
dominated Yale at this time, even though the university had already produced several
notable scholars, when he notes how much effort had to be put into improving graduate
and professional education. VEYsEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERiCAN UNsvawsrry (1965)
provides further support.
29. In the ten years of his deanship, Swan published but one article, and that article
was the reprint of a speech. Swan, Reconstruction and the Legal Profession, 28 YALE L.J.
784 (1919).
30. For Harvard history, see A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARvARD: A HISTORY OF
IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 (1967). A less accessible but generally superior version is C.
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARvARD LAw SCHOOL (1908).
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practiced, to succeed Langdell.31 But how Yale would take this last
symbolic step and what that step would ultimately mean for legal
thought were by no means evident in 1923.
A. A New Dean
If the truth be known, no part of Yale's future was particu-
larly evident in 1923. The return of Cook from his sojourn at
Columbia was heartening, but little else worthy of note was oc-
curring. Some movement might have been detected in the uni-
versity as a whole, for Yale had recently acquired a new president
-James Rowland Angell. Angell, the only president of Yale since
the American Revolution who had not been graduated from the
College, had been a professor of psychology, dean, and, for a time,
acting president at the University of Chicago, and then president
of the Carnegie Foundation before moving to New Haven. A scien-
tist by trade-Angell worked in the psychological tradition of
Wundt-he attempted from the start to turn Yale into the uni-
versity it pretended to be. As part of this attempt, he stressed the
importance of research, especially scientific research, the need for
strong graduate and professional schools, and the desirability of
interdisciplinary studies. 3 He was understood to be less than
favorably impressed by the law school, or at least its faculty thought
so.3 On the other hand, he was understood to be favorably im-
pressed by Robert Maynard Hutchins, secretary to the Yale Cor-
poration.
31. See A. SUTHER.AND, supra note 30, at 190-91.
32. B. KELLEY, supra note 28, at 370-71, has a nice thumbnail portrait of Angell: G.
PIERSON, supra note 19, at 16-19, 508-33, has a more complete but less incisive portrait of
the man. There is capsule explanation of Angell's quite significant contributions in psy-
chology as the leading "functionalist" in L. ZUSNE, NAMEs IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
276 (1975).
33. Angell's inaugural address to this effect is quoted in B. KELLEY, supra note 28,
at 371.
34. Interview with Leon Green, June 19, 1975; interview with Robert M. Hutchins,
June 20, 1975. The reasons for this displeasure are unclear. Perhaps it was because the
langdellian science of law-a rationalist, historical and, to the outside world at least, de.
ductive derivation of principles-was surely not the same as Angell's own science of experi.
mental psychology. Or it may have been his exposure as president of the Carnegie
Foundation to the criticisms of legal education made in the first two reports of the Foun-
dation's study of the subject. See J. REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE MLTIIOD
(1914); A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAW (1921). These criticisms are
summarized in Stevens, supra note 17, at 405, 441-53 (1971). A hint of Angell's attitude
can be found in his gentle criticism of law schools for ignoring their academic, university
responsibilities while pursuing their vocational, professional responsibilities in an address
to the Association of American Law Schools, The University and the School of Law,
[1927] HANDBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHooLs 40 [hereinafter cited as
A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK, without cross-reference].
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Being impressed by Hutchins hardly distinguished Yale's
president from many other people at Yale. Hutchins, tall, boyishly
good looking, extremely bright and witty, and the son of a re-
ligious academic of certifiable liberal credentials, had been hired
by the Corporation in January 1923M5 He had spent the year and
one-half following his graduation from the College teaching En-
glish and history at a school for "rich juvenile delinquents." 6
The twenty-three year old Hutchins had jumped when the job was
offered to him, ostensibly because he was almost the only member
of his class "who had gone into education."3 7 Why he jumped is
less clear because the job, largely that of vice-president for public
and alumni affairs and chief administrative officer of the uni-
versity,8 came nowhere near to occupying his enormous energy.
Hutchins used some of his spare energy to finish his law de-
gree, begun out of boredom while in his last year as an under-
graduate. Taking his courses in the early mornings, late afternoons,
and summers, and working for credit as the equivalent of an un-
paid research assistant for Charles E. Clark, he finished in two and
one-half years,39 During this time he and Clark became friends,
35. There is no biography of Hutchins. The following facts have been collected from
his senior class book, History of the Class of 1921; WHo's WHo IN AMERiCA (1974); N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (Obituary); and an interview with Robert M. Hutchins,
June 20, 1975. Hutchins was born June 17, 1899. His father, William J., was a Presbyterian
minister who in 1907 became a professor of religion at Oberlin Theological Seminary and
in 1920 became president of Berea College, Berea, Kentucky. Hutchins' uncle was a lawyer.
Hutchins' college education, begun at Oberlin in 1915, was interrupted when he enlisted
in the Army Ambulance Corps in an attempt to square his desire to serve in the war with
his essential pacificism. When he returned to college in 1919 he transferred to Yale, from
which he was graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1921.
36. The characterization is that of Hutchins. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins,
June 20, 1975.
37. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975 (quoting James R. Angell).
38. For a description of the job, created because of the general administrative inepti-
tude of Angell's predecessor and then vacated by its first occupant when he was passed
over for the presidency, see B. KELLEY, supra note 28, at 324, a description confirmed by
Hutchins. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975. Since the job required a
great amount of public speaking, especially to alumni, Hutchins' achievements as a college
orator contributed to Yale's interest in him. Angell wanted Hutchins' services badly
enough to go to the trouble of finding a person to take up Hutchins' teaching job so he
could start in mid-semester. See James R. Angell to Wilber Cross, Nov. 20, 1922, on file
in the James R. Angell presidential papers at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University
[hereinafter cited as Angell papers, without cross-reference].
39. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975. Partial confirmation is found
in Robert M. Hutchins to James R. Angell, Sept. 30, 1924, on file in the Robert M.
Hutchins papers at the Regenstein Library, University of Chicago [hereinafter cited as
Hutchins papers, withoutcross-reference]. The faculty did not particularly approve of this
method of earning credits. Once when approving credit for some of his work with Clark,
the faculty recommended that Hutchins take "some of the fundamental subjects given in
the regular course." Minutes of the Faculty of Yale Law School, Mar. 17, 1924 [hereinafter
cited as Yale Minutes, without cross-reference].
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and the two jointly published some of Hutchins' research.4"
Other faculty members seem to have liked this brash young man
too; in 1924 the faculty decided to try him out as a part-time lec-
turer the following fall.41
It was not long after Hutchins' arrival on the faculty that the
law school began to feel his presence. In January 1926, Hutchins
and Clark suggested offering honors courses, a proposal designed
to institutionalize Hutchins' own legal education. 42 A month later
the two presented a different kind of proposal: to "perform dis-
tinguished public service by assisting in the solution of the most
pressing problem in the law by scientific study of all procedure
in its functional, comparative, and historical aspects. 4 3 When
they found it necessary to justify their proposal, they began by
lamenting the low estate to which the administration of the law
had fallen, harking back to the criticisms of Bentham and Dickens
as well as noting similar complaints of contemporary leaders of
the bar.44 Then, after recounting the unsuccessful efforts at pro-
cedural reform and detailing contemporary efforts, including those
of the American Law Institute, they concluded: "The reformers
have failed, we believe, because the necessary basic research has
been lacking .... We regard facts as the prerequisite of reform."
41
Their prescription followed directly from their diagnosis: "We be-
lieve that the way to escape from the morass into which law ad-
ministration has fallen lies through study. This study should be
directed to discovering the working in practice of our present
rules. It should be correlated with the study of allied subjects out-
side the law."46 To carry out the necessary studies they proposed
to establish an Institute of Procedure, which would examine civil
and criminal procedure and evidence.
47
40. Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YAIE L.J. 259 (1925); Comment,
Modern Views of the Election of Remedies, 34 YALE L.J. 665 (1925).
41. Yale Minutes, Nov. 13, 1924. Hutchins was appointed Lecturer in Public Service
Law and Trade Regulation.
42. Yale Minutes, Jan. 21, 1926. An undated copy of the proposal entitled "Plan for
honors courses in the Yale School of Law" is in the Hutchins papers. The proposal was to
allow "men of Law Journal rank" to do all or most of their third year in directed re-
search. Id.
43. Yale Minutes, Feb. 25, 1926. An updated, untitled copy of the proposal is in the
Hutchins papers. The quotation is from the opening of that document.
44. A Program of Research in the Administration of the Law, App. A, at 1 (n.d.
Summer 1926?), Hutchins papers. This document is a proposal directed to the General
Education Board, a Rockefeller philanthropy, for a grant of approximately $125,000 for a
five-year pilot program.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 3.
47. In each field they proposed studies of the rules in force and the actual operation
of the rules, and comparative studies of both. A Program of Research in the Administra-
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The source of these ideas of Hutchins and Clark is unclear.48
Llewellyn, teaching at Columbia but still dabbling in Yale Law
School politics, probably had his hand in their formulation,49 but
that fact only broadens the question to include his sources also.
In one sense the ideas are too commonplace to have clear roots as
the reference to Bentham and Dickens might suggest. At least
since the 19th century, liberal intellectuals, and especially liberal
intellectual lawyers, have argued that the delays and uncertainties
in litigation are an evil crucially in need of reform. The lineage
of this idea can easily be traced, as it was by Hutchins and Clark, 0
through such events as the various English and American plead-
ing and practice reforms-the Hillary Rules and the Field Code,
for example; Roscoe Pound's St. Paul speech to the American Bar
Association on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice";5 and the founding of various legal
"reform" organizations, such as the American Judicative Society,
the American Law Institute, and the National Crime Commission.
The plausibility of this notion about the importance of procedural
reform and its equation with law reform generally is beside the
point;52 it was at hand and easily available to teachers of evidence
tion of the Law, supra note 44, at 2-4. The funds sought were for four half-time faculty
salaries, a research assistant for each, and library acquisitions. Id. at 6. From the salaries
mentioned and the interests noted it is apparent that the participants were to be Hutchins,
Clark, Leon A. Tulin, and a faculty member not then hired. Id. Although empirical work
was eventually contemplated, id. at 1, no funds were requested for such work.
Tulin, born in 1901, was a Yale graduate, B.A. 1922, LL.B. 1925. He became an assist-
ant professor at Yale in 1926 and moved to Columbia in 1929 as an associate professor.
He died in 1933.
48. The occasion of their formulation was a train ride by Hutchins and Clark in
December 1925. Clark had complained about the school and indicated his desire to leave.
Hutchins chided him about leaving without first trying to change anything. Clark agreed
and they thereupon drew up plans for the honors courses, the Institute of Procedure, and
limitations on enrollment. "We stood absolutely alone on all these matters and were
opposed at every step more or less actively by the Dean." Robert M. Hutchins to Samuel
H. Fisher (member of Yale Corporation), Feb. 24, 1927, on file in the Samuel H. Fisher
papers at the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University [hereinafter cited as Fisher
papers, without cross-reference].
49. See Karl N. Llewellyn to Robert M. Hutchins, May 6, 1926, Hutchins papers. See
also Robert M. Hutchins to Karl N. Llewellyn, May 17, 1926; Robert M. Hutchins to Karl
N. Llewellyn, May 21, 1926, Hutchins papers.
50. A Program of Research in the Administration of the Law, supra note 44, App. A,
at 1-2.
51. [1 9 06 ] REPORT OF THE AMEIUCAN BAR AssoClAnON 400.
52. The proposition that the reform of procedural law (together with the simplifica-
tion of substantive law) is law reform, must be counted as one of the stranger notions of
the bar. Intoned with monotonous regularity in its poundian mirror image-the admin-
istration of justice has brought disrespect upon the law-the proposition is notable for
the fact that evidence in its support, beyond the existence of dissatisfaction (also assumed)
and the assertion that the procedural deficiencies of interest to the speaker are its cause,
is virtually always lacking. Equally notable is the fact that such dissatisfaction with the
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and procedure such as Hutchins and Clark. Yet their explicit
criticism of the "reform" tradition for centering its attention "on
the presentation and adequacy of an ideal system" rather than on
"the working in practice of our present rules" and on "progress
in allied fields" is a distinct variation on the "reform" tradition
of which the proposal was a quite self-conscious part.5 Here, where
roots are an important matter, the proposal offers no insight. Of
course, there are echoes of Deweyan ethics, of the investigative
commissions that were a part of the strategy of countless progres-
sive reform movements of the 19 1 O's and earlier, and of a general
interest in, and perhaps even wonderment at,54 the scholarly re-
sources of the new university in which the two men found them-
selves; but evidence of a conscious drawing on any of these sources
is lacking. Apparently the sources, such as they were, were "in the
air,"5 ,5 and the two men just grabbed them."6
The faculty eventually adopted both the proposal to offer
honors courses57 and that for the Institute of Procedure, " but the
real impact of doing so on the activities of the school was no more
than marginal, as the short-term fate of the Institute demonstrates.
Although willing to approve the proposal, when asked to fund it
the Yale Corporation politely said, "No,"' 9 as did the General Edu-
administration of justice as there may be is always seen as "popular," and not professional.
Professor Marc Galanter has brought to my attention an excellent example of this con-
fusion of popular and professional dissatisfaction: the recent conference called by Mr.
Chief Justice Burger to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of Pound's address. See
70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
Although I have no difficulty in saying that this misidentification has allowed slightly
left-of-center lawyers to make their work simpler while supporting both "reform" and the
economic and political "status quo," see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JusTIcE (1976), the lineage
and function of this notion about what constitutes "law reform" is unimportant here.
What is important at this point is that the notion was available to Hutchins and Clark
and that they took it and used it, but in a different way than it had been used in the past.
53. A Program of Research in the Administration of the Law, supra note 44, App. A,
at S.
54. Hutchins repeatedly stressed this point. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June
20, 1975.
55. Id.
56. Tracing the intellectual roots of realist thought is made difficult because the
Realists did not usually identify the sources of their ideas. Where such identification is
made, as in Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions uppn Economics, 15 Ams. EcoN.
REv. 665 (1925), the citations tend to be general and to uncritically lump together rather
disparate thinkers, as in Llewellyn's list of "Summer, Holmes, Veblen, Commons and
Pound."
57. Yale Minutes, Feb. 11, 1926. The proposal was, however, watered down so as to
make honors work generally more available. See Hutchins, The Yale Law School in 1928,
2 CONN. B.J. 1, 3-5 (1928).
58. Yale Minutes, Mar. 11, 1926.
59. Minutes of Yale Corporation, June 14, 1926.
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cation Board.60 But the psychological impact of the two proposals
and of Hutchins' arrival generally was significant, as can be seen
by comparing such a mundane document as the dean's annual re-
port for academic year 1925-1926 with any of Dean Swan's earlier
reports. Although earlier reports had done nothing more than
note the comings and goings of faculty and students and lament
the low estate of the law school's quarters, this time Swan's report
suggested that the place was humming, largely with Hutchins' in-
spired proposals and more importantly with a new sense of pur-
pose: law improvement. For example, after beginning with the
"general recognition... that the rules of law and the machinery
for administering them need simplifying and adaptation to mod-
em conditions," Dean Swan noted that the founding of the Ameri-
can Law Institute and of committees to study defects in criminal
law and procedure as well as the attempt of a "sister university"
to acquire a large endowment for legal research were "familiar evi-
dences" of the generally acknowledged need for law improve-
ment.6 1 He then triumphantly concluded that Yale, too, knew what
was generally recognized and was going to do something about
this problem: establish an Institute of Procedure.
Dean Swan's report not only shows a change in the mood at
Yale that followed Hutchins' arrival but also suggests some of the
motivation for the change. The academic wing of the American
Law Institute's organizing committee contained all the Harvard
heavyweights-Beale, Pound and Williston-as well as the recently
arrived Edmund Morgan. Only Corbin represented Yale 2 The
pioneer study of criminal law and procedure, the Cleveland Crime
Survey, had been run by Pound and Felix Frankfurter.63 Harvard
had also recently sought an endowment for research in an amount
so large that it intimidated even the Columbia Law School.6
60. I infer this from the fact that a proposal was submitted, see note 44 supra, and
to the best of my knowledge, never funded.
61. Report of the School of Law to the President and Fellows of Yale University,
1925-26, at 110 [hereinafter cited as Report of Dean, without cross-reference].
62. On the organization of the ALI, see H. GOODRICH & P. WoLKIN, THE STORY OF
THE AMERICAN Lv IINSrrVruTE (1961).
63. See R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AhIERICAN Crry-A SUMMARY (1922). This
is one of seven separate studies collected as CRIMINAL JUsTIcE IN CLEvELAND (R. Pound &
F. Frankfurter eds. 1922). A short account of the project appears in A. SUTHERLAND, supra
note 80, at 271-72 (1967).
64. See A. SuTmmRLAND, supra note 80, at 262-70. The Columbia Curriculum Study
was moved in faculty on April 15, 1926, one day after The New Republic printed an
editorial in support of the Harvard endowment drive: Socializing Legal Education, THE
Nmv REPUBLIC 211 (1926) (the style suggests that Felix Frankfurter was the author). See
Young B. Smith?, Memorandum for the President (n.d.) on file in the papers of Underhill
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Thus, a note of inter-university warfare was hinted at in Dean
Swan's announcement, and indeed explicitly found in Hutchins'
and Clark's proposal for the Institute of Procedure"P-a note not
surprising in an up-and-coming law school. At the same time the
honors work, really the authorization of credit for independent,
directed research, was but another step toward improving the
quality of legal education at Yale, a step ahead, this time, of
Columbia and Harvard.66
Fall 1926 brought continued institutional rivalry and efforts
at the academization of legal education. This time Hutchins and
Clark proposed to abolish the privilege, which Hutchins had ex-
ercised, of Yale College men to begin legal studies in their senior
year.67 After approving this proposal the faculty finally adopted
an earlier Hutchins and Clark proposal to limit Yale's enroll-
ment, an action designed to improve the quality of the student
body and directed squarely at Harvard and Columbia."' Then, in
Moore at Sterling Library, Yale University [hereinafter cited as Moore papers, without
cross-referencej (explicit acknowledgement of stimulus). This study has now been chroni-
cled four times. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISroRY, A HISTORY OF THE ScHooL
OF LAtW, COLUMBIA UNIvxRsrrY 297-303 (1955); W. TWINING, supra note 14, at 45-52; Currie,
The Materials of Law Study, pt. 2, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955) (most comprehensive);
Stevens, supra note 17, at 471-75; see text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
65. Undated, untitled copy of proposal for an Institute of Procedure, Hutchins
papers. ("Purpose ... 5. To maintain and develop the present leading reputation of Yale
in the field of procedure, and in general to establish Yale as the pioneer in the practical,
coherent, unified study of the most chaotic and maladjusted branch of the law. (Must be
done to counteract Harvard's 6 million....)') Karl N. Llewellyn to Robert M. Hutchins,
May 6, 1926; Robert M. Hutchins to Karl N. Llewellyn, May 7, 1927, Hutchins papers.
66. Columbia followed suit in 1928 by allowing third year students to enroll in
seminars previously reserved for graduate students and, in 1929, by providing for directed
research. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 64, at 338. Harvard did
the same in 1939. A. SurHERLAND, supra note 30, at 340-41.
67. Yale Minutes, Nov. 18, 1926.
68. However, the Educational Policy Committee of the Yale Corporation refused to
approve this change in policy (Minutes of Committee on Educational Policy, Jan. 8,
1927) and a compromise was struck allowing "properly qualified" seniors in the college
tobegin law studies. See Hutchins, Connecticut and the Yale Law School, 2 CONN. B.j. 162
(1928) (details terms of admission).
69. Yale Minutes, Dec. 4, 1926. The attempt to limit enrollment dated at least to
1923, when Dean Swan recommended against any limit on the ground that relying too
heavily on grades would bring in students of "foreign" rather than "old American parent.
age," just the opposite of those Yale should be attracting, with the result that Yale would
have an "inferior student body, ethically and socially." Yale Minutes, Dec. 20, 1923.
Hutchins and Clark resurrected the proposal in 1926 as part of response to the Harvard
endowment drive. They proposed to turn Yale into an "honors or research law school"
of 300 students who would be trained "to discover the actual operation of the law rather
than to memorize its rules." Yale Minutes, May 6, 1926; Robert M. Hutchins to Karl N.
Llewellyn, May 7, 1926, Hutchins papers. Two weeks later the proposal was effectively
tabled. Yale Minutes, May 20, 1926; Robert M. Hutchins to Karl N. Llewellyn, May 21,
1926, Hutchins papers. The reason for the change in outcome seems to have been that
Corbin, who had been undecided in May, became a supporter of the idea in November.
[Vol., 28
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
late December, Dean Swan was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuity
The only real candidates to succeed Swan as dean were Cook,
thought by many to be too cantankerous to be an effective dean
over any long term, Clark, Thurston, and perhaps Vance, none
of whom had sufficient support to achieve the consensus that the
faculty desired.7 1 Part of the faculty had, however, reached some
agreement; the untenured people announced that they supported
only candidates with "the views and policies with which Mr. Cook
has been identified." 72 Sensing that the faculty was deeply divided,
Corbin, already its grand old man, proposed that Hutchins, who
apparently had already been suggested as associate dean, be ap-
pointed acting dean 7 3 The tenured faculty agreed to the nomina-
tion and so did the corporation.7 4
Whether Hutchins was supposed to be a caretaker or whether
a permanent compromise had already been struck by the law
faculty is unclear. He thought that the truth was somewhere in
See Yale Minutes, Nov. 24, 1926. From the beginning, Hutchins and Llewellyn recognized
that Corbin's support was essential. See Karl N. Llewellyn to Robert M. Hutchins, May 6,
1926; Robert M. Hutchins to Karl N. Llewellyn, May 7, 1926; May 14, 1926, Hutchins
papers.
The limit of 100 students to an entering class was a trifle fraudulent since Yale had
not regularly enrolled more than that amount. T. ArNoLD, FAIR FIrrs AND FOUL 35 (1965).
However, the decision was successful in increasing interest in Yale and thus indirectly in
improving the quality of the student body. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20,
1975.
70. Yale Minutes, Dec. 23, 1926.
71. Interview with Leon Green, June 19, 1975; James R. Angell to James P. Hall,
Jan. 3, 1927, Angell papers; Yale Minutes, Jan. 12, 1927. Angell had complicated the task
of selecting a new dean by refusing to let Swan remain in office while on the bench-
something Arthur T. Hadley, Angell's predecessor, had allowed Henry Wade Rogers,
Swan's predecessor, to do when he was nominated to the Second Circuit. Yale Minutes,
Dec. 23, 1926; M. ScHicK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 59 (1971).
72. Yale Minutes, Jan. 12, 1927.
73. Yale Minutes, Jan. 28, 1927. Although the faculty had sworn to Angell that there
was no division of opinion on the questions of educational policy underlying the choice
of dean, "except ones of degree and some of details," Yale Minutes, Jan. 6, 1927, a sub-
sequent faculty meeting at which the question of new appointments was discussed had
disclosed exactly how divided the faculty was. Yale Minutes, Jan. 19, 1927. Robert M.
Hutchins to William J. Hutchins (father), Jan. 18, 1927, Hutchins papers ("The situation
... is growing more and more complicated and more and more tense."). Hutchins pre-
dicted that with "24 of the 25 candidates mentioned" for dean, his becoming assistant
"would be certain to prove fatal within 48 hours." The one exception was apparently
Cook, whom Hutchins supported. Id. Robert M. Hutchins to Walter W. Cook, Feb. 9,
1927, Hutchins papers ("I wish we had found it possible to put you over because I think
the School will require the kind of leadership that only you can supply.").
74. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Feb. 12, 1927. Not that approval of the nomina-
tion was a cinch. The Educational Policy Committee of the Corporation approved the
nomination by one vote, a tie-breaking vote cast by the Comptroller of the University.
Minutes of the Educational Policy Committee of the Yale Corporation, Feb. 12, 1927.
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between.75 What is clear however, and what suggests that the first
possibility is not the appropriate one, is that with its vote the
faculty got a whirlwind. One week later Hutchins created a com-
mittee that consisted of himself, Clark and Corbin to schedule
classes and prepare the catalog.7 6 Two weeks later this committee
reported on appointments!7 7 And where two weeks before the
faculty had debated the relative merits of such standard scholars
as Bigelow and Seavey,78 now it was in succession asked to appoint
Richard J. Smith,79 a recent graduate interested in Public Utili-
ties, Hutchins' own course; Donald Slesinger, a psychologist in-
terested in the law of evidence, another Hutchins course; and
Bronislaw Malinowski, for a course in legal anthropology.s0 At the
same time the report of a commercial law committee, headed by
Wesley Sturges, signaled the onset of curriculum reform just like
Columbia's, and this endeavor was urged on with a pep talk given
by two of Columbia's more dedicated reformers. 1 Thus, if drive
and activity were relevant qualities for a dean, whether Hutchins
had been intended as a caretaker or in fact as a compromise can-
didate, when it came time for the search committee to act it would
have been hard for it to select anyone else. Not that the faculty
was of a mind to do so, although some of its members were less
than ecstatic with Hutchins; 2 at least one prominent legal scholar,
John Henry Wigmore, thought the idea preposterous,M and promi-
75. Robert M. Hutchins to William G. Hutchins (brother), Feb. 4, 1927, Hutchins
papers ("The theory is that I am too young and wild . . .but that if I conduct myself
with due circumspection ... the faculty might ...be willing to consider an appoint-
ment for a longer term.').
76. Yale Minutes, Feb. 3, 1927.
77. Yale Minutes, Feb. 17, 1927.
78. Harry A. Bigelow, LL.B. 1899, Harvard, was at the time a 53-year-old teacher of
Property at the University of Chicago; later he became a reporter on the Restatement
of Property. Warren A. Seavey, LL.B. 1904, Harvard, was at the time a 47-year-old teacher
of Agency and Torts on his way between the deanship at Nebraska and an appointment
at Harvard. When the two names were first suggested, Cook had argued that both men
were fine for "prestige" but not for "long run development." Yale Minutes, Jan. 19, 1927.
79. b. 1903. A.B. 1924, Catholic Univ.; LL.B. 1927, Yale. Teaching fellow 1927, instruc-
tor 1928, asst. prof. 1929, assoc. prof. 1932, Yale; private practice, 1933. Social Science Re-
search Council Fellowship, London, 1929-30.
80. Yale Minutes, Feb. 24, 1927; Mar. 10, 1927; May 5, 1927.
81. Karl N. Llewellyn and Leon C. Marshall, Yale Minutes, Apr. 21, 1927; Apr. 28,
1927. For details of the Columbia study, see sources at note 64 supra, and text accompany-
ing notes 91-93 infra.
82. See W. R. Vance to James R. Angell, Apr. 15, 1927, Angell papers. Vance was
chairman of the deanship search committee and titular head of the faculty's right wing.
83. John H. Wigmore to James R. Angell, Apr. 1, 1927, Angell papers. Wigmore
recounted how Hutchins had read a paper on the psychology of evidence at the Round-
table on Remedies at the 1926 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools that
was "behaviorist of the extreme type" and thus "so far in advance of my radical ...
[views] as to leave me in the classification of fossils ... ." Wigmore considered this paper
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nent alumni favored aged practitioners. 4 Thus, in late May 1927,
when the search committee summarized its work,"5 it supported its
nominee by stressing the youth of Ames when he was appointed
dean at Harvard, the need for a candidate who was both a legal
educator and a Yale College graduate, and the desirabilty of con-
tinuing the "scientific" Hohfeldian tradition" at Yale. President
evidence of unfitness because devotion to extreme "behaviorism in psychology" like that of
"the free silver craze in economics" raised "suspicion of . .. [a lack of] balance," because
a "jaunty and witty but irresponsible dismissal of the recorded experiences of lawyers
and judges" indicated "an unscientific and unsafe attitude towards the law," and because
the attitude underlying the paper "would tend to unsettle the minds of young men in
these days when they are already only too much inclined to cast away . . . all prior ex-
perience." Angell sent a copy of the letter to Hutchins with the following note: "I get
the impression that you must have stepped on some of his most sensitive corns." James R.
Angell to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 3, 1927, Angell papers. No copy of Hutchins' paper
seems to have survived. See note 101 supra.
84. Thomas W. Thatcher to James R. Angell, Jan. 28, 1927 (Charles P. Howland,
Lansing P. Reed); William Howard Taft to James R. Angell, Jan. 27, 1927 (Morris Hadley),
Angell papers.
85. The report, untitled, is found with Yale Minutes, Apr. 13, 1927.
86. Wesley N. Hohfeld had come from Stanford in 1914 after impressing the Yale
faculty with a paper entitled Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YAum LJ. 16 (1913). See W. TwING, supra note 14, at 34. In Fundamental
Legal Conceptions, Hohfeld attempted to show the analytical relationship between the
concepts of right, privilege, power, and immunity and their opposites. As even this short
description suggests, his work was "scientific" only in the older sense of that word, mean-
ing scholarly or rationally derived. The article was well enough received that Hohfeld
was invited to give a paper at the 1914 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
The product, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law, 1914 A.A.L.S. HANDrooK 76, is
an equally rationalist analytic presentation of an ideal school for training jurists, practi-
tioners, and citizens. The popularity of Hohfeldian analysis and the contemporary under-
standing that it was "scientific" seems quaint today, especially since the analytic system
bears some of the hallmarks of what might uncharitably be called crank legal philosophy.
The popularity and the scientific appellation might both be explained in part by the
intellectual currents of the 1910's in the law schools.
While the law teachers were developing their professional identity, the major intel-
lectual novelty among them was the spread of continental legal learning through the
Modera Legal Philosophy series, the Continental Legal History series, and the beginning
of comparative law studies. This exposure brought considerable respect, if not envy, for
the achievements of German legal academics in rationalizing German customary law be-
fore the adoption of the German Civil Code in 1896. Such work had been seen as scientific
in Europe and called such by Langdell; a similar scientific role for the new American pro-
fessionals seemed desirable. Hohfeld's Vital School suggested such a role, id. at 86-96, and
the dean at Wisconsin made a similar suggestion in 1915. Richards, A Survey of the
Progress in Legal Education, 1915 A.A.L.S. HANDBoor 60, 75-76. These two items are the
immediate roots of the American Law Institute's Restatement Project. See W. TWINING,
supra note 14, at 458 n. 19.
At the same time Hohfeld's role in these events should not be overestimated. Analytic
schemes, like those presented by Hohfeld, designed to bring system and order to the com-
mon law were numerous at the time. See, e.g., Beale, The Necessity for the Study of
Legal System, 1914 A.A.LS. HANDBOOK 31, 42-43. And, projects virtually identical to the
Restatement had surfaced earlier. See Alexander, Memorandum in re Corpus Juris, 22
GREEN BAG 59 (1910).
Given that Hohfeld was well known for his system, it is not surprising that when
appointing Hutchins, the Yale faculty would advert to the only glorious bit of its then
recent past, even though that evocation meant equating Hutchins' science with Hohfeld's
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Angell approved the nomination although he cautioned that. "it
might be desirable to defer making the appointment" until some
later date . 7 Hutchins was still a month shy of his twenty-eighth
birthday.
In a sense, how Robert Maynard Hutchins became dean of
the Yale Law School is neither distinctive nor unusually auspi-
cious. Many a law school feeling itself on the threshold of some-
thing special has hired a bright, dynamic young man to be its dean.
The sameness of American law schools provides an adequate obitu-
ary for most of their high hopes. Yet, under Hutchins something
special did develop, if only for a while. Thus, what Yale thought
it was doing when it hired its bright, dynamic young man should
be remembered, if only as a baseline against which to view the
decade to follow during which American Legal Realism meant, in
large measure, the Yale Law School.
Yale's deanship search committee stressed three things in its
report: Ames and Harvard, legal educator and Yale, and science
and Hohfeld. This list is a good clue to the meaning of Hutchins'
election to the Yale faculty. Hutchins was the first unpracticed,
purely scholar-lawyer dean at Yale just as Ames had been at Har-
vard, and much of Hutchins' early efforts were directed toward
improving the law school's academic program.88 These efforts were
and thus misunderstanding the nature of Hohfeldian science. Curiously, Hohfeld would
not have made the same mistake; at one point in A Vital School, Hohfeld actually refers
to empirical studies and distinguishes them from his own scientific pursuits. 1914 A.A.L.S.
HANDoox 76, 110.
87. Yale Minutes, May 26, 1927. Angell was extremely cautious in dealing with the
nomination, which was made pursuant to a power held by the faculty and not by him
or the Corporation. He moved first for Hutchins' appointment as a full professor, then,
four months later, for his reappointment as acting dean, and finally, two months after
that, for his as dean. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, June 11, 1927; Oct. 8, 1927;
Dec. 10, 1927. Each time, the appointment was presented to the Corporation from outside
normal bureaucratic channels.
88. Here Hutchins' idea of academic improvement and Swan's should be contrasted.
Swan improved Yale by buying established faculty wholesale-in four years he acquired
half the faculty at Minnesota: Lorenzen, Morgan, Thurston and Vance-and by promoting
good local talent-Clark, Llewellyn, Tulin, and Woodbine. Almost instantaneously Yale
was a good law school in the by then traditional model. Hutchins eschewed this mode of
development. His suggested appointments were anything but traditional and his projects
for academic improvement squarely challenged the traditional model, for they suggested
that improvement would come not by doing things better but by doing things differently
in both teaching and research. All of which is not to say that Hutchins lacked bridges
to the tradition of academic reform in law schools. The proposal to eliminate the ability
of Yale College seniors to begin their law studies a year early is directly within the
pattern of reform through the raising of formal standards that Stevens, note 17 supra,
chronicles so thoroughly. But its companion, the proposal to formally limit the number
of students admitted was not, and was contested because it conflicted with that tradition;
it threatened to cut out of law school the "C" student, not just the poor immigrants.
See note 68 supra; Robert M. Hutchins to Charles E. Clark, May 7, 1926; May 14, 1926;
May 21, 1926, Hutchins' papers.
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important to the Yale faculty because, given the academic politics
of the time, unless it was thoroughly academic Yale could not say
that it had become a truly first-class law school, and because being
as good as or better than Harvard was part of the inter-university
rivalry that accompanied an advance to the front rank. At the
same time, the mention of science and Hohfeld served a dual pur-
pose. The only glorious, independent tradition at Yale that might
set it apart from Harvard and Columbia was Hohfeldian and
"scientific," and Hutchins' actions with respect to both the Insti-
tute of Procedure and the proposed appointments fit into that
tradition.8 9 His appointment was thus useful as a part of the exist-
ing rivalry and as a statement on the part of a law faculty worried
about its degree of support from Yale's scientist-president James
Rowland Angell. The Yale Law School, too, was going to be scien-
tific, whatever that meant, as well as academic. Whether the facul-
ty's worry was well-founded is unimportant. Given its worry,
Hutchins was desirable because he would be doubly attractive to
Angell. He was a friend and former employee as well as bearer
of an academic, scientific mission that seemed to suit the presi-
dent's biases. And thus as a personal, if not political compromise,
Hutchins was a hard candidate to top.
Academic respectability, scientific distinctiveness, competitive-
ness, and a certain notoriety (Hutchins was the youngest member
of the Yale law faculty and more than twenty years younger than
was Ames when elected dean at Harvard) were all bought by Yale
when it nominated Hutchins. Whether it also bought or merely
accepted Hutchins' style of academic leadership is, however, an-
other matter.
B. A Pattern of Activity
The whirlwind did not stop with Robert Hutchins' formal
nomination as dean or with his belated election to that post by
the Yale Corporation. Indeed, if anything it grew stronger, for it
reflected Hutchins' personal style.
89. There was another tradition available at Yale, that deriving from Simeon E.
Baldwin, professor at Yale from 1872 to 1919, Judge of Connecticut Court of Errors &
Appeals from 1893-1910, Governor of Connecticut from 1910-1914, and founder of the
American Bar Association. But that tradition was simply unavailable both academically
and politically. Baldwin stood for the "Yale method" of instruction that was discarded
in the 1910's when Yale adopted the case method and for conservative politics to the
right of even the right wing of the Yale faculty in 1926. See F. JACKSON, SimEON EBEN
BALDWIN: LAwYER, SOCIAL SCIENTIST, STATESMAN (1955); Leon Green to John Henry Schlegel,
June 4, 1975.
90. See note 87 supra.
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A good place to start an examination of Hutchins' style is one
of the first areas he turned to upon becoming acting dean: cur-
riculum reform. In spring 1926, responding to internal pressures
from Herman Oliphant and Underhill Moore and also to Har-
vard's drive for an increase in endowment, the Columbia Law
School faculty decided to restudy its curriculum in order to re-
arrange the substance of the law into functional categories "in
terms of the human relations dealt with," and, not incidentally,
thus to achieve a distinctiveness apart from Harvard. 1 This major
undertaking, begun in spring 1927 and actively participated in by
the entire faculty, was carried on as a faculty seminar, led by Leon
C. Marshall, a personal friend of Oliphant from the University of
Chicago.2 Marshall was an economist and former business school
dean. As an expert on business education, he brought to the reform
effort an acute understanding of functional organization of a cur-
riculum, a system pioneered in the business schools 3 Counting
91. On curriculum reform at Columbia, see the sources cited at note 64 supra.
Oliphant began agitating for curriculum reform in the fall of 1923. Oliphant, The Re-
vision of the Law School Curriculum, Oct. 29, 1923, Moore papers (memo to the Cur-
riculum Committee ?). The quoted material is found at id., at 8. The explicit attempt to
be different from Harvard is found at id., at 3-4, 5. See also Young B. Smith ?, Memo-
randum for the President 2 (n.d.), Moore papers (justifying Marshall's appointment).
Oliphant sent this memo to Columbia's President Nicholas Murray Butler and not a long
letter as reported in Foundation for Research in Legal History, note 64 supra, at 299.
Cf. Herman Oliphant to the Committee on Curriculum, Nov.?, 1923, Moore papers (de-
tailing the response of former Columbia Dean Harlan F. Stone to the same document).
For Moore's participation, see Underhill Moore to James C. Bonbright, Apr. 28, 1924;
James C. Bonbright to Underhill Moore, Apr. 5, 1924; Huger W. Jervey (Dean) to Under-
hill Moore and Herman Oliphant, Apr. ?, 1926 (appointment to committee to make ar-
rangements for Marshall's seminar), Moore papers.
92. See Currie, supra note 64, at 1, 9 n.22. Marshall's appointment was justified to
Columbia's president only in part by his leadership of the seminar. His appointment was
primarily justified as the second step of a general plan to integrate "law and the allied
sciences, such as economics and sociology." Thus he was supposed to coordinate the work
in commercial law with "underlying economic problems" and "the actual structure and
working of ... business life"--apparently the work he did during the latter half of his
one and one-half year appointment. Young B. Smith ?, Memorandum for the President
1, 4 (n.d.), Moore papers. The first step of the plan was said to have been the appoint-
ment of Alexander M. Kidd, a teacher of criminal law and criminology at the Law School
of the University of California, Berkeley. See Foundation for Research in Legal History,
note 64 supra, at 286-87. Kidd came in fall 1926, apparently on a two-year appointment.
He left as scheduled. Cf. Alexander M. Kidd to Underhill Moore, June 10, 1929, Moore
papers ('I would not have missed my two years there even if I had known in the be-
ginning that it was going to fail at Columbia.").
93. See Marshall, The Collegiate School of Business at Erehwon, in L. MARSHALL,
THE COLLEGIATE SCHOOL OF BusINEss (1928) (reprint from 34 J. PoL. EcoN. 289 [1926));
Marshall, The American Collegiate School of Business, in HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERIuCA
78, 102 (R. Kent ed. 1930); H. DREISER, A BRIEr HISrORY or THE UNIvERsITY or CHICAGO,
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BusINEsS 6-10 (n.d.). Marshall's functional curriculum for a business
school was "finance, labor, risk and risk bearing, marketing, production, and accounting."
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the time necessary for the production of course materials, the
project was sustained for about five years and parts of its revision
of the curriculum are still generally accepted fifty years later.
In contrast, no one would call Yale's attempts at curriculum
reform either sustained or major. The work of the commercial law
group, headed by Wesley Sturges and announced in spring 1927,
just three months after the start of the Columbia seminar,9 4 seems
never to have been reported back to the faculty. Yet the following
fall similar groups in procedure and criminal law were estab-
lished. 5 While the procedure group, chaired by Charles Clark,
easily accomplished its limited business of creating an advanced
procedure course out of common law pleading and equity, the
criminal law committee-Hutchins and Leon Tulin-managed to
come to a faculty meeting essentially unprepared, so that its pro-
posal had to be rescued on the spot by, of all people, Arthur Cor-
bin." Then, in spring 1928, Hutchins announced that the curricu-
lum "correlation" was not going to work if current procedures
were followed and that he was going to appoint a special cur-
riculum committee consisting of Walton H. Hamilton, Donald
Slesinger, Arthur Goodhardt, a visiting professor from Oxford, and
Charles P. Howland of Yale's Department of Economics, Sociology
and Government." Although support for the proposal was regis-
tered, apparently a committee of two nonlawyers and two out-
siders was too much even for Yale, and the following week the
faculty decided to proceed with weekly reports, group by group,
course by course, starting with business courses. 98 But, after a quick
start with reports on agency, an old nonfunctional course, and
credit transactions, a new, functional course, the program lagged
Marshall, The Collegiate School of Business at Erehwon, supra at 170 (emphasis added).
At Columbia the study was broken up into finance, labor, risk and risk bearing, market-
ing, form of business unit, law administration, criminal law, family and familial property,
legislation, and historical and comparative jurisprudence. Marshall picked up form of
business unit as a junior college prerequisite. Id. at 170 n.9. Oliphant had picked up
these five divisions in his first memo. Herman Oliphant to Committee on Curriculum,
Oct. 29, 1923, Moore papers, as well as law administration, criminal law, and family and
familial property.
94. See text accompanying note 91 supra. The commercial law group had been di-
vided up, exactly like that at Columbia: form of business organization, finance, marketing,
risk, and personnel. Yale Minutes, Apr. 21, 1927.
95. Yale Minutes, Oct. 7, 1927. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1926-27, at 116 (course in
criminal law, a "survey of crimes that no longer exist").
96. Yale Minutes, Nov. 10, 1927; Nov. 17, 1927.
97. Yale Minutes, Mar. 22, 1928.




and with a report on corporations was never heard from again. 9
In the end, curriculum reform at Yale proceeded in the time-
honored way with the acquisition of new faculty members who
brought new courses with them and the departure of old faculty
members who took their old courses away.
Hutchins' attempt to understand the psychology of the law
of evidence is an equally revealing example of his style of leader-
ship. In December 1926, Hutchins, who had just begun teaching
evidence for the first time (although he had previously published
a rather devastating case note on a crucial evidentiary point in the
Sacco-Vanzetti case) 00 read a paper on evidence at an A.A.L.S.
round table in which, according to Wigmore, he took an extreme
behaviorist position.01 The following spring, Hutchins, appar-
ently feeling that he needed some technical advice on the subject
of psychology, brought to Yale Donald Slesinger, 0 2 a psychologist
with a background in testing, whom Hutchins had discovered
while looking for money for another project.10 3 Slesinger tried
to talk Hutchins out of the proposition, implicit in his offer of a
99. Yale Minutes, Apr. 12, 1928; Apr. 19, 1928; May 3, 1928.
100. Note, Cross-Examination to Impeach, 36 YALE L.J. 384 (1926). This note and
other activity on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti brought forth a protest from Chief Justice
Taft. William Howard Taft to James R. Angel, May 1, 1927, Angell papers. (Letter con-
taining the complaint that Felix Frankfurter seems to be "closely in touch with every
Bolshevistic communist movement in this country").
101. The topic of the round table was "Psychology, Deception Tests, and the Law
of Evidence." 1926 HANDBOOK AND PROCeEINrs or ASSOCIATON OF AmERICAN LAW SctIoois
92. Wigmore's characterization comes from John H. Wigmore to James R. Angell, Apr. 1,
1927, Angell papers. From an examination of the article that "grew out of" the paper,
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARV. L.
Rav. 860 (1928), and from Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence-The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YAL.E L.J. 1017 (1928), I suspect that the paper
was not behaviorist in the sense of specifically following the psychology of John B. Wat-
son, but rather in the much looser sense of using experimental studies of the psychology
of human perception and intelligence. Cf. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REy. 725 (1929) (unusual eclecti-
cism). Thus Hutchins' error was probably more that of disagreeing with Dean Wigmore
than anything else. See John H. Wigmore to Robert M. Hutchins, Dec. 9, 1926, Hutchins
papers ("As to the empiric psychology of testimonial error ... the question of material
is shown in my Principles of Judicial Proof and in my ... reply to Professor Munster-
berg.); Robert M. Hutchins to Justin Miller (chairman of round table), Apr. 12, 1926,
Hutchins papers ("At the time of Wardman's [sic] reply to Munsterberg the statements of
the learned dean of Northwestern were probably correct. I doubt if they are today."). The
relevant cites are H. MuNn7rEIERG, ON THE WrrNss STAND (1908); Wigmore, Professor
Munsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L. REv. 39 (1908).
102. b. 1897. A.B. 1920, Columbia. Judge Baker Foundation 1920; National Com-
mission on Mental Hygiene 1921; Cherry Lawn School 1923; Laura Spellman Rockefeller
Memorial 1926; Sterling Fellow 1927, research associate 1928, asst. prof. 1929, Yale; prof.
1931, Chicago; Dir. Dept. of Ed. N.Y. World's Fair 1937; Exec. Dir. American Film Center
1938; analytic psychology practice 1947. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Obituary).
103. Interview with Donald Slesinger, July 8, 1975. Slesinger, who was working in
criminology at the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial, came to Yale in the fall 1927.
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job, that psychology could contribute to an understanding of the
law of evidence.104 But he came to Yale nonetheless, first on a
fellowship, then as a research associate. Hutchins set to work on
his case law research; Slesinger, on finding what little in the psy-
chology literature was relevant to the evidentiary problems they
had chosen to discuss. Subsequently, Hutchins learned from
Charles K. Ogden that Bertrand Russell thought Mortimer Adler,
then in the psychology department at Columbia, was doing the
best work in philosophy in America and that Adler was interested
in the law of evidence. 05 Hutchins sought out Adler and, after
meeting him and his collaborator, Jerome Michael of the Colum-
bia Law School, apparently became concerned that Adler's work
with Michael might turn out to be better than his own work with
Slesinger.10 Hutchins proposed to work jointly with them and
secured a grant for the purpose from the Commonwealth Fund.
10 7
Little joint work was produced, however, though it is hard to be-
lieve that anyone thought such work might have been done given
the divergence of the two groups' initial interests.0 Hutchins and
Slesinger published their series of articles between 1928 and
1929.109 Each was an examination and criticism of a classic prob-
104. Interview with Donald Slesinger, July 8, 1975.
105. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975. Several readers have sug-
gested that this story is dubious, at least to the extent of reporting Russell's actual opinion
of Adler's work. Although Donald Slesinger could neither confirm nor deny the story, I
have no reason to doubt that this was Hutchins' understanding. M. ADLER, PHILosoPBEn
AT LARGE 107-08 (1977) while not supportive is consistent. Hutchins would surely have
been amused at this hearsay problem.
106. Interview with Donald Slesinger, July 8, 1975.
107. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1927-28, at 114. See Yale Minutes, Jan. 15, 1928. All
of this must have happened in summer and fall 1927. Adler met Hutchins in July, M.
ADLER, supra note 105, at 108; Michael did not start at Columbia until fall; Hutchins and
Slesinger began publishing their articles noting the collaboration in spring 1928. Adler's
story (M. ADLER, supra note 105, at 111) that Hutchins "engaged" Slesinger to work with
him after Adler informed Hutchins that he could not come to Yale seems unlikely. See
Yale Minutes, Mar. 10, 1927 (Slesinger's appointment).
108. From the beginning, Michael and Adler emphasized their interest in logic. Al-
though they talked of doing work like that of Hutchins and Slesinger, they started with
a comparative study of the "logical structure of trial and experimental procedure" and
hoped "to state the law of evidence as logical doctrine, in geometrical form." CURRENT
R.sEARCH IN LAW, 1928-29, at 71 (M. Harron ed.). (This short-lived serial, issued by the
Johns Hopkins Institute of Law, gives an unusually complete picture. of the range of
legal research both within and without the law schools.)
109. Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 CoLum. L. Rav. 482 (1928);
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HA.v. L. REv. 860 (1928); Some
Observations on the Law of Evidence-The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017
(1928); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38
YA L.J. 283 (1929); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind in Issue,
29 COLUM. L. Ray. 147 (1929); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Consciousness
of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1929); and Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675 (1929).
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lem in the law of evidence-for example, the use of a recorded
past recollection to "refresh" present memory or the use of past
statements of intention to prove the doing of the act intended-
first through a review of the relevant case law and commentary
and then through a review of the relevant psychological literature.
The articles were of a generally high quality, although their effec-
tiveness varied directly with respect to the quality and relevance
of the underlying psychological literature: where good quantita-
tive, behavioral studies were available, the articles were crisp and
their criticisms effective; 110 where an older, introspective psychol-
ogy or new freudian psychology provided the studies, the articles
tended to be less well focused and their criticisms weak."' Michael's
and Adler's contribution to the enterprise did not appear until
1931.112 And although Hutchins planned "experimental work" to
test out the theories set out in the articles and although Slesinger
left Yale to follow Hutchins to Chicago in order to do that work,
no experimental work was ever done, largely because Hutchins and
Adler headed off in wholly different directions. 3
Better than by curriculum reform or in the evidence studies,
the style of the Hutchins deanship is captured by the story of the
founding of the Institute of Human Relations. That story begins
not with Hutchins but with a man named Milton C. Winternitz,
a "steam engine in pants"'1 4 and another one of President Angell's
bright young men.
Hutchins first published a popular version of the series. Hutchins, The Law and the
Psychologists, 16 YALE REv. 678 (1927). Hutchins and Slesinger also published a selective
condensation of the series. Hutchins & Slesinger, Legal Psychology, 36 PsYCH. REv. 13 (1929).
110. See, e.g., Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, supra note 109; Some Ob.
servations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, supra note 109.
111. See, e.g., Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind to Prove
an Act, supra note 109; Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Family Relations,
supra note 109.
112. J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1931); Michael &
Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 CoLuar. L. REv. 1224 (1934); Michael & Adler,
The Trial of an Issue of Fact: II, id. at 1462.
113. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1928-29, at 8; Interview with Donald Slesinger, July
8, 1975. For Hutchins' later attitude, see The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 1 U.
Cm. L. REv. 511, 518 (1934), a typically overdrawn Hutchins presentation. It is perhaps
only curious that Hutchins' turn to the "rational sciences of Ethics and Politics," id. at
517, was in part a return to the Hohfeldian "scientific" tradition so prominently noted
when Hutchins was elected dean. See note 86 supra.
114. G. PIERSON, supra note 19, at 260 (quoting James R. Angell). Winternitz was
born in 1885. He was graduated in 1907 with an M.D. degree from Johns Hopkins where
he taught and did research in pathology until going to Yale. When he resigned as dean
in 1935, he remained at Yale and he returned to teaching and research. He retired in 1950
and died in 1959. There is a short, uncritical biography of him: C. Winslow, Dean




Winternitz was appointed dean of the Yale Medical School
in 1921, just before Angell took office. At that time the school
was in desperate straits, if it had not in fact collapsed.11, By the
time Winternitz resigned fifteen years later, the school was out-
standing. 116 In between, Winternitz faced numerous problems,
only one of which is relevant for present purposes: Yale had no
psychiatry department.
In the mid-twenties Winternitz and Angell set out to do
something about that deficiency. After much study and one false
start, they proposed to create an Institute of Human Behavior,
bringing "into geographic continuity, probably in the same build-
ing, the various sciences associated with behavior, chiefly human
behavior."'1 7 In the fall of 1927, a proposal was made to one of
the Rockefeller philanthropies for a grant of $4.3 million to be-
gin this enterprise.'" All the money requested was for the primary
benefit of the psychiatry department, except for the office space in
the Institute's building needed for other participants-the depart-
ment of psychology and the Institute of Experimental Psychology,
and the department of research in child hygiene." 9
For some reason this plan did not excite foundation interest.
But rather than cut back the scope of the proposal, during winter
1927-28, Winternitz and his good friend Hutchins created an
115. B. Kelley, supra note 28, at 380. Through resignations the school had dropped
to an effective faculty of four.
116. Id. at SO-81.
117. Report of Dean Winternitz, 1925-26, at 79. In 1925, Angell announced that the
necessary funds had been secured. What actually materialized from the Commonwealth
Foundation was a small grant for personnel that was used to bring in consultants to get
work in psychiatry started. See id. at 85. In 1926, one of the Rockefeller Foundations Was
approached unsuccessfully. James R. Angell to Wickliff Rose (General Education Board),
Oct. 26, 1926, Angell papers (Angell and Hutchins' predecessor as Secretary to the Yale
Corporation, Anson Phelps Stokes, sat on the board of this Rockefeller philanthropy.).
118. James R. Angell to Barry Smith (Commonwealth Foundation), Nov. 7, 1927,
Angell papers. Real progress was not made until two months later. James R. Angell to
George E. Vincent (Rockefeller Foundation), Jan. 5, 1928, Angell papers. The document
submitted was apparently a memorandum by Winternitz, dated March 1927, to be found
as Appendix A in A Program for an Institute of Human Relations at Yale University,
May 20, 1928, Moore papers [hereinafter cited as A Program].
119. The Institute of Experimental Psychology was established in 1924 with a gift
from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Foundation as part of a plan to separate psychology
from the control of the philosophy department, a plan that finally succeeded in 1928. This
Institute brought to Yale three famous scholars: Raymond Dodge, a psychologist, Clark
Wissler, an anthropologist, and Robert M. Yerkes, the anthropoid psychologist. See James
R. Angell to Lawrence K. Frank (Rockefeller Foundation), Nov. 13, 1928, Angell papers.
The department of research in child hygiene was the private preserve of Arnold
Gesell, one of the pioneer American scholars in the study of child development. Since
1911 it had been supported by grants from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Foundation.
See A. GsEzu., ATLAs OF INFANT BEHAVIOR (1934).
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even more grand plan.120 They proposed to establish an "Insti-
tute" located across town from the main campus, near the medical
school, to house the sciences interested in human behavior, both
individual and social, and at the same time to erect a new law
school building adjacent to the Institute.'12 What was to hold these
two pieces of an idea together was the notion that the three units
would form a center for the study of human behavior in both its
theoretical (Institute) and applied (law and medicine) aspects. 22
The major change in the financial details of the proposal for
the new "Institute," now renamed the Institute of Human Rela-
tions,12 was the addition of money for research in the social sci-
ences; money for the law school's new building was to come from
elsewhere.:' Thus, under the new proposal the medical school
would still get its psychiatry department, but the law school would
get only the right to make a claim, one of several, on a fund for
research. Moreover, any benefits that would accrue to the law
school from the fact of its location in the center would depend on
its securing construction of a new building at the appropriate
place. All other things being equal, that might have been a rela-
tively easy task; however, all other things were not equal. The law
school had already secured a pledge of funds for a new building
on a different site. 12 And what would happen to the plan if this
120. Winternitz and Hutchins had been meeting regularly for lunch at least since
spring 1926. See Robert M. Hutchins to Karl Llewellyn, May 4, 1926, Hutchins papers
("The experience of the Medical School points the way that the Law School should go.").
Hutchins later said the two men were good friends. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins,
June 20, 1975. They corresponded regularly, although only socially, while Hutchins was
at the University of Chicago. All available sources suggest that Hutchins and Winternitz
thought up the idea. G. PIERSON, supra note 19, at 590 n.12, traces the idea back to Jan-
uary 1928. The first general mention of the plan to the law school's faculty is in Yale
Minutes, Feb. 20, 1928, a special faculty meeting.
121. Report of Dean Wintemitz, 1927-28, at 70. Yale Minutes, Feb. 20, 1928.
122. Report of Dean Winternitz, 1927-28, at 73-75.
123. Why the Institute's name was changed is mysterious. Hutchins said it was
changed because "Human Behavior" had too behaviorist an overtone for Howell Cheney, an
influential member of the Corporation. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
In truth Cheney disapproved of the idea generally because it was too behaviorist and
favored students who did not intend to practice. Memorandum of Meeting with Howell
Cheney, Mar. 7, 1928, Fisher papers. Another participant in the enterprise said the ob-
jector was Angell, who had had Watson as a graduate student and disliked behaviorism.
Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975. Neither explanation is plausible since both
men had passed on the original proposal a year earlier. I think the change probably re-
flects the addition of law and the social sciences, disciplines in which the relations of
individuals are important kinds of behavior.
124. Yale Minutes, Feb. 20, 1928. Compare A Program, supra note 118, at App. A
(May 20, 1928) (original proposal) with id. at App. C (New Financial Data).
125. Minutes of Yale Corporation, May 8, 1926 (original site selected); James R,
Angell to Howell Cheney, Mar. 5, 1928, Angell papers.
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donor refused to permit a change in the site of the new building
apparently never crossed anyone's mind.In March, soon after the project had been thought up, the
Institute proposal was presented to the members of the Yale Cor-
poration, who, given the educational ramifications of the plan,
had to approve any approach for foundation support.12 Although
this presentation to the Corporation was hopelessly confused, after
a month of work Hutchins and Angell won its approval of the pro-
posal. 7 However, dealing with the trustees of the estate of John
W. Sterling, 28 who had agreed to finance construction of a new
law school building, was not so easy.
Hutchins and Angell asked the trustees to do two things:
first, to move the site of the new and badly needed law school to
a location near the medical school and the proposed Institute
building, and, second, to change the building's architectural style
from Gothic to Georgian, to reduce its size, and use the money
saved by this reduction to endow several research professorships
in the law school. 29 The trustees requested an opinion from their
counsel, John A. Garver.'30 Mr. Garver was unalterably opposed
to the idea, as he knew Mr. Sterling, "a hard-headed, practical
business lawyer," would have been.131 Among his reasons were the
126. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Mar. 10, 1928. This was before either the
provost (chief academic officer) of the university or the dean of the graduate school had
even had a chance to formally comment on the idea. Charles Seymour (provost) to James'
R. Angell, Mar. 15, 1928; Wilbur Cross (dean) to James R. Angell, Mar. 15, 1928, Angell
papers. Yale Minutes, Feb. 23, 1928, report Hutchins' first meeting with these two officers.
Hutchins had first broached the subject to the law faculty at a special meeting three days
earlier, Yale Minutes, Feb. 20, 1928, a meeting held, in all likelihood, so that the law
faculty would not be the last to know.
127. For an example of the confusion, see Francis Parsons (member of Yale Corpo-
ration) to James R. Angell, Mar. 12, 1928; James R. Angell to Francis Parsons, Mar. 16,
1928, Angell papers. Angell calmed Corporation members and Hutchins drummed up out-
side support. See Robert M. Hutchins to James R. Angell, Apr. 3, 1928, Angell papers
(enclosing letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo); Yale Minutes, Apr. 27, 1928 (Taft and
Hughes). The Corporation approved the plan in March. Minutes of the Yale Corporation,
Mar. 14, 1928.
128. Sterling, who had died in 1918, was a graduate of Yale College, B.A. 1864. He
was the co-founder of Shearman & Sterling, the New York law firm. Capsule portraits of
Sterling can be found in W. EaRLE, MR. SFIudARM AND MR. STERLING AND How THEY GRaw
54-57 (1963), G. MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 194-95 (1970), and 19 NAT'L CYCLOPAEDIA
A .BIOG. 36 (1926).
129. Yale Minutes, Mar. 20, 1928; A Program, supra note 118, App. B, at 21 (state-
ment by Hutchins); Memorandum of statement made to George H. Church by James R.
Angell on behalf of the Corporation of Yale University, Mar. 22, 1928, Fisher papers.
130. Garver was a partner of the decedent. A biography of Garver can be found in
39 NAT'L CYCLOPAEDIA Am. BIOG. 429 (1959).
131. James R. Angell to Samuel H. Fisher, Mar. 23, 1928, Fisher papers; John A.
Garver to George H. Church & Farmers Loan & Trust Co., Apr. 3, 1928, Angell papers
(Mr. Sterling "had an ill-concealed impatience of theoretical research as bearing upon the
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usual opposition of the average lawyer to anything smelling of
social science. But behind his stated reasons was another: he and
the trustees had planned a three-building memorial to the decedent
at one edge of the campus.132 If the site of the law school were
moved, that memorial would have to be scrapped. Mr. Garver was
not about to scrap it, especially to make way for social science.
Moreover, memorial aside, he plainly felt that the suggestion to
erect a less expensive building in order to save money to endow
research that neither the decedent nor his partner would approve
of was simply out of the question, especially when the decedent's
estate had more than doubled under the careful tutelage of the
estate's counsel and could easily supply money for such research
should the trustees so choose. 33 Following the advice of counsel
on this obscure question of the testator's intent, the Sterling trus-
tees indicated their intention to deny Hutchins' requests, although
they agreed to postpone any decision in order to allow an influen-
tial member of the Corporation a chance to educate Mr. Garver. 34
:Despite the negative response of the Sterling trustees, a re-
quest for $7.8 million was submitted to the Rockefeller Founda-
tion.1,5 The grant application consisted of a four page summary
of two documents that followed: Winternitz's original proposal for
the Institute of Human Behavior and a new proposal, written by
Hutchins, explaining the law school's participation in the new,
joint enterprise. This summary, written by President Angell, em-
phasized cooperative investigations into human relations and
activities of the ordinary legal practitioner."). See G. MARTIN, supra note 128, at 53 (Mr.
Sterling "viewed with suspicion and distrust all 'liberal' or 'advanced' social doctrines.")
(quoting W. E nrx, supra note 128, at 63).
132. Otto Bannard (member of the Yale Corporation) to James R. Angell, Apr. 19,
1928, Angell papers (report of meeting with Garver and trustees). At this location a "T"
intersection made it possible to erect a little triptych of modem "Gothic piles" with an
appropriately impressive tower rising at the cross of the "T" to provide a real focus for
the piece. Construction of one part of this memorial, the library, had already begun; the
architectural plans for the second part, the law school, were virtually complete; and the
trustees, who for some reason were incapable of doing two things at once, were about to
consider the third part of the monument, a home for the graduate school.
133. Id. James R. Angell to Samuel H. Fisher, Apr. 10, 1928, Fisher papers. For a
quick rundown of what the estate eventually purchased, see B. KELLEY, supra note 28, at
372-73. A $15 million bequest for "a suitable building" netted Yale $39 million in build.
ings, endowed chairs, fellowships and scholarships.
134. James R. Angell to John V. Farwell (member of the Yale Corporation), May 9,
1928, Angell papers.
135. James R. Angell to George E. Vincent (Rockefeller Foundation), May 28, 1928,
Angell papers (enclosing A Program, supra note 118). The $3.8 million increase in the
size of the grant requested is deceiving. Only $1 million of that was for endowment to
support the social science programs. The balance was for endowment of existing programs
and a modest increase of $250,000 to cover the cost of a slightlp larger building.
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painted a novel picture of an Institute housing psychiatry, psy-
chology, child development, and "the social science group" as a
literal connecting link between the medical school "studying the
applied phases of individual behavior" and the law school "study-
ing the applied phases of social behavior."' 3 6 Yet exactly what
cooperative investigations were planned and how, if at all, law
school or medical school personnel would participate in these inves-
tigations was unspecified. And nowhere was there any indication
that the Sterling trustees were not inclined to help the project
along. Hutchins' statement on behalf of the law school made up
for neither of these deficiencies. He began by emphasizing the
school's recent actions "tending toward studies in the social sci-
ences."-137 Then he noted that by contributing to the education of
the law school's faculty and by getting away from "departmental
organization," the planned Institute would overcome the twin
difficulties of "bringing in as law teachers" more than a few per-
sons "trained in the social sciences" and of creating "effective co-
operation" with the department of economics, sociology and
government. 3 s He never managed, however, to articulate the re-
lation of these rather limited problems of the law school to its
wholly contingent contributions to the plan, much less the rela-
tion of either to Angell's fleeting reference to the possibility of
cooperative investigations of human behavior, or even to the
original psychiatry/psychology side of the Institute.
In fall 1928, the Rockefeller Foundation began to show some
interest in the project. 3 9 President Angell worked to answer the
Foundation's questions, while Hutchins and Winternitz attempted
to shore up their position on the location of the law school by se-
curing the agreement of the deans of the graduate and divinity
schools for the establishment of a graduate/professional center in
the area around the medical school, the Institute, and the proposed
new law school building. 40 Some tentative support for this idea
136. A Program, supra note 118, at 1. The Yale Corporation's resolution approving
the Institute had envisioned "psychology in the broadest sense of the term" as the con-
necting link. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Apr. 14, 1928.
137. A Program, supra note 118, at 16.
138. Id. at 18. Both Provost Seymour and Dean Cross had earlier cautioned that
establishing the Institute would create problems with the department of economics,
sociology and government, an antique creation of William Graham Sumner. See letters
cited note 126 supra.
139. George E. Vincent to James R. Angell, Sept. 14, 1928, Angell papers.
140. Angell had given Vincent a memo restating the plan for the Institute. See un-
titled, undated memo beginning "More than a year has elapsed . . .", Angell papers.
Angell also helped Hutchins deal with law alumni who did not favor the idea. See, e.g
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was garnered, but, in early December, the Sterling trustees form-
ally indicated their refusal to consider changing the site of the
school. 4' The law faculty protested the trustees' decision, and its
dean petulantly demanded that the trustees provide him with the
endowment that the school would not now receive. 42 The Cor-
poration bowed to the trustees' wishes. 43 In the meantime, before
anyone could revise the plan for the Institute, now that it was
clear that the law school would be over half a mile away from it
and lack the resources that were to have provided for participa-
tion in the Institute's activities, the Rockefeller Foundation, re-
sponding to a new and concise formulation of the plan, prepared
by President Angell,144 began the new year by contributing $4.5
million to found the Institute, a sum that included extra funds
for the social sciences. 45 Thereafter little, if anything, was heard
of the plan for the graduate/professional center. 40
Years later when asked about his tenure as dean, Hutchins
dismissed it as nothing special, as simply a part of the activities of
James R. Angell to Charles H. Sherrill, Nov. 26, 1928, Angell papers. On the attempt to
secure the support and participation of the graduate and divinity schools, see E. FurNiss,
THE GRADUATE ScHoor. or YALE 55 (1965); Charles Seymour to James R. Angell, Oct. 26,
1928 (reporting meeting at divinity school at which "Winternitz and Hutchins spoke with
their usual persuasiveness"); James R. Angell to George E. Vincent, Oct. 24, 1928, Angell
papers.
141. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Dec. 8, 1928, reporting letter of Dec. 6, 1928.
142. Yale Minutes, Dec. 18, 1928; Dec. 20, 1928. Robert M. Hutchins to James R.
Angell, Jan. 15, 1929, Angell papers.
148. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Jan. 12, 1929.
144. For Angell's restatement, see untitled, undated memo, supra note 140. He em-
phasized an intention "to direct a comprehensive, well articulated attack on human be-
havior," yet the document still did not hide the fact that the law school and the
social sciences were largely the tail on the dog.
145. The Rockefeller Foundation knew of the decision of the Sterling trustees before
it made the grant. See Robert M. Hutchins to Samuel H. Fisher, Dec. 12, 1928, Fisher
papers.
The purpose of the Rockefeller gift of Jan. 8, 1929, was to support "a concerted effort
to bridge the gap which heretofore has separated the consideration of the intellectual,
emotional and personality aspects of the individual from the purely medical on the one
side and from the social on the other." A copy of the resolution accompanying the gift
may be found in the Records of the Institute of Human Relations, Sterling Library, Yale
University [hereinafter cited as IHR files, without cross-reference].
146. The foregoing discussion is an alteration of the generally accepted understand-
ing of the establishment of the Institute of Human Relations given by B. KLLry, supra
note 28, at 881-82, and presented to me by almost all of my interviewees. This under-
standing ignores the roots of the Institute proposal in the search for a psychiatry depart-
ment and the previous action by the Sterling trustees and sees the participation of the
graduate and divinity schools as central to the plan. By thus compressing the events these
accounts fail to see the crucial, though opportunistic, role Hutchins played, and they ren-
der the law school's relation to the resulting entity (see text accompanying notes 445-519
infra) quite unintelligible. Hutchins, who recounted the standard story in his interview,
came close to getting the story right as far as the psychiatry department was concerned in
Hutchins, An Institute of Human Relations, 85 Am. J. Soc. 187 (1929).
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a group of men trying to make sense out of courses, out of law, and
out of a professional school's connection to a university that "had
to" amount to more than simply "sharing the same heating
plant."147 Putting aside the question of how "special" the tenure
was, the observation captures the substance of Hutchins' activities
at Yale. Whether the subject was honors courses or evidence ex-
ams,148 appointments or programs, his aim seems to have been the
same: to make the professional study of law more rigorous and
more acceptable as a part of the academic university. In that effort
he was meeting one of the needs of the law school as it had articu-
lated them when he was named its dean. Similarly, both in his
own research and in his grander plans for the law school, there
was a continuing attempt to explore the resources of the uni-
versity-particularly in the social sciences-in an effort to learn
what they might offer to the study of law and thus to learn if they
might provide permanent links between the university and the
professional law school. This activity also fit the law school's per-
ception of its needs. But however well Hutchins' summary cap-
tures the substance of his deanship, it captures nothing of its style,
except perhaps in its striking of a lingering grace note of boyish
irreverence.
In considering Hutchins' career at the law school one can
almost hear him yell, "Do something!" And his style reflects that
command. The pace was frenetic as he constantly pushed, jostled,
and probed both law in general and legal education in particu-
lar for ways to make them better, more sensible, more reputably
a subject of academic inquiry. At times, as in curriculum reform
toward which he made three starts in little over a year, the style
could verge on a kind of educational guerrilla warfare. Then, move-
ment, keeping the enemy-old, tired ways of thinking and teach-
ing-off balance, became more important than the careful planning
that may be essential to any success at the endeavor, if the Colum-
bia experience may be taken as a guide. But guerrilla warfare or
not, at the very least the style put a premium on starting and
little on following through, on creating opportunities but not on
working with the opportunities created, 49 on coming up with
147. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
148. Hutchins once proposed to give a true-false mid-term exam in his course in
evidence and to drop anyone who could not attain a score of 55 or better. Yale Minutes,
Dec. 9, 1926.
149. Which is not to say that Hutchins invariably knew an opportunity when he
was presented with one. A. A. Berle came to Hutchins seeking an academic connection with
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ideas but not on working them through. Thus the evidence studies,
which were a good idea, were dropped when it became apparent
that they would require years of primary research with little im-
mediate impact and that something more interesting, namely
Adler's ideas on education,' had come along. All of which is not
to belittle the ultimate importance of that choice for Hutchins'
later career. Knowing when to cut losses is an art too seldom found
in academia, and Hutchins' subsequent collaboration with Adler
was provocative. Nor is it to suggest that this aspect of the style
was peculiar to Hutchins; on the contrary, many of the Realists
shared it.'5 ' But for a dean, especially one as persuasive as Hutch-
ins, the style carried with it the risk that those left behind to work
out the details would find that the pieces of Hutchins' abandoned
projects made up something no one would have wanted in the
first place. Even worse was the risk that the heirs to these projects
would lack both the ability to create opportunities from those
pieces and the good sense to know when and how to exercise the
art of cutting losses.
Here the story of the founding of the Institute of Human
Relations is instructive. The opportunity was extraordinary.
Hutchins was convinced that academic improvement in the law
school was hindered by two things: the "mephitic" atmosphere of
Yale College and the lack of a social science perspective to the
study of law.15 2 The first was a conclusion he had drawn from his
personal experience at Yale as both student and administrator;
the second was more a matter of faith. The obvious way to elimi-
nate both hindrances was to get away from the college and get
access to resources. The Institute plan reflects precisely these two
objectives-move the site of the law school, and use the money
saved in the process as endowment with which to buy resources.
However, by just listing Hutchins' objectives it becomes plain that
Yale in order to fulfill one of the conditions on a grant Berle had received from the Social
Science Research Council to support work on a study of corporation law. Hutchins said
no, so Berle took his money to the Columbia Law School instead. The product of the
research was A. BERLE 8- G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1982). See NAVIGATING THE RAPlms 1918-1971, at 20-21 (B. Berle & T. Jacobs eds. 1973).
150. Cf. Hutchins, Autobiography of an Ex-law Student, I U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 513,
517 (1933) (contrast of evidence studies with "rational science of Ethics and Politics").
151. Most notably Thurman Arnold, but also to a lesser extent William 0. Douglas
and Karl N. Liewellyn. I do not mean to suggest that Hutchins was their model for I
doubt whether that is the case.
152. See James R. Angell to Howell Cheney, Mar. 5, 1928, Angell papers (quoting
Hutchins). The Yale Corporation agreed that the college atmosphere was at least dis.
tracting. Minutes of the Yale Corporation, Apr. 14, 1928.
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as an entity for cooperative research the Institute was little more
than a vaguely appropriate opportunity that Hutchins seized as it
was passing by. That opportunity was lost when the Sterling trus-
tees would not be moved from their initial resolve. Yet, in seizing
the opportunity, Hutchins so changed the Institute that what re-
mained was a queer derelict, professing concern for interdisci-
plinary research over a broad range of individual and group
behavior, but consisting largely of a collection of existing or pro-
posed highly specialized research projects. As for the law school,
after a year of trying to garner resources Hutchins had merely
created a different opportunity, this time one not for employing
social scientists but for financing such social science research as
otherwise employed members of the law faculty would propose
to do. Had the two social scientists-Walton H. Hamilton and
Walter F. Dodd-that Hutchins managed to get appointed to the
faculty eagerly taken the lead in using these funds, the task of
realizing on this opportunity might have been simple. But it
turned out neither was interested. 1' So that task, just as so many
others that the thirty-year-old Hutchins left behind when he left
Yale to become President of the University of Chicago, fell largely
into the hands of Hutchins' good friend and teacher, Charles E.
Clark.
II. KEEPING A LAW SCHOOL MOVING
In April 1929, Robert Hutchins turned over the deanship to
a somewhat surprised Charles E. Clark, in what was surely the
quickest changing of the guard any major law school has ever
seen.15 4 Clark, ten years Hutchins' senior and an honors graduate
of both Yale College and Yale Law School, had been teaching at
153. One of the two, Walter F. Dodd, a political scientist from Chicago, came from
his practice in Chicago in spring 1927. Two and one half years later he left to begin a
study of the administration of workmen's compensation statutes under a grant from the
Commonwealth Fund. The resulting work, W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION (1936), was one of the "interview the experts" variety. While completing it Dodd
returned to practice and never taught again.
The other, Walton Hale Hamilton, a prominent institutional economist who had
taught in the field since 1910, came to Yale from the Brookings Institution in 1928. For
reasons that are unclear he did no work in economics from the time of his appointment
to the Yale faculty until about 1940, and he actively opposed empirical research in law.
Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
154. Clark was elected the day after Hutchins announced his resignation. Yale min-
utes, Apr. 25, 1929: Apr. 26, 1929. Hutchins' announcement was not a total surprise; the




Yale since 1919. His fields were procedure and property. Although
by no means the whirlwind, either personal or intellectual, that
his predecessor was, Clark, a collaborator on the reforms at the
law school and a supporter of Hutchins' activities generally, will-
ingly assumed the task of picking up where Hutchins had left off.
The law school inherited by Clark was, in Hutchins' words,
in "the best condition in its history"' 1r5 and one of the best and
liveliest in the country by any standard. It was a law school sig-
nificantly changed from the one in which Hutchins had begun
his teaching career only four years before and yet, at the same
time, one remarkably the same. Clark captured both the change
and the sameness rather well when, in his first annual report, he
noted:
The School of Law is now a complex and colorful organization.
It is still possible for a student to obtain at it a more or less ortho-
dox legal education. The activities of the school are, however,
so many and so varied that he is not likely to choose such a
course.156
The balance of the report was replete with similar assertions
that Yale had arrived, and in style. Yet the past of the School of
Law was also there in the continuing concern of the parvenu for
both "being there" and being out of the shadow of those who got
"there" first. Clark noted that at Yale the standard of professional
training was as high as that at Harvard, and suggested as well that
Yale had moved beyond the Harvard standard by having "begun
to study the law anew in the light of [changes in] modern life.'
57
The new note that Clark's report struck-a note of having
arrived-is, given the evident continuity of his report, somewhat
difficult to account for. Nothing magical happened with the change
in dean, or even during the four years that Hutchins was on the
faculty. True, Hutchins had added three important new faculty
members-William 0. Douglas, Walton H. Hamilton, and Under-
hill Moore-and he had begun all sorts of important projects; but
Hutchins' reports did not express either the confidence or the
sense of having arrived that Clark's did. Yet, Clark made only one
important senior faculty addition-Thurman Arnold-and began
only one important research project that did not have its roots in
the Hutchins' deanship. However, concentration on events-the
155. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1928-29, at 5.




comings and goings of people, the beginnings and endings of
projects-can obscure the cumulative effect of those events on their
participants and does obscure the effect of such events during the
Hutchins' years on the "feelings" of the Yale faculty.
- -Objectively, Hutchins built rather modestly; indeed, he did
much starting and little building; but the cumulative effect of his
limited accomplishments in pushing his school in a particular di-
rection made the actual growth in the institution seem enormous
to the faculty. With this sense of growth came the development
of notions of what made Yale special-that is, different from Har-
vard and, to a lesser extent, from Columbia-and what made the
faculty's enterprise a common one. Only one of these notions is
important for present purposes: Yale was special because of the
interest of its faculty in empirical research.
The idea that an interest in empirical research made the Yale
Law School distinctive and its faculty's enterprise common becomes
fully formed about the time of the change in deans, and its de-
velopment can be traced quite accurately in the dean's annual
reports. When adverting to the proposed Institute of Procedure,
Swan's last report spoke of the Yale faculty's commitment to what
in late 19th century style was interchangeably described as "legal
research" and "scientific investigation."'"5 A year later, Hutchins'
first report, when describing the first projects to be undertaken as
an outgrowth of the procedure proposal, spoke of the faculty's
having undertaken an "experiment" designed to learn "how the
rules of law are working."'159 With the arrival of the first results
from the procedure work and the beginning of the work in psy-
chology and evidence, Hutchins' report moved past "experiments"
and discussed the expectation of learning "how the judicial system
actually works [and] how it is affecting the community" and the
hope of learning how that system "may be altered to attain more
readily the objects for which it has been developed."' 60 Finally,
Hutchins' third and last report, when announcing the funding of
the Institute of Human Relations, spoke of the Institute as an ex-
pression of the faculty's need "to make clear the part of the law
in the prediction and control of behavior. 6' Thus, when Dean
Clark capped the opening of his first annual report with a rhetori-
cal question and answer-"Has not law as the expression of com-
158. Report of Dean Swan, 1925-26, at 110.
159. Report of Acting Dean Hutchins, 1926-27, at 118-19.
160. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1927-28, at 118.
161. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1928-29, at 5.
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munity standards of social conduct actually felt and reacted to the
impact of ... forces [of change]? This the School has now set it-
self to the task of ascertaining."1 2-he was both summing up an
old trend and establishing a new base line. Whether they recog-
nized it at the time, Hutchins had brought his faculty (and him-
self) from the glimmerings of a naive empiricism, through the
general but largely unfulfilled research program of Pound's "so-
ciological jurisprudence," and into the mainstream of the em-
pirical social science of the time, and Clark's statement was strong
evidence of that change in consciousness.
Of course, the point can be overdrawn. A few faculty mem-
bers were not interested in empirical legal research,1 s and others
who were interested, or at least sympathetic, were not interested
enough to try to do some. 64 And the old ways surely received their
due; the first occupant of the Sterling Research Professorship-a
year at full salary, free of classes-was Corbin, who worked on his
Treatise." 5 But the dominant elements of the faculty, and more
importantly most of those faculty members who are usually con-
sidered to haye been Realists, talked and acted as if empirical
legal research was one of the things that made Yale a special place.
Here Clark's actions are truly symbolic. He began his first report
162. Report of Dean Clark, 1929-30, at 4.
163. Of the faculty Clark inherited, Walton H. Hamilton is the most notable; he
actually opposed doing such research. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3,
1975. Arthur Corbin should probably be counted in this group too; see Karl N. Llewellyn
to Robert M. Hutchins, May 6, 1926, Hutchins papers; and surely Ernest G. Lorenzen and
William R. Vance. Alexander Hamilton Frey was skeptical of social science generally, see
Frey, Some Thoughts on Law Teaching and the Social Sciences, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 469
(1934), although he once held a Social Science Research Council fellowship to study the
economic consequences of no-par and nonvoting shares.
164. George Dession (Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975; Inter-
view with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975), Walter F. Dodd (Yale Minutes, May
19, 1927; May 31, 1927), Leon Green (Yale Minutes, Nov. 17, 1927), Richard Joyce Smith
(Interview with Richard Joyce Smith, May 17, 1976), and Wesley A. Sturges (Interview with
Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975). Difficult to catalog are (1) Edwin M. Borchard, who
did something close to empirical research in his book CONVICTrINo THE INNOCENT (1932),
but who nonetheless seems to have opposed the doing of such research by others, Yale
Minutes, May 31, 1927; (2) Roscoe Turner Steffen, who did a little bit, see Turner, A
Factual Analysis of Certain Amendments to the N.L., 38 YAEa L.J. 1047 (1928) (opinion
poll), but opposed developments at Yale generally, Interview with Leon Green, June 19,
1975; cf. Charles E. Clark to Roscoe T. Steffen, June 18, 1947, on file in Charles E. Clark
papers, Sterling Law Library, Yale University [hereinafter cited as Clark papers, Law,
without cross-reference]; and (3) Leon Tulin who left for Columbia in 1929 after three
years at Yale and died a few years later. I have been unable to learn anything about the
attitudes of Roger S. Foster, Ashbel Gulliver and Walter Nelles.
165. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1927-28, at 113-14. Indeed the post seems to have
been used as a sop for the nonempiricists. W. R. Vance and Edwin Borchard split it in
1928-29, Yale Minutes, Jan. 19, 1928, and Ernest G. Lorenzen had it in 1930-31, Yale
Minutes, Feb. 20, 1930.
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on the research activities of his faculty as no dean before or since;
he divided all research into field research and library research,'("
and then showed where his heart was with loving descriptions of
the field research and perfunctory treatment of the library re-
search.
167
Given the law school's understanding of what made it special,
Clark's job as dean was to keep his school moving in directions both
he and it approved of. At the outset of his tenure that task may
have seemed easy; as things turned out, it was not. The projects
that Clark picked up from Hutchins turned out to be difficult to
complete and the opportunities he inherited turned out to be
difficult to capitalize on. To understand why that was so and thus
why empirical research died out at Yale, one must examine four
topics: studies in procedure, business failures and auto accidents,
the Institute of Human Behavior, and the bar survey.
A. Studies in Procedure
Of the projects that Clark had to pick up, the one he was most
familiar with was the research in procedure whose conception
dated back to the original proposal for an Institute of Procedure
that he and Hutchins had made in February 1926. 16 The Institute
proposal had remained unfunded for over a year until, on the same
day that he was elected dean by the law faculty, Hutchins, with
the help of two new faculty members, secured the money for Clark
to hire four research assistants and thus begin the work of the
projected Institute.169 Although one faculty member objected to
the decision to fund Clark's project on the ground, not particu-
larly inaccurate, that no specific plan of research was proposed, in
166. Report of Dean Clark, 1929-30, at 16.
167. Clark had a coherent idea of field research that was coextensive with the con-
tcmporary notion of empirical research. In his list he included all the projects then
underway that are described in this article, as well as the work of Underhill Moore. He
excluded the one "sexy" project that was purely work at assembling already published
sources, Clark & Douglas, Law and Legal Institutions, in RIsAncn CoMMrEE ON SocIAL
TRENDS, INc., SoctTAL TRNS IN Tm UNrrED STATES (1933), a report generally discussed in
Karl, Presidential Planning and Social Science Research: Mr. Hoover's Experts, 3 PERsP.
Am. HIsr. 347 (1969). His inclusion in the class of "field" research of a study that when
published turned out to consist largely of a review of secondary literature and expert
interviews-W. DODD, ADmNISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936)-can perhaps
be explained as a lack of knowledge, since Dodd was in Chicago on leave of absence when
he did the research.
168. See text accompanying notes 43-60 supra.




due course precise plans were formulated.1 70 The work was to
follow generally from the Pound-Frankfurter Cleveland Crime
Survey, adapting the techniques first developed there-largely a
census of a year or more's caseload-to civil suits in state trial
courtsY.17 At the time, Hutchins described the endeavor with re-
markable candor and without the sense of excitement one might
have expected at the outset of such a new enterprise:
The distinction between law in action and law on the books, and
the great relative importance of the former, have frequently been
emphasized. Little work has been done, however, which gives any
indication of how practicable investigation into operation of legal
rules may be. An experiment in this type of research has therefore
been initiated. 72
The actual project description, probably written by Clark, was
more positive when it proposed "to take to the field in Connecti-
cut in the effort to discover how the administration of justice is
working. . . .The actual effect of procedural devices on the
progress of litigation will be studied in detail."'
173
Clark must have "taken" to the field with some relish, or at
least put his research assistants right to work and worked them
hard, for in July 1928, less than a year after the assistants were
hired, he published his initial findings, based on but five months
of work. 74 The scope of the research on which the article was
based was comparatively small-one or two years of cases in the
upper trial courts of the three largest counties in the state and
three years of federal district court cases, a total of about 9,00
cases-but the amount of effort must have been prodigious. No
170. The objector was Edwin M. Borchard. Yale Minutes, May 31, 1927. He had
presented a competing research proposal, as had both Green and Dodd. Yale Minutes,
May 26, 1927.
171. For an explanation of the original methodology of the Cleveland Crime Survey,
see A. BEf5AN, PRosEcUTnoN (1921). Little is known about this singular example of
Pound's sociological jurisprudence in action, Pound's biographer tells just enough to
suggest that the topic needs exploration. See D. WxcDOR, RosCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF
LAW 242-45 (1974). Frankfurter's biographer barely mentions the project. Lash, A Blrahmin
of the Law: A Biographical Essay in FROM THE DIARIEs OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 32 (J. Lash
ed. 1975).
172. Report of Acting Dean Hutchins, 1926-27, at 118-19.
173. Id. at 119.
174. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CoNN. B.J. 211 (1928), 1 Miss.
LJ. 324 (1929). Clark milked his study for all it was worth; he also published what was
substantially the same article as Clark, Some of the Facts of Law Administration in Con-
necticut, 3 CONN. BJ. 161 (1929); Clark, New Types of Legal Research, 1 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N
BULL. 394 (1929); Clark, Methods of Legal Reform, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 106 (1930); Clark &
King, Statistical Method in Legal Research, 5 YAu Sci. MAo. 15 (1930). A preliminary
version appeared as Clark, An Experiment in Studying the Business of Courts of a State,
18 A.B.AJ. 318 (1928).
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sampling techniques were used, and all the counting was done by
hand.17 5 Considering the relatively primitive technique, it is not
surprising that the results were not elaborate. Following the Cleve-
land model, Clark created a simple table showing disposition by
type of action and also took a stab at determining the frequency
of the use of jury trial, prejudgment attachment, and various dila-
tory pleas. He was somewhat tentative in his interpretation of the
data. Examination of the data suggested that, given the preponder-
ance of uncontested divorces and foreclosures, settled automotive
negligence claims, and simple debt collections, the largely admin-
istrative nature of state court civil litigation had already emerged
in urban Connecticut by 1925.176 Clark was content to state the
findings specifically and wonder about the appropriateness of using
complex judicial machinery to resolve such apparently simple dis-
putes. 7 He also presented evidence that jury trials were infre-
quent, 17 that prejudgment attachment, especially of large sums,
was an effective way to promote settlement of contract disputes,
179
and that most often motions directed at the pleadings in a case
were effective only as a delaying tactic, but all without much com-
ment.8 0 However, he was less cautious in describing his under-
standing of the value of his enterprise:
It is believed, and experience so far shows, that this, although
almost a virgin field to the social scientist, is one of the most fruit-
ful for this type of investigation.
These records are capable of use for at least two important
purposes. They may be used to illustrate and to test the efficacy of
our rules of procedure and our general methods of administering
justice. And they may be used, second, as starting points for the
175. C. CLARK & H. SHULMrAN, LAW" ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT 4, 206 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as LAw ADMINISTRATION]. However, it is not clear that sampling tech-
niques would even have been known to Clark or anyone he might have talked with about
the design of the study. Stepan, History of the Uses of Modern Sampling Procedures, 43
STATISTCAL A.J. 12, 18, 23 (1948), suggests that although isolated examples of what might
be called sampling occurred in studies as early as 1914, modern techniques were not
generally used in the United States until after 1932 when they were disseminated to the
academic community as a part of the New Deal social programs. But see text accompanying
note 204 inIra.
176. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211, 218-19.
177. Id. at 213.
178. Id. at 224-27. The data also showed that verdicts in jury trials were more often
favorable to defendants than was the case in bench trials and that verdicts in jury trials
were more likely to be appealed.
179. Id. at 227-30.
180. Id. at 230-33.
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further detailed investigation of social problems of many and
varied kinds.181
And his conclusion was enthusiastic:
It is felt that the limits of possible investigation of this kind are
only set by the capacities of the investigators. Thus it may be pos-
sible eventually to go behind the court records and to trace some-
what the potential law suits which never come to court.
1 8 2
Apparently, a rush job with simple results and a glorious
vision was exactly what was called for, for as soon as results were
available, the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Foundation made a
grant of $55,000 to extend the study for five more years.1  Thus
fortified, Clark set his research assistants upon the necessary but
time-consuming and hardly glamorous job of refining their ques-
tionnaires and expanding the scope of their study to include more
years, different states' courts, and criminal cases.
184
While Clark and his assistants worked away largely un-
noticed, America elected a new President-Herbert Hoover. When
Hoover took office as President he indicated not only his support
for the eighteenth amendment but also his near outrage at the
nationwide failure to enforce prohibition. 85 Since the liquor
problem and its near twin-the crime problem-had been issues in
the preceding campaign, the President's position was not much of
a surprise. Nor was that of Congress which, in response to a re-
quest made in his inaugural address on that same day, appro-
priated monies for "[a] thorough inquiry into the problem of the
enforcement of prohibition under the provisions of the Eighteenth
Amendment . . . together with the enforcement of other
181. Id. at 212.
182. Id. at 233. Clark's research assistants collected data that led to two more articles,
Clark and O'Connell, The Working of the Hartford Small Claims Court, 3 CONN. BJ. 128
(1929) (survey of cases filed and dispositions) and Clark, Should Pleadings Be Filed
Promptly?, 3 CONN. B.J. 69 (1929) (comparison of timeliness of filing responsive plead.
ing in Connecticut and Massachusetts). Harris, Joinder of Parties and Causes, 36 W. VA.
L.Q. 192 (1930) (objections to joinder); and Harris, Is the Jury Vanishing?, 4 CONN. BJ. 78
(1930) (comparison of use of jury in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York; very
difficult interpretive problem) use figures developed in this initial research of Clark's.
183. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1927-28, at 116.
184. LAw ADAINISTRATION, supra note 175, at 4. Some work was done in Massachusetts:
Clark, Should Pleadings Be Filed Promptly?, 3 CONN. B.J. 69 (1929); New York: Harris,
Joinder of Parties and Causes, 86 W. VA. L.Q. 192, 194 (1930); Ohio: LAW ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 175 at 5, n.20; and West Virginia: Arnold, The Collection of Judicial Statistics
in West Virginia, 86 W. VA. L.Q. 184 (1930).
185. Hoover, Inaugural Address, in PUBLIc PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STArES: HERBERT H. HOOVER, 1929, at 2, 4.
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laws."'186 And thus was spawned the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, a prestigious body headed by
George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General of the United
States, and including Ada Comstock, president of Radcliffe Col-
lege, and Roscoe Pound. 87
Despite the existence of the Wickersham Commission, as the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement be-
came known, President Hoover was not without "volunteers" who
offered to help with investigations of the problem of the adminis-
tration of justice. Among them were Robert Hutchins and Charles
Clark who, but two weeks after the inauguration, met with
Hoover and other federal officials to propose a $250,000 study of
the operation of the federal courts patterned on the Connecticut
courts study.'88 Hoover's response to the proposal is not recorded,
but eight months later Wickersham asked Clark, who was by then
dean, to meet with him about conducting one of the Commission's
studies of law enforcement ' 89 The meeting was successful; Wick-
ersham liked the old Hutchins-Clark proposal. So after he con-
ferred with the two members in charge of the Commission's inquiry
186. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 1034,45 Stat. 1607, 1613.
187. Other members of the commission were Newton D. Baker, a former Secretary
of War; William S. Kenyon, Paul J. McCormick, and William I. Grubb, all federal judges;
Kenneth Mackintosh, Judge of the Supreme Court of Washington; and Henry W. Anderson,
Monte M. Lemann, and Frank J. Lorsch, all prominent attorneys.
188. Yale Minutes, Mar. 21, 1929. ALI STUDY OF THE BusINEss OF THE FEDEAL COURTS
PART 1, CRIMINAL CASES 21 (1934) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY: CmMINAL]; Robert M.
Hutchins to Henry Stimson, Mar. 18, 1929, on file in Charles E. Clark papers, Beinecke
Library, Yale University [hereinafter cited as Clark papers, Beinecke, without cross-
reference]. Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham set up the meetings that included pre-
sentations to Chief Justice Taft, Justice Stone, Attorney General William D. Mitchell and
Idaho Senator William E. Borah. From an undated, untitled copy of the "budget" for the
project that can be found in the Clark papers, Beinecke, it can be inferred that the pro-
posal contemplated use of the major university law schools as centers for the decentralized
collection of data. Eighty percent of the budget was for the employment of an army of
field workers. See also Charles E. Clark to Frederick C. Hicks, Jan. 14, 1940, Clark papers,
Law (Hoover thought the whole problem was delay; Taft endorsed the project).
189. George W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 21, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
The intermediaries apparently were Felix Frankfurter and his friend Max Lowenthal,
the Commission's secretary, who were trying to outflank Frankfurter's colleague and
Commission member, Roscoe Pound, who proposed to do the work himself. See Charles
E. Clark to Felix Frankfurter, Nov. 80, 1929; Felix Frankfurter to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 2,
1929 (reporting Wickersham's enthusiasm for the plan); Charles E. Clark to Felix Frank-
furter, Dec. 18, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke ("[Y]our distinguished colleague and leader
had been willing to conduct the whole investigation." Clark "understood" the intention
of Frankfurter and Lowenthal "to guard against the very contingency which has hap-
pened.'). But see Robert M. Hutchins to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 18, 1929, Hutchins papers
(speculating that Attorney General Mitchell had given the papers from the original
Hutchins-Clark presentation to Wickersham, and by inference suggesting that Frankfurter
was claiming credit where none was due).
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into the courts90 and with potential members of an advisory com-
mittee to be set up to aid the project,"0 1 and after President Angell's
blessing was secured, 9 2 Clark was hired in January 1930 as a
consultant to the Commission.' 3
Clark, who had been told that only $3,000 to $4,000 was
available for the preliminary organization of his study and that
it might be difficult for the Commission to obtain any future ap-
propriations from a Congress generally uninterested in any of the
Commission's work other than on prohibition,94 began work im-
mediately. Or, more accurately, William 0. Douglas did, for he
was to design the forms on which the research assistants were to
record their data. 9 5 In this task he had the help of Charles Ulysses
Samenow, Clark's primary research assistant on the Connecticut
courts study, who was to occupy the same position with respect
to this project. 90 Working at a feverish pace, the two men began
by creating the forms for collecting data on criminal cases, since
those cases were the ones the Commission was most interested in,
as well as the ones with which the Connecticut courts study had
had the least experience. Once the forms were ready they were
pretested and then reworked, then pretested again and again re-
vised, each time after consultation with the advisory committee. 97
Simultaneously, Douglas and Samenow developed and pretested
190. William I. Grubb, district court judge in Alabama and a Yale grad, and Monte
M. Lemarn, a prominent New Orleans attorney and law school classmate and friend of
Frankfurter.
191. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Dec. 80, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
(Meetings with Orrin K. McMurray, Dean at University of California, Berkeley, Prof.
Edmund Morgan, Owen J. Roberts, then in practice in Philadelphia, later Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, and Lemann). Frankfurter was also present, though not an
official advisor. William I. Grubb to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 24, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
The other member of the advisory comimttee was Robert M. Hutchins. ALI STUDY:
CRimiNAL, supra note 188, at 20.
192. James R. Angell to George W. Wickersham, Dec. 23, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
193. George W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 9, 1980, Clark papers, Beinecke.
194. id.; William I. Grubb to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 24, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
195. Charles E. Clark to Max Lowenthal, Mar. 2, 1930; Charles E. Clark to Charles H.
Willard (Lowenthal's assistant), Mar. 25, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
196. LAw ADMINIsrRATiON, supra note 175, at 6; ALI STUDY: CRIMINAL, supra note
188, at 22. Samenow was a 1929 graduate of the Law School. He had previously publishc$
some of his research for Clark as Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 88 YALE L.J.
423 (1929).
197. Douglas & Clark, Interim Report of the Committee on the Study of Law Ad-
ministration in the Federal Courts 3 (May 11, 1930), Clark papers, Beinecke [hereinafter
cited as Interim Report]. Pretesting was begun in Connecticut, moved to the Southern
District of New York, and thereafter continued in Louisiana, Ohio and West Virginia.
The member of the advisory committee most regularly consulted was Edmund Morgan.
See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Edmund Morgan, Feb. 18, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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a form covering civil cases. 198 Meanwhile, Clark began to assemble
a collection of law school deans and faculty members who were to
participate in the study by securing and nominally supervising
local research assistants.'99
When in May 1930 Clark and Douglas paused to help the
Commission obtain further funds by explaining exactly the pur-
pose of their research, they suggested that they wished to "collect
concrete factual, statistical information" in order to "illustrate
and test the efficiency of our rules of procedure and our general
methods of administering justice" in the federal courts.2 0 They
intended to secure "actual figures bearing on congestion," on the
"types of business" in the federal courts, and on "bargain days"
and other aspects of the so-called "breakdowns" in the system. 0 1
All were quite topical, practical inquiries, given that President
Hoover had asserted that these "problems" were leading to a gen-
eral lawlessness of which the lack of enforcement of prohibition
was only a single example.
Time for thought about purposes was, however, limited.202
198. Interim Report, supra note 197, at 3. This form, based on that used in the
Connecticut Courts study was pretested only in the Southern District of New York.
199. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Herschel Arant (Dean, Ohio State), May 11, 1930
(Arant was a Law School graduate who had taught at Yale 1920-22, just after Clark had
begun teaching); Charles E. Clark to Rufus Harris (Dean, Tulane), May 11, 1930 (Harris
was a former student, LL.B. 1923, and graduate student, J.D. 1924, at Yale), Clark papers,
Beinecke. After running out of friends and former students Clark filled in to fit the need
for a cross section of district courts.
200. Interim Report, supra note 197, at 1.
201. Id. ("While public hysteria and professional criticism will not be motivating
causes in the study, much of the subject matter of these will be dealt with.')
202. Clark and Douglas did manage to find the time in late summer 1930 to attend
a Conference on Legal Research sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and
organized by Henry M. Bates, Dean at Michigan. The conference was designed to explore
the existing pattern of research, principle lines of future development, available personnel
and potential for social science contributions. R. Lynd, Tentative Agenda for Social Science
Research Council Conference on Legal Research, Hanover [New Hampshire] Aug. 29-Sept.
2, on file at Social Science Research Council, New York, New York. Other participants
included Karl N. Llewellyn from Columbia, Felix Frankfurter and Joseph H. Beale (I)
from Harvard and Hessel E. Yntema of the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins. Id. See
also Charles E. Clark to Henry M. Bates, Oct. 8, 1930 (good conference; group should be
expanded); Henry M. Bates to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 23, 1930 (rather keep group small,
adding perhaps Northwestern and Ohio. Beale should not be included next time; "regret-
table incident" brought him this time); Charles E. Clark to Henry M. Bates, Oct. 27, 1930
(Frankfurter "interesting and stimulating" but too "chauvinistic" to be a good "conference
or committee man'), Clark papers, Beinecke. "Next time" turned out to be never. Com-
menting on the conference twenty-five years later, Llewellyn suggested that Harvard and
Michigan "found themselves unready for research competition ... and ... effectively
killed off the [Social Science Research] Council's interest in aiding any law school at all
in any research looking toward integration of the disciplines." Llewellyn, On What Makes
Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEcAL EDUc. 899, 401 (1956). Frankfurter and Pound
had attended a similar conference to the Council in 1926, this time on criminal studies.
B. KARL, CHARLES E. MERMAM AND THE STUDY OF POLMTS 135 (1975).
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
As soon as the Commission's appropriation was renewed, Clark
finished lining up law schools to help with the research. 3  As fast
as Clark lined up law schools, Douglas and Samenow set to work
what was soon to be a small army of field workers whose task was
enormous. In each of the thirteen districts to be studied, all civil
cases and all criminal cases terminated in the five years ending
June 30,1930 except for prohibition violations were to be examined
and coded; for prohibition cases, a ten percent sample was to be
taken in the seven most populous districts, while all cases were to
be examined and coded in the less populous districts. 20 4
At the outset it was estimated that it would take two years
to gather and process the data Clark sought.0 Why such a vast
project was planned when funding was known to be precarious is
unclear,06 but soon problems with the original timetable ap-
peared. The civil forms proved to need more testing than expected
and the examination and coding of cases was very slow. 20 7 Some
change in plans was surely indicated. Exactly how serious a change
did not become apparent until early January 1931 when the Com-
mission filed its prohibition report, which satisfied neither wets
nor drys because it both supported prohibition and suggested that
203. In the process Clark learned much to his annoyance that the Columbia faculty
was jealous of all the publicity Yale was deriving from running the study and that, as
the price for its assistance, wanted to share the limelight, if ever so slightly, by being
represented on the advisory committee. See Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham,
Oct. 6, 1930 (Columbia representative to be Harold Medina who "conducts the best bar
* . . cramming course in New York City .... "); George W. Wickersham to Charles E.
Clark, Oct. 10, 1930; Charles E. Clark to Harold Medina, Oct. 16, 1930; Charles E. Clark
to Henry M. Bates, Nov. 21, 1931 (Bates and Thurman Arnold to join advisory committee
to cover sell-out to Columbia), Clark papers, Beinecke. I suspect some of the jealousy was
also attributable to the fact that Harvard was already represented on the committee.
Schools participating were those of the advisory committee members, California, Co.
lumbia, Harvard, Michigan, and Yale; the pretesting sites, Ohio, Tulane and West Virginia;
and Chicago, Colorado (Dean James Crafton Rodgers was a graduate of Yale College and
a prominent candidate for the Yale deanship in 1926. Yale Minutes, Jan. 1, 1927), Kansas
(Prof. Thomas Atkinson, J.S.D. 1926, had been a Clark student and teaching fellow while
at Yale) and North Carolina (Prof. Charles T. McCormick had taught summer school at
Yale and was offered, but declined, a regular appointment thereafter. Yale Minutes, May 5,
1927).
204. Charles E. Clark to William I. Grubb, Jan. 1, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
205. Charles E. Clark to Max Lowenthal, Sept. 10, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PROGRESS REPORT ON TM
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS iv (1931) [hereinafter cited as PRoGRss REPORT].
206. Even before Clark was hired by the Commission he was cautioned that funding
was precarious, William I. Grubb to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 24, 1929; soon thereafter, he
was urged to get foundation financing, Max Lowenthal to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 27, 1930;
and even after the Commission was re-funded he was warned that disputes between Con-
gress and Hoover over the scope of the problem to be investigated threatened its continued
existence, Max Lowenthal to Charles E. Clark, Sept. 5, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
207. Charles E. Clark to William I. Grubb, Jan. 3, 1931; Charles E. Clark to George
'W. Wickersham, Jan. 6, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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if more vigorous enforcement of existing criminal statutes proved
to be unsuccessful in reducing the general prevalence of viola-
tions, revision of the eighteenth amendment would be appro-
priate .2 0 It immediately became clear that Congress would not
appropriate more money to extend the life of the Commission just
to learn about the "crime problem" after it had learned nothing
it wanted to know about the "liquor problem. '20 9 So that January,
Clark, interested Commission members, and other advisors
thrashed out a new, more limited goal in many letters and several
conferences.2 10 A new target for accumulating data was established:
three years' worth of criminal cases and one of civil in each dis-
trict. None of these data would be processed except the data on
criminal cases in Connecticut, which would form the basis for a
progress report to the Commission. Meanwhile, Chairman Wick-
ersham, working with materials furnished by Clark, would seek
the foundation support necessary to finance completion of the
study.
212
While the search for funds went forward, field workers poured
the results of their labors into New Haven where Douglas and
Samenow, aided by Thurman Arnold, newly added to the faculty,
and others,18 struggled to check, run, and analyze the Connecticut
criminal cases. Their job was made doubly difficult by the need
to first process materials on juveniles that they had agreed to col-
lect for another commission consultant many months before. 14
But by May 1, although the New Haven staff, which had been
"working nights for the last week or so," was "used up," the
progress report was done. 5
What the report showed was a bit of a surprise. It noted that
although the literature suggested the existence of numerous ob-
stacles to effective law enforcement, "technicalities, delays and
continuances, irrational juries, a cumbersome grand jury system,
208. NATIONAL CoaaMIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRoHBmoN LAWS OF ThE UNrIED STATES 83 (1931).
209. Claire Wilcox (Commission Research Director) to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 8, 1931,
Clark papers, Beinecke.
210. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to William I. Grubb, Jan. 3, 1931; Monte Lemann to
Charles E. Clark, Jan. 14, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
211. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Mar. 31, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
212. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Mar. 31, 1931; Apr. 1, 1931; George
W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, Apr. 14, 1931 (reporting contacts with Rockefeller
Foundation), Clark papers, Beinecke.
213. Most notably Dorothy Swaine Thomas, see note 303 infra.
214. Charles E. Clark to Monte Lemann, Oct. 25, 1930; Charles E. Clark to George
W. Wickersham, Apr. 31,1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
215. Charles E. Clark to Claire Wilcox, May 1, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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long trials, appeals on obsolete doctrinal points, and, in general,
the widely advertised results of what is generally called 'the sport-
ing theory of justice,' "218 in fact, nothing of the sort appeared to
be happening. Seventy percent of the defendants pled guilty when
arraigned, most of those on the day the indictment or information
was filed. 17 Ultimately ninety percent of the defendants pled
guilty and only one percent had a jury trial, generally lasting less
than a day.21 Sixty percent of all cases were disposed of with a
fine (eighty percent of the prohibition cases and twenty-five per-
cent of the balance), with the amount "of the fine so nicely ad-
justed that in three years only five defendants were committed to
jail for failure to pay."2 19 Eighty-five percent of the cases were
disposed of in two months.220 Clark, Douglas and Samenow had
discovered modern federal criminal procedure.221
The three men were slightly bewildered by their discovery,
which for them raised doubts about the administration of justice
because
[the system] seems almost too efficient; because it presents the spec-
tacle of a long line of orderly offenders, few of whom it is necessary
to commit to jail either before or after trial, pleading guilty with
systematic regularity . . . , raising no technical objections and so
far as the records show, complaining about no invasions of their
constitutional or other privileges.
222
But they proposed to stick with their figures, which to them sug-
gested that the absence of delay was due to careful selection of
the prosecutions brought, with an eye to eliminating or prosecut-
ing under less serious charges possibly contested cases. 22 3
At least one member of the Advisory Committee was en-
thusiastic about the limited results.224 Unfortunately, the Com-
mission was not. After nearly a month of sitting on the report,
216. Douglas, Arnold & Clark, Progress Report on the Study of the Business of the
Federal Courts 3 (n.d.) (draft), Clark papers, Beinecke.
217. PRoGREss REPORT, supra note 205, at 18, 22-23, 32.
218. Id. at 18, 22-23, 58.
219. Id. at 18, 28-29.
220. Id. at 18, 32.
221. As distinguished from contemporary federal criminal procedure in which by the
addition of lawyers for indigents and the creation of several new constitutional defenses,
the legal system seems to have kept the same ultimate results but lengthened the time for
disposition.
222. Douglas, Arnold 9- Clark, supra note 216, at 4.
223. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 205, at 19. The inference was correct. See John A.
Danaher (U.S. Atty. for Conn.) to Charles E. Clark, June 10, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
224. Owen Roberts to Charles E. Clark, May 16, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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Wickersham, probably acting at Pound's request, asked for dele-
tion of the conclusion that no delay in the disposition of cases had
been found because "the statement is at variance with conclusions
which were reached in other reports." 22 Although the other re-
ports were virtually free of any data suggesting court congestion
and delay, a slightly bitter Charles Clark agreed.228
Why Clark agreed is uncertain. Perhaps it was the realiza-
tion that even with Wickersham's deletions, the report was a
strong statement. It noted "the complete absence of procedural
delays," a "negligible" incidence of contested cases and jury trials,
a "negligible" amount of time required for the disposition of
cases, and the prevalence of "minor offenses" for which "small
sentences" were imposed.2 7 These findings and the inference of
selective prosecution228 negated the suggestion that the system was
overrun with congestion and delay, at least for anyone who could
read.
But whatever Clark's reason for agreeing to Wickersham's
deletions, it was probably not any hope for future favors. Wicker-
sham had generated a grant of $25,000 from the Rockefeller Foun-
dation to the American Law Institute that might have financed
completion of the study, but that grant was contingent on securing
$25,000 more from other sources, and Wickersham had already
run through his short list of alternative sources of funds with no
success. 229 So in June 1931, as the fiscal year drew to a dose, the
field workers worked madly to finish their counting and everyone
awaited the inevitable termination of the study.
When funding terminated on July 1, the staff of trained field
workers disappeared. Samenow, who according to Clark suffered
from a personality that was not "pleasing" and was thus pre-
cluded from consideration for a permanent faculty appointment,
225. George W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, May 27, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
On Pound's objection, see Charles E. Clark to Alfred Bettman (who originated statistical
technique for the Cleveland Crime Survey), Feb. 9, 1933; Learned Hand to Charles E.
Clark, Feb. 15, 1933 ('"ou know what a curious person Pound is, and how little you can
tell what attitude he is going to take ... .), Clark papers, Beinecke.
226. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, May 29, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
The principal material deleted is quoted in the text at notes 216 & 222 supra.
227. PROGREss REPoRT, supra note 205, at 18.
228. See note 223 supra.
229. See George W. Wickersham to Rockefeller Foundation, Apr. 13, 1931; George W.
Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, May 12, 1931; Charles E. Clark to George W. Wicker-
sham, May 13, 1931; Charles E. Clark to Rockefeller Foundation, May 14, 1931; George W.
Wickersham to Rockefeller Foundation, May 15, 1931; George W. Wickersham to Charles
E. Clark, May 26, 1931, Clark papers. Beinecke; Paocrmss REPORT, supra note 205, at iv.
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left for practice. 230 Everyone expected that Douglas would com-
plete the exodus by accepting Hutchins' seemingly magnificent
,offer to go to Chicago, but instead he stayed on as a visting pro-
fessor at a school he had never left.231 Nevertheless, the excitement
was over.
In October, Clark and Wickersham again approached the
Rockefeller Foundation in an effort not to finish the original
project, but just to process and tabulate data already collected.3 2
Their effort succeeded and, as a result, Samenow was rehired to
begin work on the accumulated data.233 But with the small work
force that could be afforded, the job went slowly. The cards were
not all punched until summer 1932; Samenow's preliminary draft
of the report on criminal cases was not finished until fall; and
230. Charles E. Clark to Charles Seymour (Yale Provost) Sept. 22, 1931 (very valuable
but unfair to encourage about permanent position), Angell papers; Charles E. Clark to
George W. Wickersham, Oct. 2, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke. Samenow was described to
me as "brilliant, tactless and intolerant of lesser minds." Interview with David Kammerman
(friend, assistant on both Connecticut and Federal Courts studies), June 20, 1975.
Samenow may well have sensed the way in which he was an outsider. A 1932 picture
of the faculty shows him defiantly seated with his arms crossed and his fashion-
able white bucks, the only shoes of that kind in the picture, prominently displayed. He was
absolutely essential to the functioning of both courts studies. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas
to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 21, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke. For an example of his technical
expertise, see Samenow, judicial Statistics in General in PRACrICAL APPLICATIONS OF Tim
PUNCEMD CARD METHOD 319 (G. Bachne ed. 1935).
231. W. DOUGLAs, Go EASr, YoUNG MAN 163-64 (1974). Why Douglas did not go to
Chicago is difficult to say. Hutchins claimed not to know. Interview with Robert M.
Hutchins, June 20, 1975. Douglas formally told Hutchins that he had "a number of things"
that he had to spend the next year "trying up and completing." William 0. Douglas to
Robert M. Hutchins, June 10, 1931, Hutchins papers. Clark speculated that Douglas was
unhappy that Hutchins seemed to be delegating to his dean of the social sciences every.
thing about the proposed research project "in the field of finance"-the main attraction
for Douglas-and that in general Douglas seemed concerned about Hutchins' bility to
deliver on his promises. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, May 23, 1931, Angell papers.
The visiting professorship was a way for Douglas to finesse the issue of his concern about
Hutchins' promises. Id. Local scuttlebut had it that Douglas was upset that Hutchins
could not deliver the $25,000 salary he had promised. Interview with David Kammerman,
June 2, 1975. While it is clear that Hutchins could not pay that salary (William 0.
Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 15, 1932, Hutchins papers), the $20,000 per year
salary he could deliver was substantially above the best Clark could offer (Charles E.
Clark to James R. Angell, Feb. 18, 1932, Angell papers). Thus money cannot have been a
great factor. I suspect that although Douglas talked as if things at Yale were not going
well (William 0. Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 15, 1932, Hutchins papers), Yale
looked more attractive than Chicago where the law school would not support his work,
especially since by the time Douglas really had to decide, he had made the contacts with
the Harvard Business School that were to absorb him for the next few years. W. DOUGLAS,
supra, at 172-73. See also note 434 infra.
232. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Oct. 2, 1931; George W. Wickersham
to E. E. Day (Rockefeller Foundation), Oct. 6, 1931; Charles E. Clark to E. E. Day, Oct. 31,
1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
233. Norma S. Thompson (Rockefeller Foundation) to George W. Wickersham, Nov,
13, 1931; Charles E. Clark to William Draper Lewis (Director, American Law Institute),
Jan. 6, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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Douglas' redraft languished until just before Christmas.2 4 While
Douglas worked, Clark negotiated a complicated agreement with
the American Law Institute to publish the two reports. The agree-
ment required approval first by a committee of the ALI Council
consisting of two members of the Commission and Judge Learned
Hand, then by the Council, and finally by the membership-a
process so full of potential traps that it plainly left Clark wor-
ried.2 85 The report on civil cases was not ready until the end of
summer 1933, at which time Samenow left for goodYs ALI ap-
proval of both reports did not come until May 1934, and publica-
tion was delayed until the following fall.237 Counting from the
Hutchins and Clark meeting with Hoover, it had taken over five
years to publish about one year's worth of research.
Despite the setbacks and the enormous effort, Clark remained
remarkably good-humored, as can be seen from an incident that
took place at the very end of the study. Wickersham had been
asked to write an introduction to the published volumes; his draft
cut squarely into the representativeness of the study. 23 His reason
for so doing was simple. Clark had already published an article
in the American Bar Association Journal highlighting one of the
study's most topical discoveries.239 He had noted that the diversity
234. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, June 2, 1932, Sept. 20, 1932; William
0. Douglas to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 20, 1932; Charles E. Clark to William Douglas, Dec. 6,
1932, Clark papers, Beinecke.
235. See William Draper Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Sept. 15, 1932; Charles E. Clark
to William Draper Lewis, Sept. 19, 1932; William Draper Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Sept.
23, 1932; Charles E. Clark to William Draper Lewis, Sept. 27, 1932, Oct. 21, 1932, Clark
papers, Beinecke. Clark was worried that since he could not get agreement on the PROGREsS
REPoRT from the eleven member Wickersham Commission it would be impossible to get
agreement from the larger ALI council, much less the entire membership of that organiza-
tion. See Charles E. Clark to Learned Hand, Feb. 4, 1933; Learned Hand to Charles E.
Clark, Feb. 15, 1933; William Draper Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 1, 1933; Charles E.
Clark to William Draper Lewis, Mar. 2, 1933, Mar. 10, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
236. Charles E. Clark to William Draper Lewis, Sept. 21, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
Samenow went briefly into practice and then did a study for Herman Oliphant, by then
General Counsel of the Treasury Department, on the Customs Court in New York City.
C. SAMaENow, REPORT OF PRoTrm LTIGATION (1936). The report lists Clark and Fleming
James, Jr., as sponsors of the study as well as a committee of the New York Law Society,
a survival from Oliphant's work while at the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins. See James
& Stockman, Work of the New York Law Society, 27 GEo. L.J. 680 (1939). After completing
the study, Samenow went to Washington, first to the United States Housing Authority and
then to the Rural Electrification Administration as a special assistant to the Administrator
until his retirement years later in 1968. He died in 1974. Interview with David Kammer-
man, June 2, 1975; interview with Mrs. Charles U. Samenow, June 2, 1975.
237. ALI STuDy: CRIMINAL, supra note 188, at 22.
238. See George W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 1, 1934, Clark papers,
Beinecke.




jurisdiction had been so swallowed up by the federal question
jurisdiction and by cases brought by or against the United States
that diversity cases represented less than twenty percent of filed
cases. 24 0 Moreover, of those diversity cases filed, eighty-five percent
were simple contract or tort claims, and most of these were claims
involving foreign corporations doing business in the forum state.
2 1
1
Clark suggested that these findings supported a pending bill to
treat a foreign corporation doing business in a state as a citizen
of that state for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction. 42 Wicker-
sham strongly opposed the bill24 8 and so wrote his introduction to
undercut Clark's conclusion. Yet, in the face of this rather direct
attack on his scholarship, Clark, while seeking a change in the
introduction, was able to remark that he thought he had ade-
quately emphasized that the conclusions drawn in the study were
his own. 4 He continued: "Perhaps this thought is not important,
but I have in mind to make it always clear that the figures are
available to all commentators, whatever side of pending questions
they take. ' 245 Such equanimity was a long way from the optimism
of the days of the early reports on the Connecticut courts study.
Yet the reasons for Clark's change of tone, if not obvious from the
story of his enterprise, are relatively easily isolated: experience and
a bit of bewilderment.
Clark's experience had been like virtually no other law teach-
er's. His Connecticut courts study was the first of its kind, al-
though it admittedly had antecedents in the Cleveland crime
survey. In it Clark had developed a variation on the staple method-
ology of the crime survey--the mortality table. While the mor-
tality table looked at how cases entering the system dropped out,
in an effort to learn if criminals were being allowed to escape
from justice, Clark's method in Connecticut courts focused on
completed cases in an effort to learn what the system as a whole
looked like over a given period of time. This methodological
variant did exactly what it was designed to do; it generated what
we now know to be a remarkably accurate picture of an urban
240. Id. at 500.
241. Id. at 501-02.
242. Id. at 503.
243. George W. Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, July 17, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke
(responding to Clark's article).
244. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Oct. 4, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
245. Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Oct. 4, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
This time Wickersham backed down and deleted the offending comments. George W.
Wickersham to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 5, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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court system. In supervising the development of this methodology,
and then further refining it in the federal courts study, Clark had
learned enough to have acquired the concerns of the newer social
scientists about control of observation and their preference for
the analysis of primary data. He worried about observer bias,
prided himself on the fact that all his data were collected by in-
vestigators under his control, and even did some error estima-
tion.246 Clark had also absorbed some of the then current social
science cant about the separation of data collection and data analy-
sis. 247 And he was even a bit of a missionary bringing social science
to the more provincial law schools. 248 Yet as he absorbed bits of
the traditions of academic social science, somehow the early ex-
citement derived from participation in a new and scientific in-
quiry was lost.
The published results of the Connecticut courts study hint
at the reason for the loss of enthusiasm. After the first flurry of
articles, virtual silence set in, just when there was little else to
absorb Clark's time. Eight years later, further findings were pub-
lished, largely because there was little else to do with the money
left in the grant secured to support the research.249 The total num-
ber of cases examined was tripled, data collection measurably re-
fined, and machine processing of data begun. But when Clark
stepped back from the technology and looked at the results, he
discovered that they were basically the same as in the original
rush study done to secure the grant.250 True, some new items of
significance were disclosed-most obviously the development of a
specialized personal injury bar and the tendency of more jury
verdicts to be appealed and appealed successfully more often than
nonjury verdicts. 251 But the basic story was the same. Essentially
uncontested matters-collections, divorces, and foreclosures-to-
246. See Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.S. 211 (1928);
Charles E. Clark to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 13, 1930; Charles E. Clark to George W. Wicker-
sham, Feb. 4, 1930; Charles E. Clark to William F. Berry (successor to Lowenthal as Com-
mission Secretary), Dec. 4, 1930 (use of secondary data); Charles E. Clark to William I.
Grubb, Jan. 3, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
247. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to William o. Douglas, Oct. 26, 1932, Clark papers,
Beinecke. See also text accompanying notes 404-05 infra.
248. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Henry M. Bates, Oct. 18, 1930, Clark papers,
Beinecke.
249. Charles E. Clark to Filmer S. C. Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law.
250. Here one should contrast Clark's experience with the Federal courts study in
which it also turned out that the initial report and the ultimate report disclosed the same
general pattern of largely bargained pleas, but that the situation in Connecticut was variant
within that pattern. See ALl STUDY: CRIMINAL, supra note 188, at 115 (detailed Table 7).
251. LAW ADmINISTRATION, supra note 175, at 42-51, 78.
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gether with the largely settled matters-primarily tort cases-domi-
nated the docket.252 In so duplicating the results of the initial
foray into the subject, the larger study exposed the routine nature
of most scientific inquiry.
Routine inquiry need not be a problem. Indeed, fifty years
later the fact that three times the effort was not likely to even
double the results is not startling. But as the silence and resigna-
tion show, to Clark and his co-workers that fact was doubly de-
pressing. It was depressing, first, because in contrast to the initial
high expectations it seemed as if the field of investigation chosen
by Clark had not been "one of the most fruitful" for scientific re-
search, for the results did not "test the efficacy of our rules of pro-
cedure," nor did they suggest any "further detailed investigations
of social problems" that might be undertaken, much less ways to
trace "the potential law suits which never come to court."
2 3 It
was depressing, second, because from the beginning-the Hutchins-
Clark proposal for an Institute of Procedure-the courts studies
were supposed to reveal the knowledge that would fuel the progress
of reform, specifically the reform of the technical rules of pro-
cedure. 5 ' Yet the increased effort by Clark and his co-workers had
merely generated more evidence of the same conditions that
seemed by and large irrelevant to the cause of reform as they knew
it, since in a system where most cases are uncontested or settled
technical procedure played little part and thus to expend effort
at its reform made little sense.
Taken together the failure of the study to live up to the
initial high expectations and the failure to provide fuel for the
progress of reform suggested that the aims of the project, already
reduced from solving the problems of the administration of jus-
tice255 to "providing valuable information . . . to all those
interested in the processes of law administration and in its im-
provement,"258 ought to be further limited to gaining "experience
.. . in the operation of an extensive survey of civil statistics 2 57
and to providing a stimulus for setting up "a permanent machinery
to supply" "statistical data on judicial administration." 258 Such
252. Id. at 2.
253. See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra.
254. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
255. Report of Acting Dean Hutchins, 1926-27, at 119.
256. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 205, at 4.
257. ALI, A STUDY or TnE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS: PART II, CIVIL CASES 17
(1934) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY: CIL].
258. L.w ADMINISTRATION, supra note 175, at 201.
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an aim was a long way from reform and although Clark, who well
knew exactly what his enterprise was worth as a piece of scientific
research, accepted that reduction in aim, he surely did not revel
in it.2 159 And so in a real sense his experience was thus his undoing;
it sapped the impetus for the doing.
By thus limiting his objectives Clark may have succeeded in
compensating for the debilitating effects of the limited results of
his science. But limited objectives were no defense against the
bewildering demands on one's science made by friendly insiders
and by outsiders, friendly or not.
Of the insiders Samenow and Douglas were the workhorses
of the operation. They apparently did their tasks without quarrel,
maybe even with a bit of relish-indeed both worked on more
than one such research project at a time. The nearly two years
of never quite knowing whether Douglas would leave for the Uni-
versity of Chicago were perhaps unsettling,2 0 but the prolonged
indecision seemed to have no appreciable effect on his work.
Thurman Arnold, however, was a quite different kind of co-
worker. He had been brought to New Haven in part because of
his ostensible interest in both the state and federal courts studies.261
After his arrival in New Haven, Arnold was in fact of some
help,262 but as the project dragged on and he found new and more
259. Id. at 200-01 (almost elegiac in tone) is sufficient proof for this assertion if any
is needed. Regarding the early enthusiasm for the courts studies, Clark noted, "There de-
veloped an ambition and pretention about the objectives and values of this kind of study"
such that "it came to be believed that from the trial court records statistical data could be
collected on all phases of judicial administration and all manner of sociological problems
in litigation, and that the statistical data would be the open sesame to solutions." He con-
tinued, "The authors and workers on this project never regarded the study with such
excessive optimism or gave utterance to claims more extensive than shrewd as to results."
Exactly twenty pages later in the book comes the following quote from the first major
article on the study, Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211, 233
(1928): "It is felt that the limits of possible investigation of this kind are only set by the
capacities of the investigators. Thus it may be possible eventually to go behind the court
records and to trace somewhat the potential law suits which never come into court." Ex-
perience had dimmed memories too.
260. See note 231 supra.
261. Interview with Fleming James, Jr., June 11, 1975. See Gressley, Introduction to
VOLTAIRE AND THE CowBoy: THE LETERs or THURMAN ARNOLD 1, 27 (G. Gressley ed. 1977);
Thurman Arnold to Roscoe Pound, Jan. 23, 1931; Thurman Arnold to Wilson Clough,
Mar. 17, 1931 (recounting offer from Roscoe Pound of a post at Harvard to head another
study of trial courts) in VOLTAsax AND THE CoWBoY: THE Larrms OF THURMAN ARNOLD,
supra, at 176-80. On Arnold, see T. ARNOLn, FAiR FiGHTS AND FOUL (1965) (autobiography);
E. KEARNEY, THUmRAN ARNOr, SocIAL Cmasc (1970); Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The
Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1049
(1971).
262. Arnold helped draft the PRoGRss REPORT and worked on redrafts of both
Samenow's Criminal Report and the Civil Report. Progress Report on the Study of the
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interesting things to do,263 his participation became more prob-
lematical. Clark had difficulty in keeping him at his work, and
Arnold began to question the legitimacy of collecting "mass sta-
tistics." 0"
Arnold's drift away from the enterprise could perhaps be
rationalized by looking at the exciting new things he was doing.
Outsiders, on the other hand, though less personally troublesome,
were more intellectually so, as can be seen from their comments
on the federal courts study's report on criminal litigation. Some
were, of course, simply supportive, though whether reflexively or
reflectively it is often hard to say.205 In contrast, Learned Hand
was thoroughly, but gently, skeptical about the enterprise; though
he suggested that the results were "scarcely worth the extraordi-
nary amount of intelligence and time they have cost," he knew his
role and willingly bestowed his "tinorthodox blessing" on the re-
Business of the Federal Courts, Apr. 30, 1931 (draft); Charles E. Clark to William D. Lewis,
Oct. 21, 1932; Edson R. Sunderland (University of Michigan) to Charles E. Clark, June 20,
1933, Clark papers, Beinecke. Before coming to Yale, while dean at West Virginia, Arnold
did some work for the expanded Connecticut courts study and supervised local pretesting
of the criminal forms for the federal courts study. See Arnold, The Collection of Judicial
Statistics in West Virginia, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 184, 186-87 (1930); Arnold, Review of the Work
of the College of Law, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 319, 322-23, 324 (1930).
263. Most importantly, a seminar, begun in fall 1932-The Judicial Process from the
Point of View of Social Psychology-that he gave with George Dession, Jerome Frank, and
Edward S. Robinson, a professor in the Yale psychology department. The seminar, known
locally as "The Cave of the Winds," (interview with Fleming James, Jr., June 11, 1975)
was unusually successful. Its products included T. AR'oLD, TnE SYMAoLs or GOVERNMENT
(1935), and E. ROBINSON, THE LAW AND THE LAwYERs (1935).
264. See Charles E. Clark to Sam Bass Warner, Jan. 25, 1933; Charles E. Clark to
Edmund Morgan, Feb. 6, 1933; Charles E. Clark to Edson R. Sunderland, Feb. 17, 1933;
Charles E. Clark to Thurman Arnold, July 14, 1933 (draft of proposed Law Review sym-
posium, Arnold to begin with "indictment of mass statistics"), Clark papers, Beinecke.
Cf. LAW ADmiNiSrRATION, supra note 175, at 200 ("Many persons became interested-some
genuinely, others momentarily.").
Questions about the genuineness of Arnold's commitment to the courts studies have
been raised, for example, by Fleming James, Jr., Interview, June 11, 1975. Arnold was an
incredible opportunist, and there seems to have been some opportunism in his move to
Yale. However, an alternative explanation fits the facts of Arnold's participation in the
courts studies at least as well as does one that stresses his opportunism. A quick review of
his biography suggests that Arnold's main intellectual characteristic was possession of the
attention span of a two-year-old. Once he left practice he changed interests every two or
three years. Ultimately, however, he returned to practice, for only there did problems
change fast enough. Thus, I rather credit Arnold's profession of interest in the courts
studies, at least at the outset.
265. See, e.g., William I. Grubb to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 18, 1933; Edwin Sutherland
(University of Chicago sociologist and author of study of the federal courts) to Charles E,
Clark, Jan. 17, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke. From some came backhanded consolation.
Edson R. Sunderland to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 21, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke ("If it had
been known in advance to what extent statistical methods would lead to important affirma-
tive conclusions, a study of that scope would never have been undertaken.").
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port.20 6 The Harvard establishment presented a more disconcert-
ing problem, however.
To some extent Clark had created his problems at Harvard.
True to an ideal of objective social science and also a bit gun-shy
because of the Commission's objections to the conclusions in the
preliminary report, he sent out the draft of the criminal report
virtually devoid of any conclusions or interpretive material. This
action had the support of William Draper Lewis, executive direc-
tor of the ALI, who was as worried as Clark about the problems
of getting any conclusions approved by his diverse member-
ship.6 7 Many of the most thoughtful readers were not at all
bothered by this mode of presentation. Mr. Justice Roberts, for
example, was pleased with the "great discretion and fairness of
appraisement," and Thomas E. Atkinson, a professor at Kansas,
found the report "interesting" and "of great value.- 268 But Clark's
Harvard friends were not so charitable.
Monte Lemann, for example, found that the final report fell
short of fulfilling the expectations created by the preliminary
one.22 Sam Bass Warner, who had done similar work himself,
found the report a "jumble of figures without any special mean-
ing or significance," suggested that Clark or Arnold or "some other
genius.., dream about it for the next six months and... com-
pletely rewrite it with a view to emphasizing the nuggets dis-
covered," and then delivered the unkindest blow of all by
suggesting it was "no better than a good Johns Hopkins report."
270
His colleague Edmund Morgan agreed."' Felix Frankfurter sug-
gested that since the study presented neither "vivid illumination
of the workings" of the lower federal courts nor "exploraton of a
new technique for securing such illumination," "scholarship would
266. Learned Hand to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 3, 193, Clark papers, Beinecke. (I sit
"silent before the authority of statisticians, those modem magicians, who would enslave us
all, except for their own benign internecine warfare.').
267. See note 235 supra & accompanying text.
268. Owen D. Roberts to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 20, 1938; Thomas E. Atkinson to
Charles E. Clark, Jan. 25, 1933 ("dry" Kansas had "wet" judges), Clark papers, Beinecke.
269. Monte Lemann to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 13, 1933 (question whether the report
as a whole adds enough to existing information to justify the money and work); Feb. 16,
1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
270. Sam Bass Warner to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 25, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke;
see S. WARNER, CluME AND CRaIMNAL STATisTcs IN BostoN (1934); Warner, Survey of
Criminal Statistics in the United States, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL STATISTICS 19 (1931).
271. Edmund Morgan to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 24, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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not be advanced" by publication of the report.272 In support of his
conclusion, he presented a memo written by an unnamed "pro-
fessional friend," in reality Henry Hart, then in his first year of
teaching, that was an outrageous hatchet job done with little un-
derstanding of the project.
7 3
Clark was both unhappy with the criticism and slightly liber-
ated by it. Exasperated, he complained to Warner, "A few years
ago the cry was all for collecting many figures. Now it is to col-
lect hardly any and interpret."27 4 Yet he admitted that the cry for
interpretation "clears the air and prepares the way for a report
and a set of conclusions which we have for some time felt we
would like to make, but which, in view of the institutional nature
of the study and its backing from diverse sources, we did not want
to send out with the first draft." 275; Of course, when the conclu-
sions arrived, some of the same parties complained-for example,
Morgan. He argued that although the study disclosed no real ob-
stacles to law enforcement, such as "technicalities, delays, . . . irra-
tional juries [and] appeals on obsolete doctrinal points," neither
did it "indicate their absence"; thus, it did not negate the possi-
bility that the "long line of offenders pleading guilty with great
regularity" was evidence that "the regular system of examining
into the merits" was "so unsatisfactory that both the prosecution
and defense sought compromise rather than trial."270 Clark, by
272. Felix Frankfurter to Charles E. Clark, Apr. 3, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
273. Clark identifies Hart's authorship in Charles E. Clark to Max Lowenthal, Sept.
19, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke. The Hart memo was untitled and undated. It began with
the objection that "on almost no point have we" concrete factual, statistical information
"in the sense of data establishing beyond peradventure a conclusion," as well as that the
number of districts surveyed and the time period covered were limited. Hart objected as
well to the failure to disaggregate cases by type when examining time between commence-
ment of prosecution and disposition. These criticisms are well beside the mark. Establish-
ing anything "beyond peradventure" with the kind of data in question is virtually im-
possible. The defect in sampling is not the number of districts nor the number of years
but the weak scientific basis for the sample chosen, and the figures for anything but the
shortest durations are so small that disaggregation would have robbed them of what little
significance they had. Perhaps Hart knew no better. If so, then comments like "One won-
ders why when detailed study was made of so many trivial matters, conclusions as impor-
tant as this one (duration by type of case] were left to guessing" or "Many times one gains
the strong feeling that things have simply been counted indiscriminately . . . as if all facts
were free and equal" were simply out of line. Twenty-five years later Clark was still
haunted by Hart's last assertion, which a careful reading of the report in the light of the
accepted reform proposals of the day would dispel. See Charles E. Clark to Filmer S. C.
Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law.
274. Charles E. Clark to Sam Bass Warner, Jan. 25, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
Challenged, Warner backed down with an admission that it took much time to complete
his own study that was almost exclusively of secondary data. Sam Bass Warner to Charles
E. Clark, Feb. 3, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
275. Charles E. Clark to Monte Lemann, Feb. ?, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
276. Edmund Morgan to Charles E. Clark, May 1, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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this time virtually shell-shocked, was ready to change his tune and
not only to argue against appending conclusions to his study, but
also to maintain that with the coming of the New Deal the pre-
vailing practice had changed from collection of fact to "action
without even looking at the consequences," and that this change
had done the study in. 7
Clark's difficulties with his external audience were a bit be-
wildering, especially when one considers the content of the report.
He had managed to examine 70,000 cases in thirteen well-selected
district courts. 278 Presentation was clear, if not expeditious. The
pattern that emerged from the figures was again much like that
of modem criminal procedure; most cases were disposed of on
guilty pleas with relatively lenient sentences.2 79 As a result indict-
ments were at times dispensed with, especially in liquor cases;
few motions were filed; few trials were held; those trials held were
of short duration; verdicts were appealed only when imprison-
ment was the sentence; and appeals were not often successful.8
Interestingly, the report concluded that plea bargaining in the
federal courts had begun about 1916 with the rise of federal
criminal liability for what would otherwise be thought of as local
law enforcement problems, such as auto theft, prostitution and
narcotics, and suggested that the practice be recognized and regu-
larized.21 All in all the report was, and still is, quite informative
and useful.
Given the negative reaction to the careful work, based on
rather extensive data, in the criminal report, Clark must have sent
out the draft of the civil report with trepidation. Here Clark had
nearly 10,000 cases collected in haste during the last few months
of the study.82 And presentation of what data there were was
complicated by the existence of separate law, admiralty and equity
277. Charles E. Clark to Edmund Morgan, May 2, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
Why Clark took Morgan seriously after Morgan had admitted that he had "no burning
enthusiasm" for the study as he was "not born an artist" and that appointment to
Clark's advisory committee "did not light the necessary fire" within him, "perhaps be-
cause there was no ignitable material," is not dear. Edmund Morgan to Charles E. Clark,
Feb. 4, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke. Perhaps Clark valued the apparent, if not actual,
disinterest.
278. AL STuDY: CRIMIrNAL, supra note 188, at 109.
279. Id. at 115 (detailed Table 7).
280. Id. at 59-67, 71, 81-83, 104-05.
281. Id. at 13. This recommendation supported one recently aired, Miller, Compro-
mise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927). At least one of Clark's readers op-
posed the idea, Orin K. McMurry to Charles E. Clark, June 19, 1933, Clark papers,
Beinecke.
282. ALI STUy: CiViL, supra note 257, at 115.
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dockets, each with its own procedural vocabulary, and by the
overlay of federal civil actions for forfeitures and penalties.
Even more important, but for the materials on the use of the di-
versity jurisdiction, precious little about the activities of the fed-
eral courts emerged beyond the prevalence of settlements, the
limited incidence of jury trials, and the relative expedition with
which cases, especially those permitting nonjury trials, were dis-
posed of."" A very careful reader might have noticed the relative
unwillingness of the federal government to settle cases, 2 4 but that
was about all.
This time, however, except of course for a continuingly skep-
tical Learned Hand, the reviewers, especially those from Harvard,
found the report thoroughly satisfactory.28 Frankfurter com-
mented, "Not only have you posed important problems-you have
gone a long way towards shedding much light on them"; he even
claimed to have gotten Clark started in the business of studying
courts.2 6 Lemann found the report both interesting and useful,
and lamented that time and a lack of money had limited its scope;
Warner found it both very good and understated. 87 Clark intuited
a reason for the change in tune. In between circulating drafts of
the first and second reports, he had published his piece on the
diversity jurisdiction. As that piece supported the frankfurterian-
liberal reformist position on the legislation to limit corporate
access to the diversity jurisdiction,8 8 Frankfurter and his friends
supported Clark's research; it was all as predictable as Wicker-
sham's action had been. However, the existence of such a reason
was hardly comforting and, taken together with the earlier objec-
tions, showed at best a perverse preference for the results of a poor
283. Compare id. at 65-69, 86-92, with note 176 supra & accompanying text.
284. ALl STUDY: CiviL, supra note 257, at 66.
285. See, e.g., Monte Lemann to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 6, 1933 (interesting and
useful; regrets that time and money limited scope); Learned Hand to Charles E. Clark,
Oct. 3, 1933 ("I do not now see what advantage will be got out of this extremely careful
and meritorious collection."), Clark papers, Beinecke.
Friendly people said the usual friendly things. See, e.g., Thomas E. Atkinson to
Charles E. Clark, Sept. 21, 1933 (excellent); William I. Grubb to Charles E. Clark, Sept.
15, 1933 ("fine work"); Max Lowenthal to Charles E. Clark, Sept. 9, 1933 ("thoroughly
worthwhile job"; now try an observational study); Edwin H. Sutherland to Charles E.
Clark, Sept. 25, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
286. Felix Frankfurter to Charles E. Clark, Sept. 20, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
287. Monte Lemann to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 6, 1933; Sam Bass Warner to Charles
E. Clark, Oct. 9, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.
288. Charles E. Clark to Edson R. Sunderland, Sept. 29, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke.




job over those of a good one that conflicted with Clark's newly
acquired scientific values.
However bewildering to Clark, the outsiders' reaction to the
Study of the Business of the federal courts nevertheless illumi-
nates the understanding of empirical legal research held by Clark
and his contemporaries. Clark had spoken of the knowledge that
was prerequisite to reform.8 9 In so doing, he spoke from within
a tradition of "progressive" reform through the gathering of "the
facts"2 0 that dated back through Brandeis' brief in Muller v.
Oregon at least as far as the Sanitary Commission's investigations
during the civil war.291 While Clark had altered that tradition, at
least in its legal branch, by yoking it more firmly with the emerg-
ing quantitative social science of the time, he. had at the same
time affirmed it in two important ways. First, he affirmed the ac-
tivist aspect of the tradition that saw and focused scientific inquiry
in terms of its usefulness in securing desired reforms. Second, he
affirmed its model of the way the world to be inquired into was
structured-congested courts, procedural shenanigans, and all-
289. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
290. Thus it is no accident that the initial piece on the Connecticut courts study
was entitled "Fact Research in Law Administration." See note 174 supra (emphasis added).
291. I recognize that my concept of "the progressive reform tradition" needs further
definition. In particular it is no longer dear that the participants in it were in any
sense "progressive" or their objective "reform." Indeed one might quite cogently argue
that these individuals were slightly "reactionary" and their objective the further entrench-
ment of privilege. See, e.g., T. ElsELr, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE:
TIH AMEmIcAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISis OF Au-
THORITY (1977), R. WixnE, Tim SEARCH FR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967). But to resolve all of
the questions would further balloon this already overly long presentation. I plan to attack
the problem after completing an article on the work of Underhill Moore. In the mean-
time the concept can serve as a convenient shorthand for the thought and activities of a
group of individuals active in what has been traditionally seen as liberal politics between
the end of the Civil War and the First World War.
Professor Robert Gordon has suggested that what I have described as a "tradition"
might aptly be termed a kuhnian "paradigm." See T. KUHN, THE STRucrmuE OF ScmNTIFc
REVOLUTIONS (1962). While the progressive reform tradition, which continues to this day,
is durable enough to qualify as, and has other aspects of, a paradigm, especially in the way
that disconfirming evidence is either ignored as unintelligible or imported into the tradi-
tion in an ad hoc fashion, I have chosen not to use Kuhn's concept. I am convinced that
the progressive reform tradition is not so fully formed to qualify as a paradigm and I
doubt whether constructs of social reality change in the way Kuhn suggests that scientific
paradigms do, although social constructs surely do not change in the manner dictated by
the scientific rationalism of Kuhn's opponents. Moreover, the alternative tradition in
which Clark moved, that of academic social science, is even less fully formed in the
twenties and thirties, since at that time structural functionalism was by no means fully
entrenched. Thus, in order to deal with this tradition I would have to develop a notion
of quasi or emergent paradigm. For me these concerns counsel against further stretching
Kuhn's already badly battered concept. On the other hand, if the resonance from this
well known concept aids the reader's understanding, I surely have no objection to equat-
ing "tradition" and "paradigm."
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as well as its prescription of technical procedural reform as the
way to eliminate the perceived defects in that structure. But, as
noted earlier,292 somewhere in the course of his research Clark
acquired part of a different tradition, that of the new academic
social science. In his work he affirmed aspects of that tradition as
well, especially the young social scientists' concern for method
that in part replaced the old model of the way the world to be
inquired into was structured, and their recognition of a more
attenuated relationship between scientific inquiry and desired
reforms.
Clark was confused by the intersection of these two tradi-
tions, as can be seen from his reaction to the later Connecticut
Courts' work.293 There the results did not fit with the received
understanding of how the legal world was structured, and more-
over suggested that the reforms that the research was done to sup-
port were largely irrelevant. Faced with this discontinuity between
the expectations generated through his participation in the pro-
gressive reform tradition and the results of his research, Clark
hesitated a while, but ultimately published the work anyway. In
doing so he drew on his commitment to the traditions of the newer
academic social science, although his analysis never fully broke
free of the other tradition.
294
In contrast, the troublesome outsiders who so bewildered
Clark by their perverse preference for the bad over the good were
292. See text accompanying notes 246-47 supra.
293. It would be a mistake to see these two traditions as somehow "competing" for
Clark's soul. They were not in any real sense competing at all. First, they shared the
same slightly left-of-center politics and a view of reform related to that politics. Second,
the social science tradition largely lacked an agreed model of the way the world to be
inquired into was structured. What took its place was a rather virulent positivism. If a
metaphoric description of their claims on Clark's attention is needed, the best is "diver-
gent."
294. For example, although the federal courts study managed to dispel the myth
of the congestion of the criminal courts, when reporting on civil cases in Connecticut,
the problem of congestion, especially in negligence actions, reappeared though it was
evidenced only by moderate delay in disposition and that delay was greater for contract
than for negligence actions. Compare LAiw ADMINIMST'rO, supra note 175, at 35, 168-70,
with id. at 37, 39 (Table XV). Similarly, Clark's evaluation of the jury, id. at 79, went
far beyond his data, id. at 59-78, particularly with respect to the use of Clark's pet
procedural device, the summary judgment. Here, as I suspect is often the case, Clark's
academic interests and commitments hobbled his understanding in ways that his collection
of everyday views of criminal law did not hobble his understanding of criminal pro-
ceedings in the federal courts.
It is wonderfully ironic, as Professor Fred Konefsky has pointed out to me, that Clark's
search for a better technique of fact finding to support activist reform led him to a tra-
dition that, through its own primary concerns with being scientific, acted as a drag on the
very activism that led Clark to seek it out.
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not confused at all. They were squarely within but one tradition,
that of progressive reform, and their reaction to the federal courts
study proved it. When, as in the criminal report, the study simply
had knowledge to supply, when it was irrelevant, if not poten-
tially undermining, to the cause of reform as the liberal reformers
conceived of it, they were hostile; when, as in the civil report, it
supported liberal reform proposals, they were pleased. 2 5 In so
doing they reacted quite similarly to the way Clark had initially
reacted to the enlarged Connecticut courts study, but they could
not, and would not, react as Clark had ultimately done. They were
completely outside the social science tradition; thus, the fact that
Clark's fact gathering was a "scientific" enterprise made no differ-
ence. Fact gathering that did not advance an immediate reform
objective was scholarship not worth publishing, just as fact gather-
ing that did not fit their model of how the world was structured
was an "irrelevant jumble of figures." They would give or with-
hold their support for the newer empirical research in law just as
they had for the older research.
Thus, the origins of empirical legal research in the progres-
sive tradition of searching for the facts that would provide the
basis for reform partly impeded the research enterprise it had gen-
erated. Because the heirs of the old progressive reformers wished
the newer research to continue to fuel reform as the old research
had done, by providing the facts indicated by their model of the
way the world was structured, they refused to extend plainly ex-
pected and needed support to the newer research, unless their
wishes were met. Deprived of support from these obvious allies,
Clark and others who wished to do empirical legal research might
have turned to the emerging social scientific community and its
tradition for support; however, an attempt to gain support from
that community presented its own problems.
B. Business Failures and Auto Accidents
The establishment of the Institute of Human Relations
brought a small influx of social scientists to Yale. Each was at-
295. Further evidence of this proposition, if any be needed, can be found in Edmund
Morgan's review of the Connecticut courts study, which began with the observation that
the "results can hardly be called starting or even of prime importance" and finished with
the assertion that, as there was no "interpretation" of the data, the "chief contribution"
of the book was as an "exposition of a method of investigation," which showed its "defi-
ciencies and excellencies." Morgan, Book Review, 51 HARv. L. Rv. 1133 (1988).
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tached to a regular academic unit in the university as a result of
a decision, designed to wed the university's schools and depart-
ments more closely to the Institute, that no one, not even persons
whose major occupation would be Institute-sponsored research,
would be solely a member of the Institute's staff.20 Two of these
social scientists-Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Emma Corstvet-
were attached to the law school. Both were recruited by Donald
Slesinger, who acted as "Hutchins' headhunter" and secretary of
the Institute.2 97 Formally both would seem to have been more at
home intellectually in the department of economics, sociology and
government. Unfortunately, that department would have no part
of the Institute or its personnel, despite the fact that one of the
department's members had been put on the Institute's executive
committee in order to foster departmental cooperation, so they
were assigned to the law school. 21 8 Yet even in such circumstances
both were genuinely quite pleased with their new associations.2 9
They lived together with two other similarly minded women and
were together known as the "four graces" or the "71 Dwight
Street crowd"-so named for their residence, a gathering place
for junior faculty 00 All were fascinated by statistics; 30 1 on the
basis of their training and the emerging statistical ethos in many
areas of social science, they both advocated and participated in
the statistically quantifiable social science that was plainly the new
wave of the time 0 2 There, however, the similarity ended.
296. May, A Retrospective View of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale, 6 BE-
HIAVIOR SCI. NOTES 141, 143 (1971). This piece, written by the long-time director of the
Institute, is the only history of it. It is strongest in showing what the Institute accom-
plished, but weakest when depicting how difficult accomplishment was.
297. The phrase is that of Dorothy Thomas, interview, June 3, 1975. Emma Corstvct
concurs that this was Slesinger's role, interview Aug. 19, 1975. The three people are con-
nected by their work at the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial. See note 102 supra;
notes 303.04 infra.
298. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975; Charles Seymour to James
Rowland Angell, Mar. 15, 1928, Angell papers. The department was the private preserve
of the shade of William Graham Sumner and run by his protege A. G. Keller, both of
whom thought empirical social research of a quantifiable nature was somehow anathema.
See Oberschall, The Institutionalization of American Sociology, in TnE FsrADLISix-
MENT OF EMPImCAL SOCIOLOGY, 187, 222 (A. Oberschall ed. 1972). Cf. Interview with Mark
May, June 9, 1975 ("Hutchins would have taken a two bit whore.").
299. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975; interview with Emma
Corstvet, Aug. 19, 1975.
800. Interview with Donald Slesinger, July 8, 1975.
301. Emma Corstvet remembers keeping statistics about the effect of weather on
telephone calls and the effect of colors on male callers. Emma Corstvet Llewellyn to John
Henry Schlegel, Oct. 20, 1975.
802. On the use of statistics in social science, see R. HINXLE & G. HINELE, THE DE-
VELOPMENT or MODERN SOCIOLOGY 22-28 (1954); Oberschall, The Institutionalization of
American Sociology, in Tim ESTABLISHMENT OF EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY 187 (A. Oberschall ed.
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Of the two, Dorothy Thomas was the more formally edu-
cated. She came with a reputation as a methodologist of real
sophistication, based largely on her Ph.D. dissertation, a statis-
tical inquiry into the social consequences of business cycles that
she did under a pioneer English statistician, but also based on her
subsequent attempt to establish techniques for increasing the re-
liability of observations of human behavior. 3  Emma Corstvet, on
the other hand, came with impeccable progressive credentials and
a vital interest in social problems, accompanied by a then still
fashionable anti-degree bias and decent training in statistics3 04
Thomas was the first hired; she came as a consultant in summer
1929 to help decide what the Institute should be doing,30 5 and
stayed on as a part-time research associate and then as a full-time
associate professor, starting in fall 193O.30O Corstvet, lacking equiva-
1972) (seemingly overdrawn); Lazarsfeld, On Becoming an Immigrant, in 2 PansP. AM. HIST.
286, 251-52 (1968) (recounting his introduction in America of the notion of spurious cor-
relation in 1933); Stepan, History of the Uses of Modern Sampling Procedures, 43 AM.
STATISTICAL A.J. 12 (1948). See also A. OBEPSCgRALL, EMPIRICAL SociAL SEARCH IN GER-
MANY (1965) (no tradition of such research before World War I).
803. Interview with Donald Slesinger, Aug. 8, 1975; interview with Dorothy Swaine
Thomas, June 3, 1975; Thomas, Contribution to the Herman Wold Festschrift in SCIEN-
TIsTs AT WoRK: FasrscSsmFr IN HoNoUR oF HERMAN WoLD 216 (T. Dalenuis, G. Karlson, &
S, Malmquist eds., 1970); Washington Post, May 5, 1977, § C, at 6, col. 1 (obituary).
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, b. 1899. A.B. 1922, Columbia; Ph.D. 1924, University of London,
School of Economics. Her thesis, Social Aspects of the Business Cycle (1925), was done
under Arthur L. Bowley. In 1927, after taking short appointments with the New York
Federal Reserve Bank as a statistician, the Social Science Research Council as a postdoc-
toral fellow, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial working for W. I. Thomas,
she went to Columbia Teachers College. Her work there resulted in publication of SOME
NEw TECHNIQUES FOR STUDYING SOCmAL BEHAVIOR (1929).
304. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. Emma Corstvet lewel-
lyn, b. 1898. B.A. 1918, University of Wisconsin, study at Bryn Mawr, 1918-19 (economics,
statistics), University of London, School of Economics, 1923-24. While an undergraduate
she took courses from Commons and Tawney and worked for the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission. As a result of both experiences she became interested in the causes of poverty,
a subject she pursued in graduate school. In between her two stints of what she termed
"desultory" graduate study, she worked in Wisconsin and then tried Paris for a while.
After returning from London, she worked for the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial,
first as a translator and later in criminological studies. From there, in late 1927, she went
to Peking with a job as a teacher in a school that had closed by the time she arrived. In
order to remain in China she worked on a newspaper until 1929, when after another stay
in Paris, she returned to the United States.
305. Institute of Human Relations, Executive Committee, Minutes, June 11, 1929,
Angell papers (she will map out "existing statistical data" and preview "methodological
difficulties" in studies). Her report, Thomas, A Survey of Some Materials Relevant to the
Development of a Social Science Program, Sept. 15, 1929, Angell papers, acknowledged
the "tremendous value" of "path-finding studies, depending on the analysis of behavior
records, life histories, etc.," but strongly pushed the use of statistical methods, especially
new ones designed to get "fundamental quantitative data on behavior and social milieu."
806. Clark had a bit of trouble securing faculty approval for the appointment be-




lent: degrees, was first hired in late fall 1929 as a full-time research
associate. Each was put to work on an existing project: Thomas on
William 0. Douglas' business failures project, Corstvet on Charles
E. Clark's study of the compensation received by auto accident
victims. The work on these two projects by these two women illus-
trates the problems faced by Clark and others when seeking sup-
port for the doing of empirical legal research by engaging in overtly
collaborative efforts with members of the social science community.
Douglas' project was older and farther along when social
science assistance in the form of Dorothy Thomas arrived. 807
Douglas, who had taught bankruptcy while he was a part-time
instructor at Columbia, thought up the project in summer 1928
right after he moved from Columbia to Yale. 0 8 The original con-
ception, announced in September 1928, was grand; its object was
taken to be an inquiry into the "functioning of the whole credit
system of the country."30 9 This inquiry was to take as its "point of
departure administration of the bankruptcy laws."310 Douglas iso-
lated two initial targets for the inquiry: the efficiency of the
various methods of liquidating and salvaging a business and the
extent of fraudulent practices in bankruptcy."1 ' Although naming
these two targets was the only specification Douglas could give of
"the actualities of bankruptcy administration which in the past
have been engulfed in so much misunderstanding and doubt as to
bring the whole system at times under suspicion and disrespect, 312
307. Douglas' investigations have been briefly chronicled once before. Hopkirk, The
Influence of Legal Realism on William 0. Douglas, in ESSAYS ON THE AaMEIuCAN CONSrTU-
MoN 59, 69-75 (G. Dietz ed. 1964).
808. On Douglas' move from Columbia to Yale, see W. DOUGLAS, Go EAsr, YouNG
MAN 161-63 (1974), an account that reflects a certain amount of license in its composition
while it quite accurately captures the flavor of events. For example, Douglas suggests that
he was offered a job at Yale the morning after he first met Hutchins, that his proposed
salary at Chicago was to be $25,000, and that he was offered the Deanship of the Yale Law
School in 1937. Id. at 163, 164, 281. All are possible but none are likely. The first is
doubtful, see Yale Minutes, May 10, 1928, May 18, 1928, May 81, 1928; Robert M. Hutchins
to James R. Angell, May 24, 1928, Angell papers. The second is equally so, see note 231
supra. The third is even more doubtful since the deanship wasn't open at the time, as
Clark was reappointed to a second five-year term in spring 1934, and the faculty minutes
contain no evidence of any such offers having been made. On the other hand, Douglas'
stories about the intoxicated Thurman Arnold or a rather stuffy Charles Clark dealing
with a student caught with a girl in his room, whether accurate or not, capture their
subjects beautifully. W. DOUGLAS, supra, at 167, 171.
809. Address by W. 0. Douglas, 3 J. NAT'. A. REF. BANKR. 48,48 (1928).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 49.
312. Id. at 50. Douglas gave no more evidence for the assertion that "the whole sys.
tem" had at times been "under suspicion and disrespect" than Hutchins and Clark had
given two years before, see text accompanying note 46 supra, or the auto accident investi-
gators would give three years later, see note 378 infra & accompanying text.
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he did know what resources would be required in order to make
his investigation: three years and $60,000 to pay for the expenses
of two roving teams-one of economists "looking at the facts from
the economic, business and social angle" and one of lawyers "look-
ing at them from the legal, administrative angle." 313
Where Douglas got the idea for the project is unclear, al-
though it bears certain family resemblances to the original
Hutchins-Clark Connecticut courts proposal first funded not six
months earlier,3 14 and a hint of an idea first put forth in the
Columbia curriculum study.315 For some reason, funding was ex-
pected from the Social Science Research Council for work that
was to have begun in the Southern District of New York.316 The
funding, however, did not appear. What did appear was the
United States Department of Commerce, which expressed inter-
est in Douglas' project, apparently because it fit into the Depart-
ment's own "national retail credit survey," begun in 1928 at the
"request of an organization of retail merchants" and already in
progress in two cities. 17 As a result of the Department's interest,
the business failures project began not in New York, but in Phila-
delphia, with a study of the causes of failure of retail grocers.
The size of the Philadelphia inquiry made in spring 1929
was small-35 grocers0 8 Law students acting as dollar-a-year spe-
cial agents of the Department of Commerce did the work of ex-
amining court records and interviewing bankrupts31 9 Given the
size of the unscientifically chosen sample and the rather cavalier
use of even such rudimentary notions as an "average," only in the
loosest sense was the study scientific. Yet from an examination of
313. Douglas, supra note 309, at 50.
314. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
315. Underhill Moore, Douglas, and Douglas' friend Carrol Shanks, acting as the
Committee on Business Unit, had suggested that a group consisting of "a statistician, an
accountant, several specialists in business, and a number in law" do general research on the
subject of business associations, a course that was apparently to include bankruptcy.
Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pt. 3), 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, 23 (1955).
316. Memo from Charles E. Clark to Executive Committee of Institute of Human
Relations, Oct. ?, 1929, attached as Appendix 3 to Minutes of Executive Committee, In-
stitute of Human Relations, Oct. 7, 1929, IHR files.
317. W. PLUMMER & P. RITER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRADE INFORMATION BULL.
No. 700, CREDrr EXTENSION AND CAUSES OF FAILURE AMONG PHILADFLPmA GRocERS ii (1930).
Earlier a study had been begun in Louisville. See U.S. DEP'T oF COfMERCE, TRADE INFOR-
MATioN BULL. No. 627, CREDrr EXTENSIONS AND BusmSS FAILtaEs (1929). Paul 0. Ritter,
one of the joint authors of this study, had worked on it for credit as one of Douglas' re-
search assistants during spring 1929, the last semester of his third year of law school. Paul
0. Ritter to John Henry Schlegel, June 5, 1977.
318. W. PLUMMER & P. RrrrER, supra note 317, at 1.
319. Paul 0. Ritter to John Henry Schlegel, June 5, 1977.
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this sample the investigators concluded that credit losses had con-
tributed to the failure of only a few of these businesses, while "un-
scientific business practices" and "losses in real estate investment
and speculation" had contributed to failure in many more of the
cases.320 They also found, with some surprise, that despite adher-
ence to a principle of creditor control of insolvency proceedings,
most of the bankruptcies returned little to the creditors, that at-
torneys' fees ate up much of the limited assets available for pay-
ments to creditors, and that the entire process took a relatively
long time.22 It was a start.
While the Philadelphia study was underway, Douglas' project
got the first of two unexpected boosts when in spring 1929 a bank-
ruptcy scandal broke out in the Southern District of New York.
22
Several lawyers and some district court personnel were indicted
for bribery, subornation of perjury, and conspiracy to defraud
creditors in a grand jury investigation that had disclosed wide-
spread filing of collusive or solicited voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcies. 323 The grand jury report accompanying the indict-
ments suggested that a thorough investigation of bankruptcy ad-
ministration in the district be made, and the United States
Attorney, acting on that suggestion, petitioned the District Court
to institute such an investigation.2 The District Court chose one
of its members, Thomas D. Thatcher, to hold the investigation,
and he invited the major local bar associations to participate.2
With the consent of the United States Attorney, the associations
were ordered to conduct the investigation under the direction of
"their counsel," Col. William J. Donovan 2' From the beginning,
the investigation was directed not only at the corrupt practices
discovered in the grand jury investigations, but also at reform of
320. W. PLIMMER & P. RT=ER, supya note 317, at 1.
321. Id. at 10.
322. Donovan, Report of Counsel to Petitioners filed in In re An Inquiry into the
Administration of Bankrupts Estates, No. 501 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 22, 1930) in HousE CoMi.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 71sT CONG., 3D SESS., ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPT EsTATES (Comm.
Print 1931). The investigation is briefly recounted in G. MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLIcrS
226-27 (1970).
323. Donovan, supra note 322, at 79-81.
324. Id. at 64-65 (Order of Judge Thatcher, Mar. 23, 1929).
325. Id. Thomas D. Thatcher, b. 1881. A.B. 1904, Yale; 1904-06 Yale Law School.
Practice at Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett, 1906. Dist. Judge S.D.N.Y., 1925. Solicitor General,
1930, practice, 1933. Judge N.Y. Ct. App. 1943. d. 1950.
326. Donovan, supra note 322, at 64-65. William J. Donovan, b. 1883. A.B. 1905,
LL.B. 1907, Columbia. Practice in Buffalo, N.Y. 1907. Asst. Attorney General 1924, Assist-
ant to Attorney General 1925. Partner Donovan, Newton, Leisure 8- Irvine 1930. Dir.
O.S.S. 1942-45. d. 1959.
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bankruptcy administration generally, and thus of the Bankruptcy
Act. As part of this effort at bankruptcy law reform, Douglas was
asked to prepare a comparative study of bankruptcy administra-
tion in the United States, England, Canada, France, and Germany,
and an analysis of the various rules adopted by district courts for
administering the Bankruptcy Act. 27 Douglas read most of the
study as his "testimony" before Judge Thatcher. There were two
principal findings of his study. First, English and Canadian prac-
tice often limited discharge when American practice did not, par-
ticularly in cases of the use of business funds for speculative or
other nonbusiness purposes, and in cases of failure to keep ade-
quate business records. 28 Second, English and Canadian practice
seemed on the whole more efficient, more businesslike, and less
creditor-controlled than American practice. 29
Although the purest of library research, Douglas' study for
the Donovan investigation advanced the business failures project
in two ways. First, its principal findings fit in nicely with the
findings in the Philadelphia grocers study. In Philadelphia,
Douglas discovered the existence of objectionable practices by
debtors that the English and Canadian statutes suggested might
be corrected with legal controls. Similarly the inefficiencies in
bankruptcy administration that Douglas found seemed to be
avoided in England and Canada. Second, Douglas' research gained
him the appreciation of Col. Donovan and a certain amount of
public recognition among those persons interested in bankruptcy
reform. Among those persons was William Clark, a United States
District Judge for the District of New Jersey. He gave the busi-
ness failures project its second boost when he convinced Douglas
and the Department of Commerce to move their cooperative in-
vestigation to Newark and to expand it from grocers to all bank-
rupts, including wage earners. 330
While Douglas' project was getting these twin boosts, he be-
gan another branch of his projected study of the efficiency of the
327. Record, vol. 28, at 2, In re An Inquiry Into the Administration of Bankruptcy
Estates, No. 501 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1929) (Testimony of William 0. Douglas). I am in-
debted to Mr. Al Borner, librarian at Donovan, Leisure, Newton, and Irvine, New York,
New York for supplying me with a copy of this testimony.
Paul 0. Ritter, Douglas' assistant, did a field study of banks and trust companies
acting as receivers in bankruptcy proceedings for the investigation. Paul 0. Ritter to
John Henry Schlegel, June 5, 1977.
328. Record, supra note 327, at 28, 33-36.
329. Id. at 38-39, 48-49, 52-54,59-63.
330. Clark, Douglas, & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem in
Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Business Failures 11.
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various devices for liquidating or salvaging a business, with an
investigation of the court records of the equity receiverships
brought in the Federal District Court in Connecticut.8 31 This
project and the New Jersey project, together with the results of
the Philadelphia study, were sufficient to secure the agreement of
the Institute of Human Relations to fund the business failures
project generally, even though "as a matter of policy it was thought
unwise to take over a school or department project and put it on
the Institute budget. 8 32 After a year's worth of work, Douglas had
finally secured relatively stable financing.
With financing thus secured, Douglas took time to re-examine
his conception of the project as a whole as he prepared his first
written report on it. This time he abandoned the notion that his
project was in any sense a study of the whole credit system of the
country; it was a study of business failures pure and simple.
85
And with a year's experience he could specify a little better what
he meant by a study of business failures. He contemplated three
kinds of studies: one of the causes of business failures, the Newark
study; another of "the efficiency of the administrative machinery
employed in reorganizing or liquidating" a business, the equity
receivership study plus parts of the Newark study; and a third of
"the incidences of the [business] failure as measured by the effect
on the owners, the creditors, the employees and other groups in
the community," a study not yet begun.34
Douglas accompanied this restatement of his project with a
long report on a completed portion of the enterprise, a study of
the forty-four equity receiverships instituted in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut in the previous ten
years 35 The report drew no real conclusions80 but emphasized
the high cost of fees paid to a seemingly inordinate number of
officials-receivers, attorneys, appraisers, and the like-participat-
331. Douglas & Weir, Equity Receiverships in the United States District Court for
Connecticut: 1920-1929, 4 CONN. B.J. 1 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Equity Receiverships].
332. Institute of Human Relations, Executive Committee, Minutes, Oct. 7, 1929, IHR
files. How early the contemporary world of university research funding does appearl
333. Equity Receiverships, supra note 331, at 1.
334. Id. at 2.
335. Id. at 3.
336. I detect here the influence of Dorothy Thomas. The tone of the entire report,
except for one item discussed at note 339 infra, is the same as that of the earlier Philadel-
phia study, but no conclusions are drawn. Douglas had met Thomas in early summer
1929 (Donald Slesinger to James A. Angell, June ?, 1929, IHR files); she worked part-time
at Yale during fall 1929.
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ing in the proceedings and the tendency of these officials, other
than those attorneys acting as such, to be untrained for their
duties.3 7 He also noted that although the object of an equity re-
ceivership was to avoid the liquidation of the business that would
occur in bankruptcy,38 most of the receiverships undertaken had
headed or seemed to be headed toward liquidation anyway.339
For some reason Douglas never followed up on the equity
receiverships study directly;340 instead he turned his energies
toward the Newark study of the "causes" of business failures. The
key to this study was to be a "clinic" at which by court order all
bankrupts would have to appear and be examined by project in-
vestigators administering a loosely structured questionnaire,
"evolved through conferences with judges, lawyers, economists,
psychologists, sociologists and physicians," that was designed to
isolate what commonsensically might be called the "causes" of
business failures-what bankrupts' business practices had been
and how they had used available funds before insolvency.3 14
At this point Dorothy Thomas began working at Yale. When
she surveyed the project she concluded that methodologically it
was "all mixed up" and set to work to "clean up" the project and
"cut out" the ineffective parts.4 Her initial efforts in this direc-
tion can be seen in an article that she wrote with Judge Clark and
Douglas.34 3 The article outlined the procedures that were to be
followed in the Newark study and then flatly stated that the effort
could be seen only as "an immediate path-finding approach to an
337. Equity Receiverships, supra note 331, at 12-25.
338. Provisions allowing the reorganization of a corporation in bankruptcy were not
added to the Bankruptcy Act until 1934. Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 296, 48 Stat. 911.
339. Equity Receiverships, supra note 331, at 4-8. Douglas did hazard one observa-
tion that went beyond the suggestions based on his data. Speaking of the decision to
reorganize or to liquidate, he stated:
Another factor would be the effect of immediate liquidation on employees as well
as on creditors and stockholders. To be sure the employees do not have an in-
vestment in the business in the legal or popular sense. Yet their association with
the business has given them a prospective income from the business as measured
by the labor turnover which is as certain as the bondholders' prospective interest
or the stockholders' prospect of dividends.
Id. at 8-9. That idea has yet to find explicit recognition in the bankruptcy law although at
times, as in the Lockheed bailout or the Penn Central reorganization, the interest of
employees does seem to surface in decisions made outside of statutory confines.
340. The study of the activities of investors protective committees in reorganizations,
see note 442 infra, was an indirect outgrowth of the kind of concerns Douglas had voiced
in this study.
341. Business Failures I, supra note 330, at 1015, 1016.
342. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
343. Business Failures I, supra note 330. The article reads as if she were the major
author.
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untouched field" designed to "indicate possible causative fac-
tors."344 Thereafter effort would be needed to develop "more ade-
quate techniques for controlling errors" and to produce data that
would permit "inferences as to the causal connection of these
various factors with bankruptcy."3415 The study was merely prepara-
tory for two reasons. First, it was only going to collect data from
and about bankrupts, yet causation could be inferred only on the
basis of comparable data about bankrupts and nonbankrupts.
3 40
Second, although the method chosen for administering the ques-
tionnaire minimized several known problems with questionnaire
studies generally, the survey would produce only a very limited
amount of information of high reliability, and the method chosen
to check the accuracy and completeness of much of the data ob-
tained-cross examination of the debtor by the investigator-would
not likely yield data suitable -for statistical treatment.
34 7
Unfortunately, after only fifty-eight bankrupts were inter-
viewed, "political problems" forced the closing of the bankruptcy
clinic.4 s Rather than abandon the work in Newark, Douglas chose
to collect his data by relying on some personal interviews with
bankrupts and on questionnaires mailed to them with a cover
letter either from the court or from the investigators . 4 He thus
secured responses to his questionnaire from about half of a pool
of nearly .1,300 bankrupts in the district. From a methodological
point of view, however, the results he obtained were pure chaos.
The only thing that could be salvaged was material helpful for
"the development of a new [questionnaire] . . . in which most of
the obvious sources of unreliability have been eliminated."
' 8 0
344. Id. at 1019.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1019-20.
347. Id. at 1020-24.
348. Thomas, Some Aspects of Socio-Legal Research at Yale, 37 Am. J. Soc. 213, 217
(1931). Dorothy Thomas did not remember what those problems had been (Interview with
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975); nor did Paul 0. Ritter or Saul Richard Gamer,
two of Douglas' assistants. Persistent rumors suggesting that the questionnaire was out-
rageous, for example, that it included questions on the toilet training of bankrupts, are
false, as an examination of copies of the questionnaire in the Angell papers shows. I
suspect that efforts to begin to develop physical and psychiatric examinations of bankrupts
and to measure their intelligence-see Douglas and Thomas, The Business Failures Project.
II; An Analysis of Methods of Investigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1034, 1036 (1931) [hereinafter
cited as Business Failures I!]-made the two investigators too "hot" for Judge Clark to
handle.
349. Business Failures II, supra note 348, at 1035. When the study was completed
Douglas had collected 91 personal interviews, 359 responses to the court's letter, and 90




Thus Douglas and Thomas produced an article, admittedly "some-
what pedantic," that examined two things in considerable detail.851
First, it described the refinement of the questionnaire in order to
assure the "definiteness and completeness" of answers given and
thereby ensure their representativeness; 35 2 second, it described the
variations in the data secured by the various methods in order to
"indicate the extent to which the [questionnaire] . .. itself was at
fault in its failure to elicit definite replies."3 ra After a second year
of work Douglas had finally developed a reliable research pro-
cedure, although it was not one designed to find out what he
wanted to know-the causes of bankruptcy.8 54
In fall 1930 the revised questionnaire was used in Boston
"because of the interest and cooperation of the Hon. Thomas D.
Thatcher," newly resigned from the district court bench and ap-
pointed Solicitor General and director of a special Department
of Justice study of bankruptcy administration. 55 This time the
questionnaire was administered by the bankruptcy referee in the
regular examination of about 910 out of some 2,900 bankrupts
filing petitions during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1931.356
Preliminary results indicated that under the new procedures the
revised questionnaire was working significantly better than the
one used in Newark; it was producing "definite and complete an-
swers to an extent that [would] ... make frequency tables more
truly representative of the groups studied. '3 57 Progress was being
made.
Although the Boston study was as incapable of pinpointing
the "causes" of bankruptcy as the Newark study, the results from
the joint effort of Douglas and Thomas to refine the question-
351. Id. at 1053.
352. Id. at 1037-42.
353. Id. at 1042.
354. Ultimately the Department of Commerce published the substantive results of
the Newark study and gave Douglas due credit. US. DEr. or COMMERCE, CAUSES OF
BUSINESS FAILURES AND BANKRUPTCIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN NEW JERSEY IN 1929-30, at iv (Do-
mestic Commerce Series No. 54, 1931). This study of nearly 500 cases concluded that busi-
nesses generally failed because of poor business practices, although bankrupt dishonesty
and outside speculation were again prominently featured. Id. at 1-2. The study of 125
individual bankruptcies disclosed that one-fourth of the petitions were filed to discharge
large judgments, particularly in auto accident cases. Id. at 2. Although more complete
than the Philadelphia study, the report shows that Dorothy Thomas made no impact on
the Department of Commerce.
355. Business Failures II, supra note 348, at 1050 n.3.
356. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, n. 1 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as Functional Aspects].
357. Business Failures II, supra note 348, at 1054.
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naire were not conceived of as wholly methodological. The two
expected that the data generated would supply material for addi-
tional articles: one based on the data from both Newark and
Boston, "indicating the frequency of certain presumably causal
factors in the production of bankruptcy," and another describing
an attempt to develop "a method of investigating these factors in
non-bankrupt cases. ' ' 8 Douglas worked on the first of these ar-
ticles during the summer and fall of 1931. When he was finished
he had two articles, not one.350
Curiously neither of Douglas' articles bore much relation to
what might have been expected on the basis of the announced
joint expectations. True, something like frequency tables appeared
in both articles, and in neither did Douglas explicitly make the ele-
mentary mistake that Thomas had cautioned against-inferring
causation from a study that did not include a control group-but
the articles were only incidentally about the studies. They were
about bankruptcy law reform, a topic that had heated up in the
summer of 1930 with President Hoover's message on the subject an-
nouncing the beginning of Thatcher's study, which was in fact
being run by Lloyd K. Garrison, one of Col. Donovan's assistants
in the earlier New York investigation in which Douglas had testi-
fied.3
60
In each article Douglas' argument was the same basic moral
one: there are circumstances-such as inadequate accounting rec-
ords, speculation, gambling, gross extravagance, or previous fail-
ures-that actually occur, as shown by the raw data from the
Newark and Boston studies-in which discharge should not be
allowed or in which the bankruptcy court should have the discre-
tionary power, unfettered by notions of creditor control, to condi-
tion or suspend discharge, presumably in order to force the debtor
to pay his debts out of after-acquired earnings.3 Similarly, there
are actual practices-such as lack of interest in the election of the
trustee and inadequate examination of either bankrupts or appli-
cations for discharge-that are inconsistent with the assumed pur-
358. Id. at 1035.
359. Functional Aspects, supra note 356; Douglas and Marshall, A Factual Study of
Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32 COLUMr. L. Ray-. 25 (1932) [herein-
after cited as Factual Study].
360. Hoover's message is excerpted in STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL
SysrEm, S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1932), which is largely a reprint of the
report of Thatcher's investigation. Lloyd K. Garrison, b. 1897. A.B. 1919, LL.B. 1921,
Harvard. Practice in New York 1921. Dean 1932, Wisconsin. Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, 1946.
361. Functional Aspects, supra note 356, at 335, 336-60 (examples).
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pose of the Bankruptcy Act.362 In each article the remedy for those
evils was to look to the English bankruptcy act that Douglas had
analyzed for the Donovan investigation a year or so earlier.36 And
so Douglas proposed a series of technical amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act, designed to better effectuate its assumed purposes and
to deal directly with the occasions for granting of discharge when
he thought circumstances made an absolute discharge undesir-
able.36
Even as phrased, Douglas' argument was at least implicitly
causal. It implied that a change in the statute would cause a de-
fined change in the behavior of businessmen and officials, unfor-
tunately a causality that the very limited data Douglas chose to
present on the operation of the English bankruptcy act seemed to
belie. 65 But the argument was at least more sophisticated than
the arguments made in the Philadelphia grocers study. That too
was progress.
In two years' time Dorothy Thomas had made some small
impact on the way empirical legal research was done at Yale.
Similarly Douglas' arguments made some impact on the move-
ment for bankruptcy law reform. When the attorney general sub-
mitted his bill for the reform of the bankruptcy laws, based in part
on the study done by Solicitor General Thatcher, the accompany-
ing report thanked Douglas for his help, and the bill included
most of Douglas' suggested changes.3 6 But despite this progress
362. Factual Study, supra note 359, at 25-26, 36-37 (examples).
363. Functional Aspects, supra note 356, at 332-34, 360-65; Factual Study, supra note
359, at 30-31, 35-37.
864. Functional Aspects, supra note 356, at 363-64; Factual Study, supra note 359, at
58-59.
365. See Functional Aspects, supra note 356, at 343-52; Factual Study, supra note 359,
at 37. The articles together suggest that the ability to condition discharge in cases of
speculation and gambling does not lead to a decline in those kinds of behavior, for
Douglas' American bankrupts seemed to engage in less objectionable behavior than the
more carefully regulated English bankrupts.
366. See STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 65, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4,45 (1932) (thanking Yale Law School and William O. Douglas) . Thatcher
advocated conditional and suspended discharges in a provision tied directly to the objec-
tionable actions by bankrupts that Douglas had isolated, compulsory examination of
bankrupts, and compulsory hearings on discharge applications. Less related to the Newark
and Boston studies were proposals to limit creditors' control in the selection of the trustee,
to validate and facilitate certain kinds of assignments for the benefit of creditors, and to
provide for amortization of the debts of wage earners.
A proposal to establish a mechanism for corporate reorganizations outside the tradi-
tional equity receivership was obviously related to the study of equity receiverships in
Connecticut. Throughout the report there were references to the data gathered by Douglas
in Newark and Boston. See, e.g., id. at 101, 157. In one sense Douglas' articles on the
Boston study were presented in support of Thatcher's proposed reforms since they were
published after Thatcher's report was issued, though they do not mention that report.
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and despite published promises of more articles based on further
studies0 7 and private assurances that a book was forthcoming," 8
no further studies were made by Douglas, 69 no book written. The
business failures project was over. 70 Of its stated subjects of in-
quiry, the first, the causes of failure, had progressed only as far
as learning the incidence of some of the purported causes of fail-
ure; the second, the efficiency of administration, had proceeded
only far enough to make some simple observations based on the
original forty-four equity receiverships, and on the indications of
creditor interest disclosed in Newark and Boston; and the third,
the effect of bankruptcy on others, had never even been started.17 1
Like the business failures project, the auto compensation
study can be traced back to Robert Hutchins, who announced in
February 1929 that he had been talking about doing a study of
the extent and impact of injuries from auto accidents with mem-
bers of the Committee to Study Compensation for Auto Acci-
dentsW2 This committee, chaired by Arthur Ballantine 378 and
including several prominent New York and Philadelphia lawyers
and judges, was organized in late fall 1928 by Ballantine and
367. Business Failures II, supra note 348, at 1035.
368. William O. Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 15, 1932; Feb. 2, 1933, Hutch-
ins papers.
369. One related study was made at a later date, though not by Douglas. See Corst-
vet, Inadequate Bookkeeping as a Factor in Business Failure, 45 YArX L.J. 1201 (1936),
discussed in text accompanying notes 416-18 infra.
370. The Department of Commerce ultimately published results of the Boston Study.
V. SADD & R. WILIAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CAUSES OF COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCIES
(Domestic Commerce Series No. 69, 1932); V. SADD & R. WILLIAS, U.S. DEP'T OF Coat-
MERCE, CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES AMONG CONSUMERS (Domestic Commerce Series No. 82,
1933) (most frequent causes of bankruptcies are "extravagance" and "evasion" of judgment
debts, including those on foreclosed real estate). Douglas used some of the Newark and
Boston results in Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YAI L.J. 591
(1933), an article parallel in its use of the data to Functional Aspects, supra note 356, and
Factual Study, supra note 359. See text accompanying notes 428-34 infra.
371. The following articles, related to the business failures project, were done by
students of Douglas' at Yale. Gamer, On Comparing "Friendly Adjustment" and Bank.
ruptcy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 35 (1930) (using New Jersey data); Furth, The Critical Period
Before Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 853 (1932) (using New Jersey and Boston data to suggest
that most bankrupts delay filing until well past the time of bankruptcy and in the interim
dissipate their assets; includes interesting speculations on the reasons for variations in
data). Douglas was the only one at Yale who managed to generate such student participa-
tion in the research enterprise (see articles cited note 432 infra) as is so common in con-
temporary social science, although Clark did something similar when publishing the early
data from the Connecticut courts study. See articles cited note 182 supra.
372. Yale Minutes, Feb. 21, 1929. Douglas and Leon Green had suggested the desira-
bility of such a study the previous fall. Id.
373. b. 1883. A.B. 1904, LL.B. 1907, Harvard. Practice in Boston 1906, thereafter in
New York with Root, Clark, Buckner & Ballantine (now Dewey, Ballantine, Palmer,
Bushby & Wood). d. 1960.
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Shippen Lewis, who was to be director of the study. 74 The fac-
ulty promptly voted to undertake "the principal work of inves-
tigation" on the subject, provided that money for it could be
found .
75
When Clark picked up the project in summer 1929, after
Hutchins had left for Chicago, the funding problem had been
solved with a grant of $72,000 given to the committee by the
Rockefeller Foundation, through the Columbia University Coun-
cil for Research in the Social Sciences. 8 Clark learned that Yale
was to be a principal investigator; he also learned that he was to
be a member of the committee, as well as of its executive com-
mittee.8 7  In that role he soon found out that the dominant mem-
bers of the committee were convinced that a system of statutory
compensation, like that under the workmen's compensation laws,
was the only solution to the problems of personal hardship and
court congestion caused by lawsuits involving the by then increas-
ingly common automobile. 78 The committee had already decided
that its study was to have four parts: case studies of the nature and
impact of auto accidents on individuals; court record studies of
auto accident litigation; legal studies, largely directed at the con-
stitutionality of a compensation system; and insurance studies
designed to flesh out the details of the compensation system. Most
of the work was split between Columbia and Yale.Y Columbia
professors executed or supervised the third and fourth parts of the
study. Clark supervised the court records studies-not an oner-
ous task, given his experience in such enterprises. Who was do-
374. COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTI, REPORT 2
(1932) [hereinafter cited as AUTO ACCIDENTS]. In addition to Ballantine the New York Bar
was represented by Henry W. Taft; Philadelphia, by Henry S. Drinker, Jr., and William
A. Schnader.
375. Yale Minutes, Feb. 21, 1929.
376. Walter F. Dodd (a member of the committee) to Barry C. Smith (Common-
wealth Foundation), June 1, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke. Dodd was studying workmen's
compensation for the Commonwealth Foundation, see note 153 supra.
377. The balance of the executive committee was Ballantine, Joseph P. Chamberlain
and Noel T. Dowling, both of the Columbia Law School's faculty, and William Draper
Lewis, executive director of the American Law Institute. During the progress of the study
Dowling resigned, apparently concerned with the potential for conflict of interest since he
was doing a study of the constitutionality of the legislation proposed by the committee.
378. The committee began its study in June, 1929. AUTO ACCIDENTS, supra note 374, at
2. At that time its objective was to suggest the desirability of adopting a compensation
system. Walter F. Dodd to Barry C. Smith, June 1, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke. By De-
cember the committee was already beginning to make decisions about the scope of the
compensation plan. Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Minutes
of Executive Committee, Dec. 13, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
379. AUTO ACCIDENTS, supra note 374, at 3-5.
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ing the "principal investigation" was thus hard to say, especially
since Shippen Lewis personally supervised the case studies of in-
jured individuals.
The various studies were begun in late fall 1929. Work on
the court records studies was not time-consuming, at least in New
Haven. Clark used previously compiled data from the Connec-
ticut courts study; he did not bother to update or augment that
data to include additional information collected for this study
by workers in other jurisdictions."' It cannot have been difficult
at any of the other locations either, since the data sought-num-
ber of cases, number of plaintiff victories at trial, dollar amount
of verdicts, and time from filing to trial-were quite limited and
rudimentary.
Work on the case studies of injured persons initially pre-
sented no particular problems either. The general plan for this
part of the research was to use personal interviews in order to de-
velop illustrative case studies as well as statistical measures of the
severity of injury, the amount of loss, and the amount and timing
of compensation. The first studies were done in Philadelphia;
others followed in Connecticut, a state with a financial responsi-
bility law, and Massachusetts, a state with a compulsory insurance
law.3 ' No single form of questionnaire was ever agreed upon. -"
Rather, each researcher was told the general objective and the
specific data needed and was left to develop his or her own ques-
tionnaire and data collection technique.
Unlike Dorothy Thomas who found Douglas' study already
going when she arrived, Emma Corstvet, hired just about the
time work was to begin, was able to design her study from the
start. In doing so she worked primarily with Shippen Lewis, not
Clark. s3 Given the object and the method of the study, she saw
her problems much as had Dorothy Thomas: ensuring the ac-
curacy and internal consistency of the data collected.3 4 Thus,
great effort was spent in developing a questionnaire "that really
worked" and in careful cross-checking of answers with other avail-
able sources of information such as hospitals, employers, attorneys,
and charities38 With the job of questionnaire development done,
380. See id. at 282.
381. Id. at 8-9. Studies were also made in New York City, Muncic and Terre Haute,
Indiana, and San Francisco and San Mateo County, California.
382. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.; Emma Corstvet to Charles E. Clark, June 23, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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Corstvet and her three assistants began field work in December
1929, which continued through September 1930.386 The case
studies were obtained, without sampling, from the Department of
Motor Vehicles records.88 7 When finished, they had together ex-
amined over 2,300 cases and made complete investigations of al-
most 1,200.388
The results did not surprise any of the participants. Only
about sixty percent of the victims received any compensation, al-
though about thirty percent of them received compensation in
excess of total expenses, including lost wages.8 9 Some slight tend-
ency for the adequacy of compensation to be inversely related to
the severity of the injury was also noted. 9 Careful research dis-
closed that deficiencies in the amount and delays in the timing of
compensation were met largely by postponing or defaulting on
payment of medical expenses or by using savings, and that in
severe cases, when family income declined significantly, substan-
tial debts were incurred for current living expenses. 91
When the results of the various studies were compared it
appeared that the results from Boston, located in the only state
with a compulsory insurance law, were significantly different from
those elsewhere. A victim in Boston appeared to have a better
chance of receiving compensation equal to or substantially in ex-
cess of losses than victims elsewhere, even victims of insured driv-
ers 9 2 Clark was excited; while advising caution, because figures
were "limited," and after careful checking to avoid "grievous
error," he noted that the committee was "at the threshold of
perhaps the most important conclusions to be drawn from [its]
... case studies," for as a matter of "first impression . . .Massa-
chusetts law causes the difference." 39 3 On the other hand, Corstvet,
seconded by Dorothy Thomas, warned that worker bias or dis-
crepancies in worker understanding of the object of research was
likely to be a significant source of the differences. 94 Indeed, upon
386. AuTo AccanEr.s, supra note 374, at 256.
887. Emma Corstvet to Charles E. Clark, May 19, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
288. AuTo Acc1DEN, supra note 374, at 257.
289. Id. at 76-90.
290. Compare id. at 80, with id. at 85. The results are more clearly set out in Corst-
vet, The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 466,
470 (1936).
291. AUTo AcciDENrs, supra note 374, at 55-62.
292. Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Oct. 17, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
393. Id.
394. Emma Corstvet to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 28, 1930; Dorothy Swaine Thomas to
Shippen Lewis, Oct. 28, 1920, Clark papers, Beinecke. Dorothy Thomas acted as a statis-
tical advisor for the committee. AuTo AccIDENTs, supra note 374, at 3.
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careful inquiry it turned out that the worker in Boston had simply
decided to include in her study only cases of "serious" injury
D0
So the Boston study had to be rerun in Worcester, where the re-
sults turned out to be different from those elsewhere, although
not as extreme as in the initial study 90
While the social scientists were gathering their data and de-
bating the reasons for their differing results, the lawyers were
planning their report and worrying about money. From the be-
ginning, despite the known preferences of other committee mem-
bers, Clark advocated making the committee's product "a scientific
investigation rather than a brief for a particular point of view."3 7
Lewis, who was initially interested in using the case studies in a
"fact brief of the Brandeis type," found that Clark's argument
changed his mind; at least he agreed that the facts had to be
"strong enough to speak for themselves."3 3 However, Clark's
opinion, even as strengthened by Lewis', did not carry much
weight with the committee, which decided to put the statistical
tables in an appendix and to present a Brandeis brief drawn from
the case studies in a chapter in the text preceding the chapter in-
terpreting the data in the appendix. 99
At the same time Clark was pushing for a real "scientific in-
vestigation," the committee was running out of money. Within
a year of receipt of the initial grant, Lewis was predicting that
expenses would be $7,000 in excess of the $72,000 grant; five
months later the estimated deficit had doubled.400 Since the legal
consultants had worked on a fixed fee basis, a significant portion
of this shortage was due to the case studies and much of that could
be attributed to Yale. Corstvet had caught the error that had
395. Shippen Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 6, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
396. Auro AccimrDrs, supra note 374, at 261,273-75.
397. Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Mar. 8, 1930, Clark papers Beinecke. (Three
quarters of the entire bulk of the book would be devoted to presenting facts without
much in the way of interpretation.).
398. Shippen Lewis to the Executive Committee, Feb. 28, 1930; Shippen Lewis to
Charles E. Clark, Mar. 10, 1930, Clark papers, Beinecke.
399. Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Minutes of the
Executive Committee, Mar. 6, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
400. Shippen Lewis to the Executive Committee, April 13, 1930; Oct. 14, 1930, Clark
papers, Beinecke. The rather quick decline in the committee's financial fortunes and the
tone of the entire enterprise is shown by the nature of and change in the physical format
of the official record of its operations. In December 1929, its meetings were run from a
printed agenda, complete with draft resolutions; its minutes were also printed. While the
nature of the agenda and minutes remained the same, by May 1930, both were being typed.
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necessitated another study in Massachusetts,4"' and her study had
cost anywhere from fifty percent to six hundred percent more
per case than any other.0 2 Although the Rockefeller Foundation
picked up the deficit,40 3 Clark was both apologetic about Yale's
part in creating the deficit and a bit bitter because of the nature
of the report that the committee finally chose to issue. In a letter
to Lewis he defensively suggested that Yale had "tried to do this
work thoroughly and carefully" and then observed that the cost
had not been "excessive" when "compared with other research
projects we have undertaken. 4 He noted that there had been a
bit of conflict because at Yale "we have been most interested in
the social and methodological implications of the study, while you
have been most interested in the support which it gives to the
Committee's thesis." And then he lamented that, as most sociologi-
cal data would have to be left out of the report and would ap-
pear badly cut even in the appendix to which it was relegated, he
and the Yale staff felt "as though we had worked hard in mining
coal only to have most of it left at the mouth of the mine." Lewis
was hardly comforting when, in reply, he suggested that the effort
had been worthwhile, for it showed that "a very careful study will
reveal conditions similar to those revealed by less careful
studies." 405
The committee's report was completed in December 1931
and published two months later.40 6 After being "extensively dis-
cussed,"40 7 it was forgotten to such an extent that a Yale Law
School faculty member, hired only a year and a half after its pub-
lication and teaching in the field of torts, did not even know that
Yale had had a major part in the research.0 8 Meanwhile, the social
401. Curiously, Clark had indirectly warned Lewis about the problem that actually
arose. Shippen Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 17, 1930 (we want to study "hardship
cases"); Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Jan. 18, 1980 (going to be hard to decide
what those are), Clark papers, Beinecke. Lewis nonetheless went ahead and used the term
without further defining it.
402. Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Agenda, Feb. 18,
1931, Clark papers, Beinecke. Costs ranged from 85 cents per reported case in Indiana to
$2.50 in Philadelphia, $4.00 in New York and $5.50 in Connecticut.
403. Id.
404. Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Oct. 15, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
405. Shippen Lewis to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 16, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
406. Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Minutes, Dec. 21,
1931, Clark papers, Beinecke. Clark did not bother to attend although up until this time
he had attended regularly.
407. Charles E. Clark to Filmer S. C. Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law
('even up to the House of Lords").
408. Charles E. Clark to Fleming James, Jr., Aug. 28, 1959, Clark papers, Law.
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scientists, who felt that the effort at Yale had "laid the foundation
for ... a detailed social study," began that study at the Institute
of Human Relations. 40 9 Apparently it showed nothing that the
earlier study had not also shown, for it was never published and
thus could not even be forgotten.410
Years later when asked why she had stopped working with
members of Yale's law faculty, Dorothy Thomas, who at first was
extremely happy with her new association,411 replied that it was
because "nothing interesting" was going on.41 2 That was, of course,
not the only reason,4 3 but within a year after the termination of
the business failures project she severed all but her paper ties to
the law school by giving up the seminar in empirical legal research
that she taught there.1 4 Her reasons for this decision are signifi-
cant; she felt that she was getting too few students, each of whom
had too little time for research, and that she was presenting ideas
about the importance of careful, statistical research for an under-
standing of social and legal institutions that were "clearly against
certain of the prevailing dominant attitudes in the law school." 415
Emma Corstvet stayed active and interested in empirical legal
research- for several more years. During the year following the com-
pletion of the auto accident compensation study, she did an ele-
gant study of the adequacy of accounting records kept by bankrupt
409. Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Oct. 15, 1931 (quoting Dorothy Thomas);
Charles T. Clark to Emma Corstvet, Mar. 3, 1931 (start of IHR study), Clark papers,
Beinecke. For details about this study, see T. Neely, A Study of Error in the Interview
119-40 (n.d.) (unpublished thesis in Butler Library, Columbia University).
410. One of the field workers on the initial study did manage to use the data from
both to enrich a Ph.D. thesis that was otherwise drawn from secondary sources. See T.
Neely, supra note 409. Several years later Emma Corstvet took the committee's results and
turned them into a more poignant and effective plea for a compensation scheme than the
committee had ever managed to make. See Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its
Problems, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936).
411. Dorothy Swaine Thomas to James R. Angell, Nov. 25, 1930, Angell papers.
412. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
413. About the time Dorothy Thomas came to Yale she met the Gunnar Myrdals
and began a long term study of population migration and business cycles in Sweden.
Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975. This work was a continuation of
her Ph.D. thesis work on the same subject done with data on Britain, and the beginning
of the major work of a career largely devoted to population studies. Thus, in retrospect,
her work at Yale and at Columbia before that was really a detour from what proved to
be her major interest. Indeed, in an autobiographical essay, Thomas, Contribution to the
Herman Wold Festschrift in ScETImsTs AT WORK: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF HEIrAN WOL
216-23 (T. Dalenius, G. Karsson & S. Malmquist eds. 1970), she does not even mention
her connection with the law school.
414. Dorothy Swaine Thomas to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 9, 1933 ("'ll be glad to par-




and going concerns.416 This was just the kind of study that Thomas
thought should be the next part of the business failures project,
417
but that Douglas never got around to doing. The results were
hardly conclusive, but given the difficulty of defining and measur-
ing adequacy and the limitations of the available statistical tools,
Corstvet nevertheless managed to show that more going businesses
than bankrupt ones had adequate records. 18 After completing this
study she became research assistant to Underhill Moore. She
worked on Moore's studies for nearly three years until family re-
sponsibilities, acquired when she married Karl Llewellyn who was
still teaching at Columbia, necessitated her moving to New York
City.419 Although for a while thereafter she commuted to New
Haven for a few days a week, she too was through with empirical
legal research.
Thomas turned her attention to population studies, an out-
growth of her interest in business cycles and her training in sta-
tistics; Corstvet turned hers to institutional economics, an out-
growth of her Wisconsin progressive education.420 Of the two,
Corstvet had had the better experience in working with the law-
yers, largely because she did some research herself and because
Moore, the lawyer she worked most closely with, was more inter-
ested in scientific research than the rest of the Yale Realists. But,
neither social scientist really looked back, and the Realists' interest
in empirical legal research was never to receive significant support
from the social scientific community again.
As Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet grew away from
participation in empirical research at Yale, surely neither thought
that she had been helped to leave her former activities by ten-
416. Interview with Emma Corstvet Ilewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. The study was first
published as Corstvet, Adequacy of Accounting Records in a Money Economy, 10 AccoUNr-
wo lxv. 273 (1935). ("The author owes much to Prof. W. 0. Douglas . . . for his direc-
tion of this study." But as she remembers it, Douglas left everything to her that was "in
the least bit technical." Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.) This
study looked only at going concerns. The data examined in the first article was then com-
pared with data from the Boston bankrupts in Corstvet, Inadequate Bookkeeping as a
Factor in Business Failure, 45 YAL L.J. 1201 (1935). This article earned her the right to
attend the annual banquet of the Yale Law Journal, apparently as the first female ever
to come other than as a guest. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
417. Business Failures II, supra note 348, at 1035.
418. Corstvet, Inadequate Bookkeeping as a Factor in Business Failure, 45 YALE L.J.
1201, 1207-08 (1935).
419. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. One interlude was her
work for Clark, described at notes 522-81 infra.
420. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
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sions generated from the interaction of the social scientific tradi-
tion and the progressive reform tradition. Each simply found that
other professional and personal interests and commitments were
more satisfying and followed them. In personal terms that per-
ception was correct, but here personal terms are misleading.
Both Thomas and Corstvet were squarely within the emerg-
ing social science tradition. As such, each had needs or objectives
common to most of the young social scientists interested in em-
pirical research at the time-accuracy of data collection, niceties
of questionnaire design, and basic scientific predispositions. More
important, though perhaps less obvious at the time, each also ac-
cepted the lengthening of the reform horizon that accompanied
the growth of academic social science in America. In contrast, the
lawyers in the supposedly joint research enterprise had an interest
in procedural and remedial reform that was straight out of the
progressive reform tradition. Ballantine's committee acted out of
a "felt need" to reform the mechanism for compensating the vic-
tims of auto accidents.421 That Douglas acted from a similar motive
can be seen in his continued attempts to refine his notions about
what he was going to investigate: he felt the need, but that was
about all. In particular, both the committee and Douglas shared
the same model of the world that their inquiry into the facts was
directed at-court congestion, delay, procedural complexity, popu-
lar disrespect, and all that goes with the progressive notion of law
reform.422
Except for Clark, all of Ballantine's committee was prob-
ably a part of the progressive law reform tradition alone. For the
relationship of these men to the social science tradition, "tension"
is probably too weak a word. By the early thirties the two tradi-
tions, historically offshoots of the same root,423 were simply dis-
continuous. The lawyers on Ballantine's committee were not
interested in, if they were even more than dimly aware of, the
campaign to make social inquiry a science like the physical sci-
ences. If the use of the best current methods-"careful selection
of sampling, careful rules of questionnaires, for formal decisions
on substitutions when parts of the sample were unavailable" 424-
421. Id.
422. See text accompanying notes 50-52 & 290-91 supra.
423. See generally T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: Trn.
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION ANID THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY
(1977).
424. Emma Corstvet Llewellyn to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 20, 1975.
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brought good results, that was fine; but to be hobbled by method
or the limits of available data, that was a different matter. Care-
fully collected data were less important than effective data. Facts
were facts; for these lawyers, once enough of them were collected
or the need for them had passed the enterprise was over.425 But
for social scientists like Thomas and Corstvet, turning social in-
quiry into a science was a very important part of a developing
professional identity that each participated in. Facts were not
facts; some were meaningful and others doubtful. If the lawyers
would let the exigencies of short-term campaigns for discrete re-
forms determine the nature and scope of social inquiry, if they
would not attenuate their perception of the relationship between
such inquiry and desired reforms, then there was no reason to
continue the association. There were many other things to inves-
tigate, things that because of their susceptibility to methodological
sophistication were truly more interesting.4 2
6
Douglas and Clark presented a less clear-cut problem for
Thomas and Corstvet. Clark sat insecurely in both traditions.
Douglas' position was more ambiguous. His activities in the Fed-
eral Courts study suggest that he participated in, if not affirmed,
some of the methodological aspects of the social science tradi-
tion.427 But the depth of his attachment to that tradition was an-
other matter, as can be seen most vividly from his later activities
in the campaign for bankruptcy reform.
Comprehensive bankruptcy reform was not to be had in the
early 1930's, although eventually the provisions for wage earner
amortization of debts that Douglas had urged were adopted.2-
Yet when such amortizations were approved, Douglas was op-
425. This was exactly the same attitude Clark faced in dealing with his Harvard
critics who were part of the same progressive reform tradition.
426. Two of the most enchanting days I have ever spent were spent interviewing
Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Emma Corstvet Llewellyn. The grace, -charm, and wit of
each plainly captivated me and has surely influenced my view of events at Yale in a way
that the generally, though by no means universally, less interesting lawyer interviewees
were simply unable to do. Professor Robert Gordon has suggested, quite accurately, I
think, that one of these influences is an observable preference in this section for the
rather "hard-edged" method that both women were working with in the twenties and
thirties. But whatever the source, the preference is defensible. Lawyers are quite used to,
and comfortable with; "soft" methods; it is very easy to drift from soft methods into the
kind of arm-chair theorizing, really the reifying of one's biases, that is much of legal policy
analysis today. While hard methods have their own problems, most notably the rigid con-
striction of the sphere of the knowable to that of the countable, given the acknowledged
methodological biases of lawyers these problems are preferable to the risk that soft science
will turn into no science at all.
427. See text accompanying notes 195 & 234 supra.
428. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467.
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posed to them on the basis of "the facts" about bankruptcy, largely
the same facts on which he had earlier supported amortization.42
Of course, in the intervening years Douglas had learned some-
thing new; he had learned the opinion of his colleague Wesley
Sturges, 430 as thoroughgoing a skeptic as the Realists ever pro-
duced 4 31 that the basic problem for wage earners was "credit
management"-an inability to intelligently limit the use of credit
to a reasonable estimate of the amount of future income-so that
amortization of consumer debts was simply a sentence to future
abject poverty.432 Douglas' "facts" could support that argument
just as well as his earlier one in support of wage earner amortiza-
tions, for ultimately Douglas believed that his study had uncov-
ered the causes of bankruptcy. Although he admitted that the
determination of causation was "extremely hazardous," since cause
and effect "curiously intermingle" and "appear differently to dif-
ferent observers," he was convinced that a "dominant characteris-
tic" could be determined433 and, by implication, that from this
"dominant characteristic" causal relationships could be inferred
as a matter of something close to informed common sense. On the
basis of these "dominant characteristics" and a comparison of the
figures on the incomes of his bankrupts and some early attempts
to define standard budgets for wage earners, Douglas concluded
that amortization was impossible in most cases. 4
429. See Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J.
591 (1933).
430. William O. Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Mar. 1, 1932, Hutchins papers
(Change of mind; Sturges is "a hot shot in every way" interested in something more than
"professional education").
431. See Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE LJ. 1022, 1035-
36 (1976).
432. See Sturges & Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42
YM, L.J. 487 (1933) (review of secondary literature). This article and the one by Douglas
are part of a symposium on the subject that includes two superb pieces of empirical re-
search: Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co.,
42 YALE L.J. 526 (1933); Nehemkis, The Boston Poor Debtor Court-A Study in Collection
Procedure, 42 YALE LJ. 561 (1933). Each piece credits Douglas as its inspiration. Whatever
one may say about Douglas' own empirical work, he inspired a great amount of very good
work by others. That is a significant achievement all by itself. Tangentially related to all
of this is Douglas & Frank, Landlord's Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003 (1933).
433. Douglas, supra note 429, at 595.
434. Id. at 626-42.
This time Douglas did a much better job of presenting the results of the Boston and
Newark studies of wage earner bankruptcies than in either of his previous two articles.
Nevertheless, the article is still not about the studies; it is an argument using materials
from the studies to "prove" that wage earner bankruptcies should be left to state control
since the incidence of various kinds of credit problems varied from state to state.
One can exaggerate the effect of the exigencies of the campaign for bankruptcy reform
on Douglas' "withdrawal" from empirical legal research. Douglas stopped doing empirical
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One can imagine Dorothy Thomas tearing her hair after
learning of Douglas' argument. Whether his estimate of causality
was right or wrong, as far as she was concerned Douglas went
about his evaluation in the wrong way. Indeed, not only did he
not follow the appropriate methodological rules, he reverted to
the kind of arm-chair theorizing that methodological rules were
designed to foreclose. Here the partial commitment of Douglas,
a personal friend, 35 to the social scientific tradition was in some
ways more disturbing to deal with than the noncommitment of
lawyers like those on Ballantine's committee. For the flip-flop
from one tradition to another only emphasized the ways in which
careful, statistical research was apart from the "prevailing domi-
nant attitudes in the law school."
Finding the appropriate response to the less than total com-
mitment of lawyers like Douglas to the social scientific tradition
was difficult for young social scientists like Thomas and Corstvet
who were active missionaries for their young discipline. But, in
general, it was to gravitate toward the lawyers more committed to
the social science tradition than most. Thus, three years later
Corstvet tried to do research with Clark,436 who had so fervently
defended the "value" of the "detailed work" she had done for the
auto compensation study, 37 and both she and Thomas would try
to work with Underhill Moore who was more singlemindedly
devoted to scientific method and who more fully accepted the
lengthened reform horizon of academic social science than any of
his colleagues.48 Yet, in the end, other things seemed more inter-
esting and so, affirming the tradition of which they were solely
a part, Thomas and Corstvet drifted away to investigate those
other things.
research not simply because the sodal scientists' concerns over the quality of their product
were irrelevant to his need for facts to fuel reform. Just as was the case with Dorothy
Thomas, he changed activities in part because ones other than those he was then engaged
in seemed more interesting at the time. For Douglas at this time the major other activity
was a growing association with several faculty members at the Harvard Business School,
an association that eventually resulted in creating the short-lived Yale-Harvard/law-
business four-year joint degree. See W. DouGLAs, supra note 308, at 172-3. The association
with Harvard dated back to 1930. Yale Minutes, Mar. 27, 1930 (Moore trip); May 29, 1930
(attempt to bring visitor). The first Harvard visitor came in spring 1932 to help in one of
Douglas' courses. Yale Minutes, May 21, 1931. The law/business program was begun in
the fall of 1933. Report of Dean Charles E. Clark, 1933-34, at 17-18.
435. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3,1975.
436. See text accompanying notes 522-81 infra.
437. Charles E. Clark to Shippen Lewis, Oct. 15, 1931, Clark papers, Beinecke.
438. I will endeavor to prove this in "American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore" (forthcoming).
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Whether this attempt at joint empirical legal research might
have had any other conclusion is highly doubtful. Had the social
scientists been regular full-time teaching faculty, perhaps their
views would have carried more weight.4 ' Had the social science
of the time been in a less prickly440 phase methodologically, the
task of meeting the social scientists' norms might have been easier.
But, even under the best of conditions the tension between the
two traditions was probably too great for the lawyer reformers and
the social scientists to have engaged in much joint research with-
out each first substantially compromising its own tradition, as an
incident that Dorothy Thomas related aptly illustrates. 4 1 While
at Yale she taught a seminar in empirical legal research. One
semester, Thurman Arnold resolved to take it. He attended regu-
larly until it came time for the students to present their research
projects, at which point he objected to the student presentations
on the ground that he had come to hear her, not them, and there-
after he stopped coming. Such insensitivity to the importance of
student research for recruiting membership in the social scientific
tradition may be understandable in someone as removed from
that tradition as Arnold was, but however understandable, such
actions by the lawyers that casually undercut efforts to sustain
and expand that community and its traditions did not make it
easier for individuals within that tradition to continue to work
with persons outside it. With a whole world to investigate, it
is hardly surprising that the social scientists chose to follow a path
that made their work easier.
Thus the social scientists found unacceptable the unwilling-
ness of the lawyers interested in empirical legal research to act in
support of the methodological imperatives of the nascent social
scientific discipline and would not provide continuing support for
that research. Similarly, the sympathetic legal community, locked
in the progressive reform tradition, found empirical legal research
that was unrelated to its current reform interests irrelevant and
thus, would not provide continuing support of such research. Per-
haps lawyers like Clark and Douglas, still interested in empirical
legal research 442 but caught between these two traditions, might
439. And surely the fact that Walton H. Hamilton, the one regular full-time faculty
member whom everyone at Yale identified as a social scientist, was actively opposed to
empirical legal research, see note 163 supra, meant that such weight as the views of Thomas
and Corstvet would otherwise have been given was seriously diminished.
440. Professor Robert Gordon has supplied the unusually apt adjective.
441. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
442. Clark's interest brought forth the bar survey. See text accompanying notes 522-81
infra. Douglas too would lead one more "empirical" research project before moving to
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have been able to keep their enterprise going themselves. To do
so it would have been essential to secure funds, a task made diffi-
cult by the Depression.443 The foundations had not semed par-
ticularly eager to support empirical legal research, and at Yale
general university funds were not to be had.444 But the Institute
of Human Relations might have been tapped for funds. Why that
did not happen is less a problem of relationships between lawyers
and social scientists than of the peculiar nature of the law school's
relation to that unusual institution.
C. The Institute of Human Relations
For the short while that he remained at Yale after he lost his
fight to locate the law school away from the college and near the
Institute of Human Relations, Robert Hutchins began to turn
his newly created opportunity for financing social science research
into a way to draw the law school toward academic pursuits simi-
lar to those he thought would have followed from the change in
location. He went about this task with his usual dispatch. Al-
though he had been directed to plan the Institute's program in
the social sciences with Professor Edgar S. Furniss of the depart-
ment of economics, sociology and government, 445 and although a
central topic for that program-the family-was adopted,44" it is
hard to see any plan in what happened other than that of the law
the Securities Exchange Commission-the mammoth study of the activities of investors'
protective committees in corporate reorganizations-a study more in tune with his rough
notion of causation. See SEcurrEs EXcHANGE COmMIsSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcrIvrriEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REoRGAmzATION Coarzamus (1936-40). This study was under way by spring 1933. See
William 0. Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Mar. 27, 1933, Hutchins papers; Report of
Dean Charles E. Clark, 1933-34, at 28. Ballantine never gave up either, Arthur Ballantine
to Charles E. Clark, May 11, 1948, Clark papers, Law (seeking help for another auto
compensation study).
443. Dorothy Thomas said that foundation funds were not particularly difficult to
obtain during the Depression. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
Although she ought to have known, I can find no one who agrees with her. And even
if she were correct, the law school thought funds were hard to obtain. See Report of
Dean Clark, 1931-32, at 20.
444. Yale was very badly hit by the Depression. Charles E. Clark to Robert M.
Hutchins, Mar. 15, 1933, Hutchins papers ("rumor" that Yale is in worse shape than
elsewhere in country).
445. See James R. Angell to Edgar S. Furniss, Feb. 12, 1929. IHR Files.
446. Yale Minutes, Feb. 21, 1929. The reason behind the choice of topic eludes me.
Donald Slesinger said it seemed "obvious at the time" (Interview with Donald Slesinger,
July 8, 1975), but it is not obvious now, especially given the notion of exploring law as
a mechanism of "social control," see text accompanying note 161 supra. that animated
at least some Realist thought.
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school to collect for itself as much of the available money as pos-
sible. Hutchins' collaborator, Donald Slesinger, was named execu-
tive secretary of the Institute. Slesinger found two social scientists
who were studying juvenile delinquency in Boston and offered
them money to extend their study to New Haven;447 he then hired
Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet.448 Simultaneously, Hutchins
recruited Underhill Moore, whose interest in Yale was said to be
"largely due to" the existence of the Institute,44 and whose em-
pirical research was later financed by it. Hutchins also tried to
get his entire faculty directly involved in planning the Institute's
activities.450 Together the two men were successful enough, or at
least thought themselves successful enough, for Hutchins to predict
that "sooner or later" the Institute would "supplement" the work
of the law school "at every point.' 451
When Clark became dean, he continued Hutchins' program.
He began the school year with a series of discussions of Institute
projects452 and at the same time secured funding for Douglas'
bankruptcy study.45 Thus, on paper at least, Hutchins and Clark
were eminently successful both in welding the law school to the
Institute and in securing Institute funds for research. The total
funding of people and projects associated with the law school
grew from over one-third of the social science budget in the first
year of operations to over two-thirds just two years later,5 4 and
at the same time the number of persons formally associated with
447. See Yale Minutes, Mar. 21, 1929. The two were William Healy and Augusta
F. Bronner. Their work eventually resulted in the publication of W. HEALY & A.
BRONNER, NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY AND ITs TREATMENT (1937). They were chosen
rather than Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, who had by then begun their work at Harvard,
because Slesinger found the Gluecks' work "competent, but rather superficial and
unimaginative." Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, May 30, 1929, IHR files.
448. See notes 297 & 8303-04 supra.
449. See Underhill Moore to Robert M. Hutchins, Jan. 28, 1929; Robert M.
Hutchins to Underhill Moore, Jan. 30, 1929, Moore papers; Yale Minutes, Mar. 29, 1929.
450. See Yale Minutes, Feb. 21, 1929; Feb. 28, 1929; Mar. 21, 1929.
451. Report of Dean Hutchins, 1928-29, at 6.
452. See Yale Minutes, Oct. 3, 1929; Oct. 10, 1929; Nov. 11, 1929; Dec. 12, 1929.
453. See text accompanying note 332 supra.
454. Compare Institute of Human Relations, Budget, 1629-30, with Institute of
Human Relations, Budget, 1931-32, Angell papers. There were limits, however; Hutchins
reported that the Institute would not fund work in trade associations although it
would agree to work on the subject if independent funding could be acquired. Yale
Minutes, Feb. 28, 1929. Unintended side effects soon appeared, too; within a year of the
Institute's founding, Clark reported that Institute money for social science research
would be hard to come by since it was almost all allocated. He did not mention that
the allocation was largely to law school affiliated projects. Yale Minutes, Dec. 12, 1929.
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both the law school and the Institute tripled-from four to
twelve.455
From such events one might expect that when Clark needed
funds to support his faculty's empirical legal research the Institute
would have proven a fairly dependable source. But it turned out
not to be; indeed, it soon was virtually no source of funds at all.
How that happened, how Hutchins' goose virtually stopped lay-
ing any eggs at all, further illuminates the problems the Realists
faced in their attempt to do empirical legal research at Yale.
Although the Rockefeller Foundation envisioned a program
of cooperative research 456 into the medical, psychological, and so-
cial aspects of human behavior, 57 the terms of its grant did little
to foster, and much to hinder, such a program. Stipulations in the
grant specified that over three-quarters of the operating funds
were to be devoted to the two existing foundation-supported
projects-the Institute of Psychology and the Institute of Child
Development-and one new one-the psychiatry department at the
medical school.458 Thus, any cooperative research at the Institute
would require the coordination of financially independent research
programs or the use of the less than one-quarter of the operating
funds-65,000 per year-left over for the "social sciences. ' 459
Given the realities of the funding, concern was expressed
almost immediately about the Institute's division into pieces.460
Nevertheless, the Yale Corporation confirmed a compromise plan,
455. The original four were Clark, Hamilton, Moore and Slesinger. By December
1931, there were Borchard, Bronner, Clark, Corstvet, Dodd, Douglas, Healy, Moore,
Samenow, Smith, Gilbert Sussman (Moore's assistant) and Thomas. The original list is
taken from letters from President Angell appointing each to the Institute's staff, each
dated May 13, 1929, in the III files; the second, from letters from President Angell
informing each of the reorganization of the Institute's executive committee, each dated
Dec. 16, 1931, in the Angell papers.
456. I use the term "cooperative research" largely because the participants did. See,
e.g., Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, Nov. 5, 1929, IHR files; Charles E. Clark to
James R. Angell, Nov. 21, 1931, Angell papers; note 136 supra & accompanying text
(Angell). I think they liked the phrase because it was vague and trendy, but
their use of it suggests that by it they meant nothing more than "joint" research on a
single topic by persons identified with different disciplines or what we today would call
"multi-disciplinary" research. The overtone to usage indicated that everyone understood
that such research would be "empirical."
457. See note 145 supra, setting forth purposes of grant.
458. May, A Retrospective View of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale, 6
BEHAVIORAL SCL Noas 141, 147 (1971). The text of the grant is to be found in the IHR
files. See supra note 145. Psychology received $50,000 per year; child development, $35,000;
and psychiatry, $100,000. Id.
459. May, supra note 458, at 147.
460. See Roswel Angier (director of Institute of Psychology) to James R. Angell,




drafted in the fall, before the terms of the Rockefeller grant were
known, for an executive committee to run the Institute.461 That
plan only emphasized the separateness of the individual programs
by seeing that each little interest group had its own representa-
tive on the committee." 2 Thereafter the potential for actual co-
operative research was further diminished by the de facto adoption
of a budgetary process that gave the executive committee the task
of coordinating research, but left it without any but hortatory
tools to accomplish that task.4c
Several people tried to counteract these centrifugal forces
in the Institute, at least as they affected the social sciences.
Hutchins intended to plan a unified program for the social sci-
ences.464 But that effort was never undertaken, and Clark never
picked up on the idea.465 Angell tried to help by making it easier
for members of social science departments to meet regularly on
an informal but official basis, but even that attempt was unsuccess-
ful.466
Slesinger, who took a special interest in the social sciences at
461. Minutes of Yale Corporation, Apr. 13, 1929. I infer that the arrangement was
a compromise from Charles Seymour to James R. Angell, Oct. 30, 1928, Angell papers
(reporting terms), and Donald Slesinger to Robert M. Hutchins, Nov. 29, 1929, Hutchins
papers (referring to "a scrap similar to (the one over] the chairmanship last year").
462. May, supra note 458, at 148, reports that the membership consisted of the
president (Angell); the provost (Seymour); the deans of the medical school (Winternitz),
law school (Clark), and graduate school (Wilbur Cross, who was replaced in 1930 by
Edgar Furniss); representatives of the department of economics, sociology and government
(Furniss) and the Institute of Psychology (Angier); and the executive secretary (Slesinger,
replaced in 1930 by Mark A. May). The group had been functioning even before the
Corporation got around to giving its approval. See James R. Angell to Edgar S. Furniss,
Feb. 13, 1929, IHR files.
463. Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975. See Institute of Human Relations,
Executive Committee, Minutes, Oct. 28, 1930, IHR files, (not the function of executive
committee to "discuss or pass upon" items in individual research group budgets).
464. Robert M. Hutchins to Underhill Moore, Jan. 30, 1929. Moore papers. Hutchins
intended to use Charles E. Merriam, a political scientist at Chicago; Wesley Mitchell, an
economist at Columbia; Charles A. Beard, the historian; W. I. Thomas, the sociologist;
and Lawrence K. Frank, an official of the Rockefeller Foundation, as his consultants.
Moore suggested adding to the list Floyd Allport, a psychologist at Syracuse; Franz Boas,
the anthropologist; and W.F. Ogburn, a sociologist at Chicago (Underhill Moore to
Robert M. Hutchins, Jan. 31, 1929, Moore papers) and John Dewey (Underhill Moore
to Robert M. Hutchins, Feb. 1, 1929, Moore papers).
465. Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, Apr. 29, 1929, Moore papers (reminding
Clark of the planning proposal). Both Hutchins and Clark may have felt that the decision
made in the interim to study "the family" obviated the need for the kind of planning
originally thought appropriate.
466. See James R. Angell to Robert M. Hutchins, Feb. 18, 1929, IHR files (law school
and department of economics, sociology and government to swap members of their Board
of Permanent Officers). There is no record of any member of that department ever
attending either a faculty or board of permanent officers meeting.
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Yale and wanted to use the Institute to make them "unbeat-
able," 467 worked as hard as anyone to generate cooperative inves-
tigations,468 but after nearly a year of such work he became
convinced that it would be impossible "to force mature workers
into a cooperative program. "469 Others expressed fears that the
Institute would break into pieces,470 and at the turn of the year
Slesinger declared that the Institute had already broken into
three pieces.4  President Angell "vigorously" denied the asser-
tion, while tacitly admitting its truth by predicting that an even-
tual "consolidation of the general mass" of research would take
place.47 12 The university community added its opinion on the
matter by dubbing the Institute's new building "the place with
the kids, the kooks, and the apes,"4 73 thus recognizing the lack
of relation among the Institute's dominant entities.
The potential of the naturally insular law school for involve-
ment in the activities of the thus fragmented Institute was dimin-
ished by the fact that the quarrelsome Winternitz, 474 and Clark,
not only quarrelsome, but also incapable of ever forgetting a lost
point,475 could not get along. As soon as Hutchins announced his
467. Robert M. Hutchins to Donald Slesinger, Jan. 1, 1930, Hutchins papers.
468. See, e.g., Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, May 31, 1929, IHR files.
469. Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, Nov. 5, 1929, IHR files.
470. See Charles E. Clark to Robert M. Hutchins, Dec. 23, 1929, Hutchins papers.
471. Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, Jan. 16, 1930, IHR files. (Slesinger's letter
of resignation).
472. James R. Angell to Donald Slesinger, Jan. 17, 1930, IHR files.
473. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. The references are
to Gesell's child development clinic, Winternitz's psychiatry facility, and the studies of
anthropoid behavior by R.M. Yerkes of the Institute of Psychology. It is notable that
the community never even noticed the social sciences.
474. Angier called Wintemitz "the stormy petrel," an oblique reference to his
diminutive stature. Roswell P. Angier to James R. Angell, Oct. 29, 1929, Angell papers.
Slesinger recounts his problems in dealing with Winternitz in Confidential Memo-
randum for Mr. Angell, Oct. 22, 1929, IHR fies; and Donald Slesinger to Robert
M. Hutchins, Nov. 29, 1929, Hutchins papers. Comments about Winternit's quarrel-
someness were also made by Dorothy Swaine Thomas, interview, June 3, 1975. Mark A.
May, interview, June 9, 1975, noted that Winternitz was given to the delightful practice
of calling Protestants by Jewish names as well as the reverse.
475. Dorothy Thomas, interview, June 3, 1975, called Clark quarrelsome. The Angell
papers are full of support for both this assertion and the notion that Clark even had
trouble understanding when he had lost. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell,
Dec. 14, 1931 (cavil after losing fight over organization of the Institute); Thomas W.
Farnam to James R. Angell, May 19, 1936, May 20, 1936, Angell papers (reporting a
dispute between Clark and Moore). To add to these problems Clark was remarkably
insecure and needed repeated reaffirmations of his value to the university. See, e.g., Charles
E. Clark to James R. Angell, Feb. 4, 1932 (reporting offer to teach at Chicago); James
R. Angell to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 5, 1932; Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Aug.
30, 1935 (reporting second offer to teach at Chicago); Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell,
Nov. 6, 1935 (again); James R. Angell to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 8, 1935; Charles E. Clark
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departure for Chicago, if not before, Winternitz began to act as
as if he ran the Institute. Clark, suspicious of Winternitz's mo-
tives, feared that he intended "to swallow us all. 470 Hutchins ad-
vised Clark that Winternitz's style was pure bluster-"fight and
he will go away"-and even offered his help in dealing with
Winternitz. 477 Yet, Clark so let the matter get out of hand that
Winternitz felt free to attempt to control law school research
projects and even to dispute the right of the law school to seek
foundation funds for its research while the medical school was
seeking to tap the same sources in a drive to increase its own
endowment.4 78
The result was predictable. In less than a year Clark, who had
no personal tie to the Institute, began to lose interest in its affairs.
Although he continued to attend executive committee meetings,
he soon began to see the Institute as uninterested in "law projects"
and to view its ostensible topic for joint investigation in the social
sciences-the family-as "some flumdoodle" to be overcome when
seeking funds from the Institute's coffers. 47 ' About the same time,
a potential alternative source of leadership in cementing the
law school to the Institute was lost with Slesinger's departure and
his replacement as executive director of the Institute by a mem-
ber of the psychology department.4 0 And so, discussion of Insti-
tute affairs soon ceased at faculty meetings,48s and the Institute
instead became the private concern of those who were associated
with it.
In these circumstances leadership in establishing the law
school's relationship to the Institute would have had to come
from within the faculty generally. Since within a year or so after
the Institute was founded twelve persons associated with the law
to James R. Angell, Jan. 1, 1936 (reporting offer to teach at Harvard); James R. Angell
to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 16, 19386 (counseling the avoidance of "those who dwell in
Egyptian darkness"), Angell papers.
476. Charles E. Clark to Robert M. Hutchins, Oct. 29, 1929, Hutchins papers.
Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
477. Robert M. Hutchins to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 4, 1929, Hutchins papers.
478. Id. Winternitz was trying to control the juvenile delinquency project which at
the time was admittedly being financed in part by non-social science funds. Donald
Slesinger to Robert M. Hutchins, Nov. 29, 1929, Hutchins papers. Winternitz also tried
to control space in the Institute's building. See James R. Angell to Milton C. Winternitz,
June 5, 1930, IHR files.
479. Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, July 24, 1930, Moore papers.
480. Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, Jan. 16, 1930, IHR files (resignation).
The replacement was Mark A. May who was an educational psychologist.
481. There is no mention of the Institute in the faculty's minutes from January
1930 until November 1931:
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school also had become associated with the Institute, such an al-
ternative might have seemed plausible; 82 however, a close look
at those twelve persons suggests otherwise. Only six of the twelve
were regular faculty members.483 Of these six, only Douglas and
Moore were engaged in research funded by the Institute, but
Douglas had virtually nothing to do with the Institute and Moore
had little to do with the law school. Of the other six, three were
research assistants who as such had limited entree into faculty
life generally.8 4 Of the remaining three, the two social scientists
whose study of delinquency absorbed one-third of the law school's
part of the Institute's budget never were a part of the life of the
school; indeed one of them was not even working in New
Haven.4 5 Dorothy Thomas, who took up another third, advised
Douglas and Moore, but most of the time she pursued her own
program of research into techniques of observing human be-
havior,48 6 although she did teach one seminar at the law school
87
and occasionally showed up at the weekly faculty meetings. There
was little cement to these twelve individuals and thus the institu-
tion that was to supplement the work of the law school at every
point was allowed to become something else, if not something
less.
What that something else was, at least in the eyes of most of
the law school faculty with an interest in social science research,
seems to have been a source of funds and a reservoir for technical
assistance, but little else. Here Douglas' actions with respect to the
business failures project are illustrative. When the exigencies of
the program for reforming bankruptcy law and practice made
further research unnecessary, Douglas stopped doing bankruptcy
research48 and effectively terminated his already limited associa-
tion with the Institute and its activities. The Institute was for him
a source of funds and not an entity for continuing cooperative
482. See lists in note 455 supra.
483. Borchard, Clark, Dodd, Douglas, Moore and Smith. Dodd's leave of absence
to work on his study of Workmen's Compensation began in fall 1930, so he could not
be of much help.
484. Corstvet, Samenow, and Sussman.
485. Slesinger, Confidential Memorandum for Mr. Angell, Oct. 22, 1929, IHR files
(Healey never there).
486. See D. THOMAs, THE OBSERVABILrrY OF SocIAL PHENOMENA WITH RESPECT TO
STATIsnCAL ANALYsis (1931). Why this project never resulted in experiments on the
psychology of evidence escapes me, especially since Thomas explicitly noted the potential
crossover in a memo circulated to the entire law faculty. Arnold, Smith & Thomas,
Memo, Nov. 27, 1931, Moore papers.
487. See text accompanying note 414 supra.
488. See text accompanying notes 367-70, 428-34 supra.
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research. Still other projects similarly illustrate the faculty's ac-
tual understanding of the Institute's limited role in the law school's
research program; for example, the work of George Dession.48 9
Although many law school faculty members who were not then
participating in a sponsored research project were invited to par-
ticipate in the Institute's activities, only Dession used the Institute
either for the stimulation of new associations or for help design-
ing research. Dession, who was searching for an understanding of
the psychological basis of criminal responsibility, invited himself
to the Institute to learn what it had to offer.4 90 Yet his actions
serve only to underline the law school's attitude toward the Insti-
tute. Dession went to the trouble to take courses in the medical
school in order to learn about psychiatry.0 When choosing a col-
laborator he started with a locally well-known practicing psychia-
trist.492 Then he became unhappy with the "objectivity" of this
first expert,9 3 and so he found another, a social psychologist.4
That collaboration worked no better, and though Dession "re-
turned" to teaching with his first collaborator 0 5 he gave up
virtually all collaborative work, for what he wanted was not co-
operative research but the "facts" about mental illness.40 He
wished to make such use of the facts as he wanted, not to deal
with an expert's idea of what those facts might mean.0 7
489. Dession (b. 1905, A.B. 1926, M.A. 1927, Cornell) was a 1930 graduate of the
law school who stayed on as a teaching fellow.
490. Dession had spent the last semester of his third year working as an assistant
district attorney and during his first year he offered criminal law and a seminar called
"The Legal, Psychological and Psychiatric Aspects of Crime" taught with Thurman
Arnold and Eugene Kahn, the psychiatrist Winternitz found to head his psychiatry
department. Although his course list indicates that he began work in criminal law and
psychology almost immediately, and although Dorothy Thomas (interview, June 3, 1975)
distinctly remembers his interest in empirical research in general and the Institute in
particular, his name appears on no list of faculty participants in the Institute that I have
been able to find.
491. Yale Minutes, May 29, 1920.
492. Dr. Eugene Kahn.
493. See Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 21, 1931, Angell papers. Exactly
what the problem was with Kahn I cannot learn. Hutchins described Kahn as a "total
loss" whose acquisition was one of the two reasons for the Institute's failure, but did
not explain why he thought this was so. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
494. Edward S. Robinson, later Arnold's collaborator, see note 263 supra.
495. I use "returned" advisedly. Dession never gave up teaching his seminars with
Kahn but for a while tried working with Robinson in another seminar. Robinson seems
to have been largely uninterested in criminal law. See generally E. RoBINson, LAW AND
TBE LAwYERs (1985).
496. This theme is recurrent in the memorials written about him after his death.
See, e.g., Douglas, George Dession, 5 BuvrF.rLO L. REv. 3 (1955); Fortas, George Hathaway
Dession, 5 BumAs.o L. R.v. 5 (1955).
497. All of which is not meant to slight Dession's scholarship and impact on legal
education. He was the virtual fountainhead of the law and psychiatry movement in the
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Given the limited relationship to the Institute that the law
school had defined for itself over time, the decline of the school's
participation in the Institute's affairs might be seen as but a re-
run of the attempts of Thomas and Corstvet to collaborate with
the lawyers on research. Yet as such it was a rerun with a differ-
ence; Thomas and Corstvet left whatever joint research there had
been only to continue their scientific work elsewhere. Clark, and
to a lesser extent Douglas, did likewise. But when the lawyers
finally realized they had given up any real connection to the In-
stitute, they alone were left with the feeling that something had
been lost; the other participants in the Institute continued as be-
fore. Clark described this loss as one of access to an important
source of funding for empirical research and ascribed it to a re-
organization of the Institute's executive committee in fall 1931 
498
But an examination of that event and its consequences suggests
a different source for the sense of loss.
When the proposal to reorganize the executive committee
with an eye to better coordinating the Institute's researches, es-
pecially in the social sciences, was first aired, Clark, who had not
even been included in the initial discussions, not only did not
complain about the slight, but even suggested that termination
of the law school's "tenuous" connection with the Institute might
be an easy way to solve the problem of coordination of sociol sci-
ence research.499 Yet, as soon as he and the faculty heard that their
law schools. Through his work with Richard C. Donnelly, he is one of the men who
made R. DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN, & R. ScHWARTz, CRIMINAL LAw (1962) and J. KATz,
J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. DERSHOWITZ, PsYcHoANALYsIs, PSYC.IATRY & LAW (1967), possible.
His articles still have an unusually contemporary ring. See Dession, Psychiatry and the
Condition of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319 (1938); Dession, The Technique of
Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5 BUFFALo L. REv. 22 (1955).
Nevertheless he was not interested in cooperative research, but rather in reform of the
criminal law. And for reform he wanted facts. The major impact on Dession was not
the field of psychiatry, but rather the person of Harold Lasswell, who provided him
with an understanding of the legal system that supported the values Dession felt were
lacking in the criminal law, as can be seen from a comparison of the two articles cited
above.
498. Report of Dean Clark, 1931-32, at 20.
499. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 10, 1931, Angell papers. For three
reasons I infer that the discussion was begun by President Angell. First, it was he who
had first articulated a coherent notion of what the Institute as an entity might be, and
when he did so, in his final proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation, his notion centered
on cooperative research into human behavior. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
Second, Angell hardly was known for the forceful imposition of his ideas on other people.
It was characteristic of him not to have insisted on implementation of his preference
for such research by the Institute at its outset, but rather to hope that coordinated research
would come about naturally and, if not, to move cautiously to bring it about. See KELLY,
supra note 28, at 371; Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975. Third, the
plan of reorganization that was developed advanced his ideas by creating a single executive
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commitment to, and capacity for, empirical research had been
challenged 00 and learned that, as a consequence of the reorgani-
zation, Clark would lose his place on the committee and a member
of a competing department would assume control- over research
money for a new single topic of research in the social sciences, r l
he and they began to fight. 02 First came the charge that the law
school was being pushed out of the Institute'0 3 and then a virtual
demand that, because the law school's collection of research projects
was "of such importance and value," it should be made "the nu-
cleus for the future research" in the social sciences.504 Both pro-
in the social sciences who could foster the desired cooperation, yet was not an overly
forceful change in the way business was done at the Institute. See note 501 infra.
Why anyone thought that the lack of cooperative research was a "problem" escapes
me. There seems to have been no pressure applied by the Rockefeller Foundation. Con-
ceivably, Dean Furniss used Angell's interest in such research to advance the interests of
his department, which had been largely cut out of the Institute, primarily because its
chairman lacked sympathy for the newer quantitative social science methods. See note
298 supra & accompanying text. Furniss, one of the younger men in the department,
evidently was more interested in such methods and in the modernization of his own
branch of the department-economics. The Institute was plainly a potential vehicle for
advancing both interests, just as the Institute of Psychology had advanced similar interests
of President Angell and others when it was established eight years earlier. See note 119
supra. The difficulty with this speculation is that Furiss' impact on the form of the
reorganization and the Institute generally seems to have been marginal. The only other
possible source of the notion that the lack of cooperative research was a problem, other
than Angell, is Mark A. May. On the basis of my interview with him, I seriously doubt
that May could have moved Angell on the matter if Angell had not wanted to be moved.
500. Yale Minutes, Nov. 12, 1931 (reporting remarks by Dean Winternitz at a public,
nonuniversity gathering to the effect that it had been a mistake to include the law
school in the plan of the Institute and that the law school's faculty lacked the ability
to direct or even engage in research projects). These deliberately provocative remarks had
their intended effect; the faculty became furious at the public affront and concerned about
the truth of the matter stated. Id. Although Wintemitz later denied making the remarks,
see Yale Minutes, Nov. 19, 1931, throughout the discussion about reorganizing the Insti-
tute there is a recurring sense of hurt pride on the part of Clark and his faculty that
made rational discussion difficult. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 21,
1931, Angell papers. I suspect that in the end this sense of hurt pride made it more
difficult for the faculty to participate in the research at the reorganized Institute.
501. The plan called for Furniss, by then Dean of the Graduate School, to direct
activities in the social sciences, including psychology, and for Dean Winternitz to direct
all of the psychiatric research including child development. They, together with Angell
and May, would form the executive committee. See May, supra note 458, at 148; Interview
with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975.
502. See Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 18, 1931, Angell papers. Yale
Minutes, Nov. 12, 1931; Nov. 19, 1931 (reporting appointment of committee on research
consisting of Douglas, Arnold, Moore, Smith and Thomas).
503. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 18, 1931, Angell papers.
504. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 30, 1931, Angell papers. The letter
was based on a report submitted by an ad hoc committee on research that was apparently
largely written by Dorothy Thomas. The report reviewed the law school's research
activities, suggested several extensions of those activities, noted that while the Institute
provided "the most direct avenue" for developing the law school's research, such work
could also be done outside the Institute, and suggested that the choice to work inside
or outside the Institute turned on whether the law school program could "become a
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tests and demands were, however, quite deftly dismissed by Presi-
dent Angell, 05 who allowed the reorganization to proceed as
planned.r0 6
The law school's response to the threat of administrative re-
organization, a response complete with an ad hoc emergency com-
mittee on research r07 and numerous, interminable decanal letters,10
was definitely exaggerated in view of the limited use the law school
had made of the Institute's resources. While that exaggeration
might possibly be attributed to a real threat of a loss of funds for
empirical research, the later history of the law school's relation to
the Institute shows that this was not the case. It took a year for
the reorganized executive committee to select a new subject for
joint study.50 9 By that time the juvenile delinquency study was
center for the development of the Social Sciences at the Institute." It proposed a research
program for the entire social science group focused on "the interrelation between govern-
mental policy . . . with the habit formation and behavior reactions of the people."
Arnold, Smith & Thomas, Memo, Nov. 27, 1931, Moore papers.
505. Angell deflected the first charge in James R. Angell to Charles E. Clark, Nov.
19, 1931, Angell papers (expressing "puzzled surprise" at Clark's assertions). Clark
responded by inviting Angell to speak at the next law school faculty meeting in a letter
that contained several very truculent swipes at the medical school and revealed exactly
how deeply Winternitz's remarks had wounded the faculty's pride, when it noted that
the faculty was "properly nervous" that its "capacity for original research" was being
"doubted." Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 21, 1931, Angell papers. Angell
reacted with an unusual expression of irritation and suggested that Clark rid his mind
of the "hobgoblins which seem to have their home in the Medical School." James R.
Angell to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 24, 1931, Angell papers. Clark, unable ever to let anyone
get the last word, responded emphasizing exactly how insecure the law school was by
first, dragging out assertions from alumni that the stress on social science research was
causing Yale to allow students to be graduated who could not pass the New York bar
and then, seeking assurance that the research activities "most dear and satisfactory to
us" were viewed with "official approval." Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 24,
1931, Angell papers.
Angell deflected the second at a regular law school faculty meeting. Yale Minutes,
Dec. 4, 1931. In the interim, Clark's new proposal had been effectively undercut by Mark
May, who suggested that it was nothing less than an attempt to take over the social
science program of the Institute and thus would both alienate other potential participants
and undermine the notion of cooperative research. Mark A. May to James R. Angell,
Dec. 2, 1931, Angell papers. His bluff called, Clark tried an ingenious strategic retreat,
but the effect was unconvincing, when he suggested that in fact the law school's plan
was the one May desired but was unable to recognize. Charles E. Clark to James R.
Angell, Dec. 2, 1931, Angell papers.
506. Institute of Human Relations, Executive Committee, Minutes, Dec. 10, 1931,
IHR files; Minutes of Yale Corporation, Dec. 14, 1931.
507. See note 504 supra.
508. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 18, 1931; Nov. 21, 1931;
Nov. 24, 1931; Nov. 30, 1931, Angell papers. Clark generally managed to produce two
letters to every one from Angell; the timing of them suggests that he usually composed
his two page, single spaced replies immediately upon receipt of Angell's letters.
509. Institute of Human Relations, Executive Committee, Minutes, Nov. 7, 1932,
IHR files. The subject chosen was the City of New Haven. Mark May had suggested the
program at the time of the reorganization dispute. Mark A. May to James R. Angell,
Nov. 9, 1931, Angell papers. At that time Angell suggested the need to "stress . ..not
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virtually over; 510 Douglas had lost interest in bankruptcy, and
with it his need for the Institute's funding;511 and Dorothy Thomas
had lost interest in the law school 51 2 In the interim no faculty
member had sought funds for a new project. And in the succeed-
ing years only Underhill Moore chose to seek such funds;518 he
had little difficulty redirecting his research to fit in with the new
order and was able to participate generally in the affairs of the
Institute.
Despite protestations to the contrary, therefore, the reorgani-
zation made no financial difference to the law school's empirical
research activities; the source of the very real sense of loss must be
found elsewhere. In searching for that elsewhere a distinction be-
tween source and occasion is helpful. The occasion for first recog-
nizing the sense of loss was without a doubt the reorganization.
After that event the Institute was no longer felt to be a ready, if
recalcitrant, source of funds. Thus the lawyers thought that they
had lost something in the reorganization. But the real source of the
sense of loss was their choice, made back in 1929-30, to treat the
Institute as a repository of facts and funds and little else, and
thus to affirm generally their relatonship to the progressive reform
tradition. They effectively cut the school off from the scientific
enterprise that for the rest of its participants, all part of one or
another of the scientific traditions, was at the core of the notion
of the Institute. The exaggerated response of the law school to the
reorganization plan therefore masked the embarrassment of hav-
ing the actuality of the school's relationship to the Institute pub-
only the possible, but the necessary incorporation of the Law School" in the plan. James
R. Angell to Mark A. May, Nov. 10, 1931, Angell papers. It is possible that the study
was patterned after R. LYmN & H. LYND, MmDLEToN (1929). See William 0. Douglas
to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 15, 1932, Hutchins papers.
510. See Mark A. May to James R. Angell, May 18, 1931; James R. Angell to Mark
A. May, Oct. 7, 1931, IHR files; Edgar S. Furniss to James R. Angell, Jan. 1, 1932,
Angell papers.
511. See text accompanying notes 367.70 supra. Douglas' last request for funds for
the project was in spring 1930; at that time it was said that the funds were for "com-
pletion" of the work. Institute of Human Relations, Executive Committee, Minutes, May
29, 1930, IHR files.
512. See text accompanying notes 41115 supra.
513. See Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers [suggesting
a project that eventually became Moore's study of the behavior of parkers in New
Haven-Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943)]. Given
the willingness of Furniss to accept Moore's work, which really could have been carried
on in any large community in the United States, as part of the study of New Haven
it is hard to see how the choice of topic really limited anyone wishing funds for empirical
legal research. On the other hand some retailoring of existing faculty interests would
have been necessary to convert them to such a local focus, especially since with Roosevelt's
election national problems were moving to the center of the agenda for reform.
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licly disclosed by being publicly acted upon. 14 Such public
disclosure undercut the school's pretentions, dating back at least
to Hutchins' selection as dean, to a "scientific" tradition, and did
so in front of, and with the tacit approval of, the very man-Presi-
dent Angell-whom that scientific tradition was intended to im-
press21r The sense of loss was thus not that of a loss of funds but
that of a loss of part of the school's claim to science, in turn a part
of its claims to being a distinctive part of the law school world
generally, and to being an integral part of the university's emerg-
ing scientific community16
To identify the law school's real loss as a result of its limited
relationship to the Institute is not to deny the reality of its per-
ception of the source of that loss. If anything, identification of the
real loss heightens the force of the perceived one as an explana-
tion of the difference between the attempt to collaborate with
Thomas and Corstvet and the rerun of that attempt. The feel-
ing that the law school had lost a source of funds came at the
height of the Depression when funds seemed scarce generally,
517
and were in fact scarce for the kind of projects Clark and Douglas
had engaged in. Such a feeling was debilitating when it came to
thinking of starting any of the new projects that had been float-
ed among the faculty, 18 and doubly so when that feeling was
inextricably bound up with a sense that the pretentions of being
actively engaged in the doing of science had been undercut. Now
that the enormous real costs and effort associated with even small
empirical research projects were known, the addition of other de-
bilitating features to them did not encourage new beginnings.
How much more empirical research would have been done
at the law school had the faculty become a part of the Institute
instead of drifting away from it is admittedly hard to quantify.519
514. See Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 18, 1931; Nov. 21, 1931, Angell
papers.
515. See text following note 89 supra.
516. See Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 24, 1931, Angell papers.
517. See, e.g., Report of Dean Clark, 1930-31, at 30; Report of Dean Clark, 1931-32,
at 6, 19, 20. Dorothy Thomas doubted the truth of Clark's assertions (Interview, June
3, 1975), but the important matter is that Clark thought it was true.
518. See Arnold, Smith & Thomas, supra note 504. The suggestions included evidence
studies, studies of the relationship between taxation and saving, and studies of state
Blue Sky laws.
519. This is especially true in view of the later history of the Institute. The social
scientists did not exactly head straight for cooperative research among themselves. The
decision to study New Haven was not a success, and in 1936 a further reorganization
made Mark May director and created an executive committee of university officers and
Dean Wintemitz. Two years later membership was again changed, this time to include
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The recognition that the law school was not part of the Institute
by no means killed the lawyers' interest in their understanding
of cooperative research or their interest in empirical research. The
most fruitful of all the cooperative research between lawyers and
social scientists was barely begun,520 and Clark would begin yet
another bit of empirical research. 21 But the reorganization had
changed the way in which both enterprises were to be carried out.
Cooperative research would continue to be undertaken on the
law school's terms and would thus reflect both the progressive re-
form tradition and the social science tradition in proportions that
the lawyers would determine. Empirical research would be harder
to begin, even for Clark who was so obviously dedicated to it and
relatively swift to adopt its principles. Now, cut off from the sup-
port of both the social scientists and the old-fashioned progressive
reformers, and from the money of the Institute, Clark turned to
that now great, but then new, source of funds-the federal govern-
ment.
D. The Bar Survey
During the debate over the reorganization of the Institute
of Human Relations, Charles Clark, in closing one of his numer-
ous letters to President Angell, vowed "to endeavor so far as lies
in my power to secure means for the continuance of our work
.... if not from the Institute, then in whatever manner may be
possible."'5 2 At the time he had some reason for his note of dogged
determination combined with the feeling that the task would not
be easy: within the past month he had finally succeeded in getting
the Rockefeller Foundation to release enough funds to allow com-
pletion of a truncated version of the federal courts study.2 3 But
it was two full years before Clark's determination was at all tested.
mostly Institute staff members. The 1936 reorganization was accompanied by a decision
to create a centrally administered research fund to be used to develop inter-disciplinary
research. The 1938 reorganization reflected the emergence of the desired program of
research from common interests of a group of young psychologists working with Clark,
Hull and a group of similarly minded young anthropologists, May, supra note 458, at
148-50. Thus ultimately Slesinger was right when he suggested that cooperative research
would not come from older workers. See Donald Slesinger to James R. Angell, Jan. 16,
1930, IHR files.
520. Arnold had just met Edward S. Robinson. See Charles E. Clark to James R.
Angell, Nov. 21, 1931, Angell papers. Their joint seminar, The Judicial Process from
the Point of View of Social Psychology, was first given in fall 1932. For the results
of this collaboration see note 263 supra.
521. See text accompanying notes 522-87 infra.
522. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, Nov. 30, 1931, Angell papers.
523. See text accompanying note 233 supra.
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In the interim, Clark struggled to get the Federal Courts
project finished and to keep his faculty happy as the Depression
cut into Yale's resources and the lure of jobs in the fledgling
Roosevelt administration made that faculty somewhat footloose.524
One of the rewards for these efforts at Yale was his election as
president of the Association of American Law Schools for the
year 1933, an honor, at least at that time, passed from hand-to-
hand among the deans of the major law schools. 525 The job appar-
ently amounted to little more than the opportunity to see that
the program of the December annual meeting of the Association
was to one's liking. Clark did just that; he produced a program,
heavy with comment by his friends,526 that reflected current con-
troversies in jurisprudence 527 and a current concern about the
legal profession's societal obligations growing out of claims that
the economic distress of the bar caused by the Depression had
brought forth shoddy practices among practitioners.528 Clark's
rather rambling, nondescript presidential address emphasized this
second theme and suggested that the A.A.L.S. sponsor a "careful
study of the bar's functioning" in order to learn whether the bar
was in fact meeting its obligations. 29 With the help of his friend
524. As a preview of what was to come, during the summer of 1933 Arnold and
Sturges worked for Jerome Frank at the Department of Agriculture. Abe Fortas, who
was to start teaching in fall 1933, went with Arnold and Sturges and got so involved
in his work that he stayed in Washington for fall semester, too. And J. Howard Marshall,
the assistant dean, who had made himself an expert on petroleum production, went to
Washington to serve as a member of the Petroleum Administration Board and stayed
for the entire year. Report of Dean Clark, 1933-34, at 10, 11, 12.
525. Leon Green, interview, June 19, 1975 (referring to the practice as "the deans'
conspiracy").
: 526. Robert Hutchins, Leon Green, and Karl Llewellyn all spoke. 1933 A.A.L.S.
HANmOOK 135, 136.
527. Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, and Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson spoke at a
symposium, "Modern Trends in Jurisprudence." Id.
528. The source of the notion that the Depression had brought forth shoddy pro-
fessional practices, one of the numerous ways of saying that there were too many lawyers
and too little legal business, is a mystery. Clark first asserted it in spring 1932. Report
of Dean Clark, 1931-32, at 5. Of course, in one sense the source of this idea is as unim-
portant as is the precise source of the ideas in the Hutchins-Clark procedure proposal,
for the notion that the bar is overcrowded and that overcrowding is leading to shoddy
professional practices is as ubiquitous as the notion that procedural reform is the
appropriate cure for popular dissatisfaction with the law. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JusTrcE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) chronicles the persistent
cqmplaints about overcrowding over the last hundred years and locates their cause in
attempts by elite lawyers to preserve their status in the profession. While this explanation
is partial in that it ignores the similarly virulent complaints by low-status lawyers that
cannot be accounted for as manipulations of opinion by elite lawyers, it is plainly correct.
529. Clark, Law Professor, What Now?, in 1933 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 14, 21. Curiously,
despite the fact that contemporary jurisprudence was on the program, not a soul men-




Karl Llewellyn, Clark had the project referred to the Association's
Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, a group that
at the time was a resting place for former presidents of the Asso-
ciation, and which Clark had managed to get himself selected as
the chairman of for 1934 . 30
In suggesting a survey of the actual functioning of the bar,
Clark was working in largely unchartered territory, although he
had a model-a recently completed survey of the medical pro-
fession.5 31 The idea for such a survey was hardly original with
Clark; it had possibly been suggested to him by Karl Llewellyn,
who knew that in spring 1932 a committee of the New York
County Lawyer's Association, largely in the person of the inde-
fatigable, if slightly crank-like, Isidor Lazarus, had proposed a
questionnaire study of the income from, and nature of, the prac-
tice of the legal profession in that city.02 Other people had the
idea, too. In late fall 1932, the California Bar Association surveyed
recently admitted attorneys. 33 A year later, the University of
Wisconsin Law School was given about thirty recent graduates
to do research as part of the Civil Works Administration project
there.51 Professor Lloyd Garrison 535 managed to capture seven of
530. 1933 A.A.LS. HANDBOOK 124-25. The Committee on Cooperation was a perfect
vehicle for Clark's proposal. It was a ten year old enterprise of Professor Joseph Beale
of Harvard. Beale, acting as the Association's floor leader, had urged its creation as a
nearly euphoric response to the presidential address of William Draper Lewis, director
of the then newly formed American Law Institute, who had suggested that the law
teachers were now a coequal branch of the profession with the duty of cooperation with
the other two branches-the bench and bar-in the improvement of the law. 1924 A.A.LS.
HANDBOOK 87-89, 97. The committee had never really done anything, despite Beale's
continuing efforts. First it had tried to get up a juristic center; then it had branched
out into surveying developments in legal education, only to be chastised for stepping
on the toes of the Committee on the Curriculum. 1932 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 138-39 (re-
counting history). Thus in 1933 it needed something to do.
531. THE CoMMITTEE ON THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMER-
ICAN PEOPLE (1932), cited in Clark, Law Professor, What Now?, in 1933 A.A.L.S. HAND-
BOOK 14, 23 n.8.
532. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn to Charles E. Clark, May 3, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke,
Llewellyn, Remarks in 1934 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 83-88. There are many Lazarus letters
in the Clark papers, Beinecke. For a slightly more accessible example of the temper of
the man, see Lazarus, Separate Concurring Statement to American Bar Association, Special
Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, Report 6-7, bound with AMERICAN
BAR ASOCIATION, SPECIAL COMIrTEE ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE BAR, Tim
ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1938) [hereinafter cited as THE ECONOMICS OF TlE
LECAL PROFESSION]. Lazarus describes his survey, which in fact was not begun until
fall 1934, id. at 155-77.
533. THE ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, sup.ra note 532, at 190-93.
534. L Garrison, Results of the Wisconsin Bar Survey, with Some Suggestions for
Future Bar Surveys, in 1934 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 58, 59. There is a short description of
the survey in Ti ECONOMICS OF THE LECAL PROFEssION, supra note 532, at 184-87.




these graduates and set them to work gathering data, largely from
the Wisconsin state income tax records, then open to public in-
spection, on the history of the Wisconsin bar and the income of its
members from 1927 to 1932.1"1 Using these data he attempted to
compare the growth of the bar with the economic growth of the
state and hoped to determine whether the bar was "overcrowded"
as had been alleged' in some quarters.3
Clark knew he wanted to follow neither Garrison's study nor
the California or New York questionnaire surveys. He had already
done two studies based on accumulated records and knew the
limits to such an effort first hand; he had learned from Dorothy
Thomas the limits to the reliability of data drawn from mailed
questionnaires. Given what he wanted to know, he would have to
conduct personal interviews. But the costs of a national survey by
personal interview, even of a carefully chosen sample of the bar,
much less of the general public, was well beyond the ability of
the A.A.L.S. to finance. So Clark set off to find the necessary funds.
Yale plainly did not have the money,5 35 and even a cursory
inquiry disclosed that none of the major foundations was inter-
ested in the project either;5 39 so Clark, perhaps influenced by
Garrison's windfall, turned to the federal government, specifi-
cally the Federal Employment Relief Administration (FERA).540
Armed with an appropriate letter of introduction, Clark traveled
off to Washington. There he presented the rather simple argu-
ment that getting the facts about the economic condition of the
bar would lead to the improvement of its condition in the short
run, through employment in the survey, and in the long run as
well.541 But although his project was met with "the greatest of in-
536. Garrison, supra note 534, at 59, 60.
537. Id. at 59. Garrison also planned to study the correlation between success in
law school and monetary success in practice. Id. His results were published as Garrison,
A Survey of the Wisconsin Bar, 1935 Wis. L. R~v. 131. They showed first, that during
the early years of the depression, although the increase in the number of lawyers was
proportionally greater than for other professions, income levels remained higher than
that of doctors who were general practitioners; second, that during the period 1880 to
1930 the increase in the number of lawyers was proportionately less than almost any
index of either legal or economic acitivity; and third, that students who obtained better
grades in law school tended to have higher incomes in practice.
538. See note 444 supra.
589. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Frederick P. Keppel (Carnegie), June 22, 1934,
Clark papers, Beinecke.
540. Clark, Remarks in 1934 AA.LS. HANDBooK 88, 89.
541. See Charles E. Clark to Jacob E. Baker (Asst. Adm., FERA), May 15, 1934,
Clark papers, Beinecke (summary of meeting). Clark planned to use A.A.L.S. member
schools to do the local administration of the survey together with a central staff to do
the tabulation and to write the report. He envisioned interviewing lawyers only aiming
to learn the number of lawyers, type of practice, and the kinds of services perfomed.
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
terest," 1 2 Clark came home with no money, for he was informed,
first, that there was no money available at the time; second, that
even if money were available it was not available directly to in-
dividuals, or even universities, but only through state and local
employment relief agencies; and third, that even such state and
local agencies could fund only projects for which there was a
"working procedure" approved by FERA. Undaunted by what
must then have seemed a particularly onerous obstacle course
because of the assurance that money would eventually be avail-
able,54 4 Clark set out to get approval for the project through the
issuance of an acceptable working procedure. Another trip to
Washington,5 4 5 many letters, and six months later FERA produced
a one and one-half page working procedure. 4" After one year's
worth of work, Clark still had no money.
In the process of negotiating with FERA, Clark had been
forced to define exactly what he intended to do. That process
involved a considerable advance on Garrison's study and on the
California and New York County surveys. Clark's field workers
were to interview a sample of lawyers with an instrument directed
largely at the nature of their practice and their income from it and
at the same time interview a sample of the general public with an
instrument directed at learning the amount of potential legal
business, particularly of a preventive nature, in the community. 47
And, by borrowing Emma Corstvet from her work at the Institute
on Underhill Moore's parking studies, he had managed to get a
good preliminary draft of the questionnaire for lawyers 48
542. Clark, supra note 540, at 89. The quote is Clark's own words. He did recognize
that that interest might well have been momentary, as it turned out to be. Five months
later Baker had forgotten about the project, although when his recollection was refreshed
he was again "quite enthusiastic." Charles E. Clark to Edson R. Sunderland (prof.
Michigan, Committee member), Oct. 28, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
543. Clark, supra note 540, at 89.
544. See Charles E. Clark to Jacob Baker, Sept. 4, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
545. See Charles E. Clark to Karl N. Llewellyn, Sept. 24, 1934, id. (can you come to
meeting Oct. 5, 1934?).
546. The working procedure is reproduced in Committee on Cooperation with
the Bench and Bar, Report, in 1934 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 183-84. Baker actually worked
faster than the gross elapsed time would suggest. Once he agreed to sponsor the project,
he prepared a draft work procedure in two weeks and then held up issuing the approved
procedure for over a month and a half to let Clark have a chance to seek foundation
funds for a central office staff to direct the study. See Jacob Baker to Charles E. Clark,
Oct. 18, 1934; Oct. 31, 1934; Nov. 13, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke. See note 551 infra &
accompanying text.
547. Clark, supra note 540, at 91. See also Karl N. Llewellyn to Jacob Baker, Oct.
19, 1934, copy in possession of author (includes sketch of entire project). The idea to
expand the study to include interviews with potential clients was first made in Karl N.
Llewellyn to Jacob Baker, Oct. 19, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
548. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Nov. 30, 1934, Moore papers. The
draft questionnaire it reproduced in 1934 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 93-98.
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Unfortunately, Clark's careful planning also disclosed a new
problem. From the beginning the studies were to have been con-
ducted locally. 49 This fact meant that Clark would not only have
to convince friends at other schools to carry out the research, but
he would also have to establish an office to coordinate the several
local studies and do the composite analysis of the results. Clark
knew from his experience in the federal courts project that once
a successful pilot project was completed, it was easy to generate
interest from other academics, so he did not expect any difficulty
securing law school cooperation. Based on the same experience he
did not expect any problem securing federal funding for the cen-
tral office either, but he soon learned that such funding was ex-
tremely doubtful. 50 So again Clark turned to the foundations 51
and then followed up on the suggestion that the Connecticut State
Employment Relief Agency might use its federal funds to support
the central office.552 But the best Clark could do anywhere was to
determine that successful completion of a pilot project would
likely make it easier to obtain funding for any central planning
and evaluation office to coordinate the project.
5 3
No matter which side of his problem Clark chose, it seemed
as if Yale would have to run a pilot study to generate any move-
ment on the project. So, after a short stop at the 1934 A.A.L.S.
convention, where bar surveys were one of the two major topics
on the program, Clark filed his application for his field workers
and their supervisor with the Connecticut FERA office, under the
working procedure he had largely written. 54 Indeed, through
549. See note 541 supra. Originally this organization was adopted in order to increase
convenience and maximize the involvement of A.A.L.S. member schools. In fact it was
necessary given the structure of the FERA program, which had been decentralized in
order to build local support, although Clark did not learn this fact until his second
trip to Washington. See Jacob Baker to Charles E. Clark, Sept. 20, 1934; Charles E.
Clark to Members of Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, Oct. 17, 1934,
Clark papers, Beinecke.
550. Jacob Baker to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 18, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
551. Charles E. Clark to Stacy May (Rockefeller Foundation), Oct. 24, 1934; Stacy
May to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 28, 1934; Charles E. Clark to Frederick P. Keppel, Nov.
24, 1934; Charles E. Clark to Evans Clark (Twentieth Century Fund), Nov. 27, 1934;
Evans Clark to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 4, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke. The Rockefeller
Foundation apparently refused the grant because one of its lawyer board members,
Raymond Fosdick, soon to be Foundation president, thought the project useless. See
Charles E. Clark to Phillip W. Wickser, Nov. 8, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
552. See Charles E. Clark to Justin Miller, Jan. 7, 1935; Charles E. Clark to Cor-
rington Gill (Baker's replacement as Asst. Adm. FERA), Jan. 7, 1935, Clark papers,
Beinecke; Clark, supra note 540, at 90.
553. Emma Corstvet Llewellyn to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 15, 1935; Charles E. Clark
to Karl N. Llewellyn, Feb. 9, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke. Clark, supra note 540, at 90.
554. See Charles E. Clark to Elanor E. Little (Conn. FERA Adm.), Jan. 19, 1935;
Manor E. Little to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 29, 1935; Charles E. Clark to Elanor E. Little,
Jan. 30, 1929, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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Emma Corstvet, now at work on the other survey instrument,
Clark had even identified an acceptable supervisor; but the re-
gional FERA office quite politely declined to provide him with
any workers on the ground that FERA money was available only
to public educational institutions-and Yale was a private uni-
versity.55 After a flurry of correspondence with Washington, it
was perfectly plain that Clark had indeed worked for fifteen
months without having once read the statute.550 Somewhat em-
barrassed, he began the search for alternative financing.
With a little bit of finagling, Clark was able to get the re-
gional FERA office to provide him with a supervisor out of its
budget.557 But finding field workers was more difficult. The local
FERA committee was the only potential sponsor, and although
Washington said that the committee would help,5 8 in fact it re-
fused to sponsor anything legal without the approval of the New
Haven County Bar Association. 59 That bar association, whose re-
lationship with the Yale Law School faculty varied from mutually
studied scorn to downright open warfare, was unwilling to endorse
the project at all.' 60 Faced with the likelihood of having a super-
visor with no one to supervise, Clark turned to the A.A.L.S. for
money to support "its" project."' With some help from two friends
on the Association's executive committee, the Association agreed
to the expenditure, but only on the understanding that no further
555. Charles E. Clark to Corrington Gill, Feb. 12, 1935 (what do I do now?); Cor-
rington Gill to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 14, 1935 ("a number of annoying minor difficulties
remain to be solved"), Clark papers, Beinecke. The problem was doubly critical because
nearly half of the law schools targeted as participants in the national study were also
private schools. See Karl N. Llewellyn to Charles E. Clark, Nov. ?, 1934, Clark papers,
Beinecke (listing targets).
556. See Act of Feb. 12, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-93, 48 Stat. 351 (widening program
from grants to "States" by including grants to "public agencies").
557. W.R.F. Stier to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 20, 1935 (use New Haven FERA office
as sponsor); Charles E. Clark to W.R.F. Stier, Feb. 21, 1935 (they will not do it); W.R.F.
Stier to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 27, 1935 (I will pay two months salary), Clark papers,
Beinecke.
558. Corrington Gill to Charles E. Clark, Feb. 26, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke.
559. Mrs. Samuel C. Harvey to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 15, 1935; Charles E. Clark
to Members of Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, Mar. 19, 1935,
Clark papers, Beinecke.
560. Charles E. Clark to Samuel J. White (New Haven Bar Assn.), Apr. 24, 1935
(recounting phone conversation). Clark publicly referred to the problem as a "lack of
complete cooperation between the local bar association and the local representatives of
FERA." Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, Report, in 1935 A.A.L.S.
H NDBOOK 191, 193.
561. Charles E. Clark to Rufus C. Harris (dean at Tulane and A.A.L.S. President),
Apr. 29, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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requests for assistance would be forthcoming.56 2 In early spring
the first of the field workers headed off.
Data collection proceeded in New Haven and Hartford until
August 1935.56 Over 500 people were interviewed, and eventually
the survey of potential legal business was split into two pieces,
one for businesses and one for everyone else. 64 The resulting study
was, with a carefully chosen sample complete with explicit rules
for substitutions and an instrument with explicitly formulated
coding rules, the most sophisticated methodologically of all the
studies done by Clark or Douglas. 6 5 Preliminary analysis of the
data showed that there was much legal business to be done in low-
and middle-class communities, if only the lawyers and clients
could be brought together at an appropriate price.5 66 Clark was
pleased, though hardly surprised, with the results. 67 But there was
no one to write up these findings, for during the summer Clark
had become the reporter to the committee charged with drafting
the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Emma Corstvet had
returned to her work for Underhill Moore.
Since Clark was unwilling to let the data just sit there, he sold
the project of analyzing the data and writing a "Bar Survey
Manual" based on the analysis to a "quite brilliant" new S.J.D.
candidate named Edward H. Levi, who set to work, or so Clark
thought. 6 But by summer 1936, when Levi returned to the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, he still had not finished the work,
and even some push from his new employer was of no immediate
help in getting it completed. 69 Meanwhile, Clark completed his
obligations to his grantors by filing with FERA and A.A.L.S. a
crude preliminary report of the survey done the previous fall
by Emma Corstvet and the field work supervisor.
570
562. Rufus C. Harris to Charles E. Clark, May 17, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke.
The two friends were Harris and Herschel W. A-rant, the Association's secretary-treasurer.
563. Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, supra note 560, at 193.
564. Id. Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47
YALE L.J. 1272, 1276, 1285 (1938).
565. See Clark & Corstvet, supra note 564, at 1276 (methodological discussion).
566. Committee on the Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, supra note 560, at 194.
567. Id. (the results "sustain our hypothesis as to the maladjustment of legal business").
See also Charles E. Clark to Emma Costvet & Bernice Smith (supervisor of field workers),
Oct. 26, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke.
568. Charles E. Clark to Emma Corstvet, Nov. 9, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke. Edward
H. Levi to John Henry Schlegel, Mar. 3, 1977.
569. See George T. Bogert to Charles E. Clark, Oct. 13, 1936; Oct. 21, 1936, Clark
papers, Beinecke.
570. See Charles E. Clark to Emma Corstvet & Bernice Smith, Oct. 26, 1935, Clark
papers, Beinecke. The findings in Corstvet's report are set forth in Committee on Coopera-
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At the same time the writing up of the Connecticut survey
results was proceeding at a snail's pace, progress on generating a
national survey ground to a halt. Clark, having concluded that
FERA would not be able to sponsor such a survey,5 71 had set for
himself and his committee the task of finding another source of
financial support,572 but he was unable to find the time even to
look. 72 And an attempt to use Corstvet's work as the basis for gen-
erating an A.A.L.S. pamphlet on the results of the already com-
pleted surveys foundered because two of the moving parties, Clark,
who was still at work on the Federal Rules, and Llewellyn, who
was at work on his magnificent group of sales articles, could not
find the time to do the work. 74 And so, after three years' work,
Clark and his committee had generated a working procedure, a
short summer's worth of field work, and a preliminary report.
At this point the chairmanship of the Committee on Coopera-
tion passed to Wiley B. Rutledge, who, as dean of the University
of Missouri Law School, had been somewhat skeptical of the sur-
vey of the Missouri Bar.575 That spring he saw to it that the entire
project was shifted to a special American Bar Association com-
mittee, chaired by Garrison, who was then dean at Wisconsin .1 7
tion with the Bench and Bar, Report, in 1936 A.A.L.S. HAND1OOK 275, 278-80. A draft of it
entitled "Report of Experimental Survey of Lawyers and the Public" is in the author's
possession.
571. See Charles E. Clark to Lloyd K. Garrison, Oct. 10, 1935, Clark papers, Beinecke.
572. Committee on Cooperation with the Bench and Bar, Report, in 1935 A.A.L.S.
HANDBOOK 191, 194.
573. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Karl N. Llewellyn, Mar. 20, 1936. Clark papers,
Beinecke ("I am going to be terrifically tied up with the federal rules from now on.").
574. Charles E. Clark to Karl N. Llewellyn, far. 20, 1936; Karl N. Llewellyn to Lloyd
K. Garrison, June ?, 1936, Clark papers, Beinecke. The third moving party was Garrison.
Llewellyn quickly produced On Warranty of Quality and Society I, 36 CoLum. L. Rxv. 699
(1936); On Warranty of Quality of Society II, 37 COLUM. L. RaV. 341 (1937). These were
followed by Through Title to Contract and Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 159 (1938); The Rule
of Law in Our Case Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938); Across Sales on Horseback,
52 HI- v. L. REv. 725 (1939); The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv. 873
(1939). It was probably the most productive period of Llewellyn's life. When at work on an
article Llewellyn was completely oblivious of anything else. Interview with Emma Corstvet
Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975 (recounting how Llewellyn was unfazed by news of Cardozo's death
even though at the time at work on an article about the man).
575. See Rutledge, A Survey of the Welfare of the Missouri Bar, in 1934 A.A.L.S.
HANDBOOK 74,76 (The survey "was thoroughly unscientific. It was unscientific in some of its
objectives, in most of its methods, and in nearly all of its conclusions .... ). The results
of the survey were published in 5 Mo. B.J. 223 (1934).
576. Wiley B. Rutledge to Charles E. Clark, Apr. 17, 1937; Charles E. Clark to Wiley
B. Rutledge, Apr. 27, 1937, Clark papers, Beinecke. Clark had previously tried to get
Garrison to start on a national survey. Charles E. Clark to Lloyd K. Garrison, Feb. 19, 1937,
Clark papers, Beinecke. This letter is interesting for its indirect comment on the level of
social science sophistication elsewhere, as compared with Yale's. Although Garrison had run
the Wisconsin Survey, in this letter to him Clark had to take time to explain to Garrison
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Garrison had the pamphlet written summarizing the studies done
so far, but his committee killed the project with the dubious con-
clusion that "experimentation in planning and method" had not
proceeded "far enough" for a successful national survey.
577
In late summer 1937 Levi finished his report. Clark was dis-
gruntled both at the delay and at what Levi had been doing
instead of working on the bar survey materials.57 8 Corstvet was
simply unhappy with Levi's work and decided to do an article
of her own because she felt the data to be richer than Levi had
reported them to be.5 79 Her article, published jointly with Clark
in late spring 1938, almost four and one-half years after the project
was begun, was unpretentious but informative.5 0 It told a now
familiar story of clients who had a significant need for legal ad-
vice but who never got any, in part for lack of a way to find a
reputable lawyer, and of lawyers, hardly wealthy overall, doing
a very varied practice. But at the time no one cared about such
mundane findings-no one, that is, but the New Haven Bar Asso-
ciation. It got upset enough about the suggestion that it might
not be serving the public adequately that it appointed a com-
mittee to study the article.58' Charles E. Clark, one year away from
an appointment to Learned Hand's court, never tried empirical
research again. Emma Corstvet, by then on the Sarah Lawrence
faculty, never tried such narrowly legal research again, either.
Why Clark's national bar survey never got started, much less
the difference between the Connecticut study, a true survey by sample, and the Wisconsin
study, a census, and the merits of each, because Garrison had confused the two. At the
time the doing of empirical research in no way implied any social science sophistication,
much less quantitative understanding.
577. Tim ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8, supra note 532. The committee's
findings are generally not interesting except for their perversity. They simply repeat asser-
tions about low salaries, lack of jobs, sub-standard proprietary law schools, unauthorized
practice and general popular dissatisfaction. To these ancient assertions they add the
existence of much legal business in low income groups, a finding from Clark's data, and the
large overhead in law practice, a finding in Wisconsin and New York. Id. at 11. Of course,
Garrison's own study provided evidence that salaries were not low and that legal business
was probably more plentiful than fifty years earlier. See note 537 supra.
578. Charles E. Clark to Emma Corstvet, June 17, 1937 ("Levi is... now engaged in
reorganizing the teaching of law along Mortimer Adler lines .... 1); Charles E. Clark to
Emma Corstvet, Oct. 16, 1937, Clark papers, Beinecke.
579. Emma Corstvet to Charles E. Clark, Sept. ?, 1987; Charles E. Clark to Emma
Corstvet, Nov. 22, 1937; Emma Corstvet to Charles E. Clark, Jan. 24, 1938; Feb. ?, 1938,
Clark papers, Beinecke.
580. Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YA L.J.
1272 (1938). The article is discussed in W. HUsT, THE GROWTH OF AMRICAN LAw: Tm
LAW MAKERS316-18 (1950).
581. See William A. Bree (N.H. Bar Assn.) to Charles E. Clark, June 14, 1938; Charles
E. Clark to Paul Shipman Andrews (dean at Syracuse), June 15, 1938, Clark papers, Beinecke.
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finished, is a complex question, but much of the answer can be
found in the difficulties he faced in getting even his little study
completed. Clark began work exactly as he had begun in the
Connecticut courts and auto accidents studies and as Douglas
had done in the business failures project. Faced with what he per-
ceived to be a problem, he drew on his participation in the
progressive reform tradition and set out to get the facts. In this
case the problem was the impact of the Depression on lawyers, al-
though the vernacular expressions were catch phrases like "over-
crowding," "unauthorized practice," and "quota admissions,"''
and, if one may intuit from a research proposal, the facts were
a poor distribution of legal services.r,8 But finding the facts was
no longer as simple as it had been in 1927 when Clark threw four
law students into a court clerk's office in an effort to find the facts
about law administration in Connecticut. By 1934 Clark was
enough a part of the social science tradition that fact gathering
meant research design, questionnaire development, field worker
supervision and the rest of the accoutrements of modern social
science. That kind of an enterprise could not be carried off on a
shoestring. So Clark set out to find someone who would support
his research. But by 1934 Clark was left with only the federal
government.5 4 That grantor, as Clark had learned once before,
proved to be no more tractable than any other, no more inter-
ested in empirical legal research than in a myriad of other things,
and perhaps even less. Doing even a little bit of research had be-
come a seemingly enormous chore, more than even Clark's com-
mitment to the social science tradition could support. And so,
when the opportunity presented itself, as in drafting the new Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and in reconstituting the American
Bar Association, 5 5 Clark slid back into the more direct pursuit of
reform, as Douglas had done, by following things of "special in-
582. Clark advocated quota admissions to law school as a more humane way of limiting
entry into the profession than by manipulating the pass rate on the bar examination.
See Clark, The Selective Process of Choosing Law Students and Lawyers, 7 Amr. L. SCHooL
Rav. 913 (1933); Clark, Making Selective Admission to the Bar Practicable, 8 A. L. ScHooL
Rv. 13 (1934).
583. See Charles E. Clark to Jacob Baker, May 15, 1934, Clark papers, Beinecke.
Karl N. Llewellyn to Jacob Baker, Oct. 19, 1934, copy in possession of author.
584. Curiously Douglas was left in the same position. His last study-protective com-
mittees in corporate reorganizations-was also federally financed.
585. There is a quite fascinating letter box in the Clark papers, Bfeinecke, detailing
Clark's efforts in 1935 to reorganize the American Bar Association in order to neutralize its
voice in national politics by turning it into a lawyer service organization. The reorganiza-
tion attempt was ultimately successful, although the results were not exactly what he had
expected, as Clark soon learned in the "Court-packing" controversy.
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terest,"'8 6 just as had Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet.
The tension between progressive reform and social science
can of course be overemphasized. The lack of financial and other
support for empirical legal research, aptly captured in Clark's dis-
couragement when after a year's worth of work he was told that
Yale as a private university was ineligible for funds under his
project,8 7 alone played a significant part in the decline of such
research at Yale. After Clark learned of the federal government's
indifference there was no place left to turn. The Harvard law re-
formers, the social scientists, and the Institute had all turned out
to be rather unconcerned about the kind of empirical legal re-
search Clark and Douglas wished to do; each group had other in-
terests or objectives. Had there been a supportive National
Foundation for Scientific Legal Research the result might have been
different. But there was no such entity; there was only FERA,
convinced that the way to build support for its programs was by
co-opting local forces. With such weak support, empirical legal
research died at Yale, swallowed up in the other activities that
made it an exciting place and the hot-bed of American Legal
Realism.
III. WHY THE LAW SCHOOL STOPPED MOVING
A good story, it is said, should have a beginning, a middle
and an end. By this canon, the story of the Yale Realists' attempts
at empirical research in law has not been a good one, for if there
has been any form to it at all, it has been that of a slow descend-
ing curve from enthusiastic high hopes and almost frenetic ac-
tivity to doubt and virtual inactivity, but without any denouement.
Of course to say that the story has been one of decline is not to
say that an entire institution-the Yale Law School or the Realist
movement-slipped slowly down the figurative drain. Indeed, just
the opposite is true: as "scientific" research in law declined, the
philosophical side of Realism, which gave the movement its name
and fame and tied it inextricably to Yale, flowered."" And, more
586. Charles E. Clark to James R. Angell, June 4, 1935, Angell papers (reporting
appointment as Reporter to Federal Rules Advisory Committee).
587. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Paul Brosman (professor at Tulane), Mar. 19, 1935,
Clark papers, Beinecke ("This is one of the bits of red tape over which I have torn my hair
during the past several months.").
588. One may sample this side of realism by starting with Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUi. L. Rv. 431 (1930); Pound, The Call for a
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HAav. L. Rlv. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism About
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important, the political reformist side of Realism,5 9 which when
combined with its "scientific" side defines or isolates this move-
ment in legal scholarship far more readily than the philosophical
debates of the thirties, continued in full force and even gained in
strength. But on the "scientific" side, on the side of empirical so-
cial science as it was understood then, the story can only be char-
acterized as one of decline. 190
The reasons for the decline of the Yale Realists' efforts at em-
pirical legal research are numerous and in one sense accidental.
They are accidental because the background against which the
story must be seen was surely as favorable to an attempt to do, and
institutionalize the doing of, such research as anyone had a right
to expect. Socially and politically it was a time when scientific
research was a good thing. Herbert Hoover, the great engineer, was
President. He, who would bring his practical, objective science
to bear on American goverment, who in the Department of Com-
merce had fostered the collection of incredible quantities of
"facts,"'59 and who continued to foster detached inquiry into so-
cial problems,5 92 at least gave social scientific enterprises a setting
in which they could try to flourish. And other elements of the
social scene helped, too. Taylorite scientific management was a
significant force in business; 93 the progressive tradition of com-
missions of detached inquiry was still prevalent; and even the
general public was, it appears, fascinated by statistics. 94
Realism, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931). See also T. ARNOLD, Tnm FOLKLORE o CAPITALism
(1937); J. FRANK, LAW AND iE MODERN MIND (1930); E. ROBINSON, THE LAW% AND THE
LAWYERs (1937); F. RODELL, WOE UNTo You, LAWYERSl (1939).
589. Consider, for example, Douglas' work in securities law, Clark's work on pro-
cedural reform that culminated in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Llewellyn's work on reforming sales law that ultimately produced the Uniform Commercial
Code, Hamilton's work on destroying economic due process, Arnold's work at reviving the
antitrust laws, and Borchard's tireless activities on behalf of the Federal Tort Claims Act
and the declaratory judgment. What holds these diverse activities together is that at the
time they were seen as liberal, reformist projects. One of the characteristics of Realism as a
movement was its slightly left of center politics.
590. Even more obviously so when the experience of the shortlived Johns Hopkins
Institute of Law is taken into account, which I hope to do presently.
591. For a revealing account of Hoover's policies as Secretary of Commerce, see Roth-
bard, Essay, in HERBERT HOOVER AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CArI'TAusm 35 (J. Huth-
macher 9: W. Susman eds. 1973).
592. See, e.g., PREsIENT'S ComrrlTE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS (1988),
discussed extensively in Karl, Presidential Planning and Social Science Research: Mr.
Hoover's Experts, 3 PERsP. AM. HIsT. 347 (1969).
593. See S. HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE
EPA, 1890-1920 (1964).




Academically the background was equally favorable. The
social science disciplines had just finished their fragmentation
along methodological lines from a unified science of political
economy into their now invariable universe,5 95 but the concomitant
fragmentation of academic departments was still underway, 96
This was the time of the early reception of quantification into so-
cial science, when counting seemed enough and statistics as it is
known today was in its infancy.597 Thus, method in the social
sciences was only beginning to adopt the now familiar norms,"""
and indeed major methodological works were still being written
canonizing all then generally accepted methods within given dis-
ciplines. 9 Graduate education was expanding rapidly, in part to
supply the needed Ph.D.'s to staff the new social science depart-
ments in every educational nook and cranny in the country. Pro-
fessional education, especially in medicine, but also in law, was
still in the process of reform.60 Foundation interest in and sup-
port for education, especially professional education, was at a high
point. On a more narrrowly institutional level, Columbia, it ap-
pears, was still suffering from growing pains; Yale, just becoming
a university; and Johns Hopkins, still trying to duplicate its medi-
cal successes. 01 Thus, there was great potential for new edu-
cational openings in general and openings toward an active,
diversified social science community as well.
Professionally, the background was admittedly nowhere near
as favorable. The enormous American Law Institute scholarship
engine had already been set in motion, its wheels well-greased
with money that might have been captured for scientific research
595. For a recent recounting of this process of specialist separation in a single
discipline, see M. FUmmt, ADVOCACY AND OBjEarrvry: A CRisis IN TIE PRoFssIoNAUZArioN
OF AMERICAN SocIAL SCIENcE, 1865-1905 (1975) (economics); for a more general account, see
T. HAsKEL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE ASSoCATION AND THm NINETEENTH CENTURY CRIsIs OF AufHoR (1977). See also
L. BERNARD g& J. BERNARD, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SoCIOLOGY (1943); THE SocAL SCIENCES AT
HARVARD 1860-1920 (P. Buck ed. 1965).
596. Yale's Department of Economics, Sociology and Government is a good example
of the halfway stage in the fragmentation of the social sciences. Psychology did not split off
from philosophy at Yale until 1927.
597. See notes 175, 802 supra.
598. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3,1975.
599. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, A CASEBOOx ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD (S. Rice
ed. 1931) is a good example of such a work.
600. On medical education, see R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLC
INTERST (1971); on legal education, Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law
School, 5 PERsP. Am. HIsr. 405,481-504 (1971).
601. See A HISTORY OF COLUMBIA COLLEGE ON MORNINGSlDE (1954); B. KELLEY, YALE,
A MsToRY (1974); J. FRENCH, A MIsToRY OF THE UNIVERsrrY FOUNDED BY JOHNs HOPKINS
(1946). See generally L. VEYSEY, EMERGENCE OF TE UNiVERsrrY AMmUCA (1965).
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in law, but that instead lined the pockets of more traditional legal
scholars.0 2 That organization provided now tax deductible op-
portunities for slightly left of center, upper caste lawyers to so-
cialize in an atmosphere that reinforced the notion that theirs was
a learned profession and thus further separated them from the
stench of the untermenschen of the profession. Even more debili-
tating was the notion fueled by the Institute's mere existence that
library, not field, research was the method of legal research among
the group in the profession that was the most likely to support
empirical research in law. And the profession as a whole, or at
least that upper portion about which something is known, was
surely not interested in social science intrusions into the "prac-
tical" training for the practice of law, although the phenomenal
use of the "bar survey" suggests that at least parts of the pro-
fession were not adverse to using "scientific" methods when such
methods seemed to advance the profession's interests. But the pro-
fessional background could hardly be expected to be favorable at
any time; union spokesmen can be expected to oppose innovations
in the craft that smell of automation or, in that marvelous English
word, of redundancy, and this is as true of unions of persons whose
craft skills are mental as of those whose skills are manual.
If the social, political, and academic, if not professional,
background was largely supportive, what then were the reasons
for the decline of empirical research in law and thus of the scien-
tific side of Realism? Speaking of Yale alone, these were the usual
accidents of time and of person-the Depression and Deans Hutch-
ins and Clark-and the nonaccident that was the nature of the re-
search enterprise itself. The first two have not yet been extensively
discussed but their importance should not be underestimated.
In some sense the Depression did the dirty work. If business
had continued its short-lived postwar boom there might well have
been enough foundation money for starting much empirical re-
search in law. But the Depression came, and instead of watching
the Rockefeller's largess almost fall out of the trees, Charles Clark
saw the money tree wither. Virtually untrained in the then de-
veloping art of grantsmanship, he looked for money to support his
predetermined research objectives rather than attempting to orient
his research toward grantors' interests. Thus, he was reduced first
602. On the history of the ALl, see H. GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INnSTITE (1961); Goodrich would, however, rather strongly disagree with
my characterization of the Institute and its program. E. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PuBLic SR.avcE 243 n.l (1948) is some support for my position.
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to asking George Wickersham if he could find some money and
then to scrounging for free assistants from the government. Other
more single-mindedly dedicated scholars like Underhill Moore
were left to get what little support they could from the increas-
ingly frugal Institute of Human Relations and then, when that
money was gone, to finance research out of their own funds. 03
Thus, the Depression brought home the realities of modern social
science research and belied the Realists' initial feeling that the
diversity of social science presented numerous opportunities.
At Yale the Depression worked against establishing the
Realists' empirical research activities in another way, too. The
decline in available funds led to cutbacks in Yale's educational
programs, as would be expected. The result of such cutbacks ap-
pears to have been that the more recent claimants on the available
funds fared worst and fringe benefits, such as having research as-
sistants, were generally eliminated.0 4 Since the empirical research
activities of the Realists at Yale were not only new but also ex-
pensive ones that Yale had almost never funded except with soft
money, 05 any attempt to turn to Yale to support the expense of
such research was squarely stymied, while at the same time the few
research assistants that were availabl6 were slowly eliminated26
Had empirical legal research been begun even five years earlier
and the cost of the research establishment transferred, at least in
part, to the University's budget, the effect of the Depression on
such research might have been far different.
Despite the obvious importance and impact of the "accident"
of the onset of the Depression, the "accident" of men, particularly
their styles of leadership, was probably more important. Empirical
research began at Yale because Robert Hutchins was there. Both
the state and federal procedural studies were begun under Hutch-
ins' impetus. Douglas' field research was not begun until Hutchins
603. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976. The records of the Institute bear this
out. See Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, May 10, 1937, IHR files (over $3,000 spent to
date). See also Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 18, 1936, Angell papers.
604. See, e.g., Thomas W. Farnam to Underhill Moore, Apr. 27, 1936; Memorandum,
Law School Budgets 1925-34 (n.d.), Angell papers; Yale Minutes, Nov. 3, 1932; Feb. 16, 1933;
Apr. 26, 1934. After research assistants came salary increases and accelerated tenure
consideration for junior faculty members. See Board of Permanent Officers, To the President
and Fellows of Yale University, June 1, 1935, Angell papers (remonstrance drafted by
Arthur L. Corbin).
605. Only the four research assistants who began the Connecticut Courts study,
Douglas' assistants on the Philadelphia grocers study, and a single assistant for Moore,
who often did no empirical work, were paid for out of regular university funds.
606. See James R. Angell, Memo to File, May ?, 1936, Angell papers.
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brought him to Yale and conceivably was not even formulated be-
fore he was hired. The law school's participation in the Institute
was due solely to Hutchins' interest in making that connection.
All these activities are reflections of Hutchins' personality or style.
His protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,17 he was pas-
sionately interested in educational reform from the start of his
career, even if, perversely but revealingly, he had never syste-
matically thought about the subject until after he had left Yale.10
His style in pursuit of that interest was not to think out educa-
tional plans carefully or even to build institutions patiently, if
instinctively, but rather to shake things up constantly while follow-
ing any and every promising lead. It was a lively style played out
not just in encouraging empirical research, but also in appoint-
ments, curriculum reform, and general educational policy. As
styles of administration go, it was probably just what Yale needed
to turn its law school from a promising place into an exciting one.
But it was a style that had its limitations and, as it turned out,
critical ones at that.
As a summary of those limitations it might be said of Hutch-
ins, as Carlyle said of Matthew Arnold, "He led them into the
Wilderness and left them there."'0 9 Bright ideas about changing
institutions seldom go anywhere unless institutionalized, prefer-
ably all by themselves. Hutchins never institutionalized any of his
educational innovations at Yale. Had he stayed longer perhaps he
might have done so, although his record at Chicago appears to
suggest the contrary, 10 but no matter what might have been, what
was, was that all of the Hutchins-inspired enterprises were started
and then left to sink or swim. The Institute was begun with a
firm, though only tangentially relevant, idea of why the law school
was part of its program, but no idea what its program would be
to which the law school's nonexistent program of research would
relate and, although it was not Hutchins' fault, no substantial
607. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
608. M. ADLER, PHILOSOPHER AT LARGE 128-29 (1977). The only hint of systematic
thought about education that appeared in print before Hutchins left Yale is in the last
paragraph of Hutchins, Modern Movement in Legal Education, 1928 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 30,
33. The thought there expressed about the ability of the University to "afford" educational
experimentation because it possesses "a life that is nearly immortal" is hardly unusual.
609. As quoted in D. HOLLINGER, MoRIus CoHEN AND THE SCMNTIFIC IDEAL (1975) and
in Stevens, supra note 17, at 481 (applied to Realism generally and, I think, somewhat
erroneously). The epigram fits Hutchins better than Arnold.
610. See N.Y. Times, May 16, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1, § 2, at 48, col. 3 (Obituary).




funds to work miracles with. Clark's and Douglas' research was
begun with no particular idea where it would lead or how it would
be financed. Curriculum reform was started in three different di-
rections in less than six months. The honors program never really
had a purpose, except to get students out of the rut of classes. A
pattern emerges rather clearly: start something and, if necessary,
see what it might be turned into.
The consequence of Hutchins' brand of educational leader-
ship was that whoever inherited a project-something not always,
or even often, a known quantity at the outset-defined what that
project would be. When no heir appeared, as in the case of sys-
tematic curriculum reform or the honors program that lived to
plague the faculty at its weekly luncheon meetings for years, 11
the project went nowhere. But most often the task of definition,
the responsibility of heirship, fell to Charles E. Clark. That fact
was not without its consequences either.
The two friends-Hutchins and Clark6t2-could not have been
more different had one been a Laplander and the other a Hotten-
tot. Although it could not responsibly be said that empirical re-
search died at Yale because Charles Clark was there, it is notable
that although he passionately believed in "fact research," as he
called it, and loudly lamented its decline, Clark was able to do
little to keep any going. Not only was nothing new started, nothing
was started while there were plenty of ideas for research projects
just lying around.6 ' True, both the two procedure studies and the
auto compensation study were eventually completed. But only the
legal needs study had really been Clark's idea, and it went no-
where. Moreover, Clark was unable to capitalize on either Douglas
or Moore, his resident engines of social science research, was un-
able to make anything out of the law school's connection with the
Institute, and was even unable to generate any real educational
innovation during his deanship, a period four times longer
than Hutchins'. Yet Clark's tenure was not without substantial
achievements. He held the Yale Law School together through
years of declining resources while federal agencies made extraordi-
611. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to Eugene V. Rostow, May 31, 1946, Clark papers,
Law, supra note 164 (commenting on a faculty report again attempting to make senge
out of honors work).
612. For public declarations of this friendship, unusual among grown men, see R.
HutrcmNs, Tnm HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERIcA. (1926) (dedication); Clark, The Higher
Learning in a Democracy, 47 INr'L J. ETmcs 317, 320-21 (1937).
613. See note 518 supra.
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nary demands on everyone's time.61 4 At the same time he managed
to recruit a faculty of unusual talent and, ultimately, achieve-
ment. And he saw to the development of an effective committee
system, necessary to run the law school, which had doubled its
faculty in the ten years following Hutchins' selection as acting
dean.615
Clark's achievements and failures trace a pattern of activity
as telltale as that of Hutchins'. The procedure studies were com-
pleted in large part because Clark saw to it that they were com-
pleted;"' the thought that something once begun might not be
completed was inadmissible to him. And the auto compensation
study was so finely wrought that it is a monumental example of a
concern for careful work overwhelming the rather mundane pur-
pose for which it was done. Such changes in the educational pro-
gram of the law school as were undertaken were all considered,
reported, and justified almost to death by a committee structure
Clark had created. And although his faculty was unusually talented,
it was not audacious any more than Clark was an audacious dean.
Taken together these events reveal a man who in his approach to
problems and in his style, if style is the right word, was always
careful, measured though not plodding, and above all thorough.
That was Clark's way-lawyerly, in a word. 17 It was a style appro-
priate to times of consolidation or decline, when order and the
husbanding of resources are appropriate. Thus it is not surpris-
ing that Clark's achievements as he guided the law school through
the Depression were largely administrative. But with respect to
new activities and partial programs it was a style with limitations,
just as Hutchins' had been.
The limitations of Clark's style were two. The first can be
614. The participants in the law school's periodic exodus to Washington included
Arnold, Clark, Dession, Douglas, Fortas, Hamilton, Marshall, Harry Schulman and Sturges.
Some, like Fortas and Marshall, never returned to Yale; others worked anywhere from just
a summer to a year or more.
615. The growth of the committee system can be seen only by patiently reviewing the
minutes of the law school's weekly faculty meetings for the period of Clark's deanship,
a job that reminds one how trivial one's own faculty politics must be and how ultimately
boring C.P. Snow's "The Masters" is.
616. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark to George W. Wickersham, Oct. 2, 1931; Charles E.
Clark to Sam Bass Warner, Jan. 25, 1933, Clark papers, Beinecke. For examples of similar
efforts with respect to the bar survey, see Charles E. Clark to Karl N. Llewellyn, Mar. 4,
1936; Charles E. Clark to Emma Corstvet, June 8, 1937, Clark papers, Beinecke.
617. See M. ScHicK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 242 (1970) (although Schick emphasizes
Clark's quarrelsomeness); W. DouGLAs, Go EAST, YOUNr MAN 170-71 (1974); Interview with
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975. Cf. Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Be.
lated But Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1965); Rostow, Judge Charles E. Clark,
73 YA.a L.J. 1 (1963).
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seen in several incidents. Despite Clark's worries that Douglas
would leave for Chicago, when Douglas' bankruptcy studies were
finished his interest was allowed to drift, drift probably induced
in part because of his rather stern introduction to real social
science method administered at the hands of Dorothy Thomas.
Moore too was left to move along his own track, although the
cantankerousness of these two neighbors probably made it im-
possible for Clark to have moved Moore in any particular direc-
tion, even if he had wanted to move him.1 " Similarly, Clark was
unable to make anything out of the law school's connection with
the Institute. Granted, he was left with at best a half-baked idea;
yet that fact was less a liability than a potential asset, one in which
President Angell took relatively personal interest. 19 But realizing
on potential assets was not Clark's forte. Given a sensible project,
he could execute it; create one out of scraps and pieces, he could
not. All the care and thoroughness he could muster was of no help
in such a task. Ultimately, it was just not his style.
The second limitation was related to the first. Just as Clark
could not create out of scraps, he could not lead out of diversity,
either. His idea of leadership was leadership by demonstration. 20
He could, and did, show what kind of activities he thought were
appropriate for legal scholars-a rather promising combination
of empirical study and policy analysis that might have led away
from the kind of data-free social science that is the dominant
mode of law school legal analysis today. He made his silent point
over and over again, especially in the procedure studies and the
bar survey, but if no one wanted to learn from the demonstra-
tion, Clark was not the dean to think up new and exciting things
618. Moore and Clark fought repeatedly. See, e.g., Thomas W. Farnam to James R.
Angell, Apr. 20, 1936, Angell papers (detailing attempts to mediate a fight between the two
over research assistants; "This will be my last effort to get these two contrary characters to-
gether."). Moore believed that Clark's "temperament" resulted in "leadership and administra-
tion" that was "morale-destroying." Underhill Moore to Arthur L. Corbin, Apr. 28, 1939,
Moore papers. Clark, on the other hand, was more charitable, at least in public. See Clark,
Underhill Moore, 59 YALE L.J. 189 (1950). I doubt that the two men could ever have gotten
along, but their relationship was not helped by the fact that Moore's salary was greater
than Clark's (see, Charles E. Clark to Charles Seymour (provost), Feb. 10, 1934, Angell
papers) and that Moore bought the house next door which was larger and up the hill.
619. Clark recognized that he had been left with only a glint of an idea, Charles E.
Clark to James R. Angell, Dec. 29, 1936; Jan. 5, 1937, Angell papers, although as these
letters show he never understood that this fact was a potential asset. -
The estimate of the extent of Angell's interest in the Institute was noted by Mark May
who recalled that Angell called at least once a week to talk about affairs at the Institute.
Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975.
620. I would like to thank Professor Jacob Hyman for contributing this felicitous
description of this aspect of Clark's style of leadership.
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to do that might tempt others to follow his lead despite them-
selves. He was too thorough for that kind of serendipity. His work
was self-describedly "practical. '6 21 It was sophisticated in a tech-
nical way, but as such it was hardly the sort of thing to galvanize
others into action.
The consequence of Clark's brand of educational leadership
was as striking as in Hutchins' case. The faculty Clark inherited
was alive with energy and activity; 22 it plainly knew that it was
special. It did not lack for ideas; if anything, it had too many.
What it lacked was direction. 623 Hutchins left behind scraps and
pieces of that needed direction, largely pointing toward empirical
legal research. But Clark could not work with scraps and pieces,
and regrettably his faculty was not patient (one almost wishes to
say humble) enough to learn from careful, but not flashy, exam-
ples. And so the momentum that Hutchins brought to the faculty
was allowed to spend its force, as well as to grow, in pursuits
other than empirical research, as the Depression and the nature
of the research enterprise made that kind of research less attractive.
Hutchins never recognized the part that his personal style
played in the demise of what he started at Yale. The best he could
do was to suggest that the group as a whole may have been operat-
ing with "too narrow a theoretical base."0 24 Clark, on the other
hand, did, at least in part. He expressed that understanding ten
years after the research was over as he spiritedly defended his pro-
cedure enterprise from criticism like that of Frankfurter and Hart,
criticism that had by then grown in volume:
... I resent the repeated assertions that these studies were with-
out plan or purpose beyond "piling up the data." On the contrary,
they were aimed at very definite things, with clear hypotheses
worked out as a result of law practice, plus teaching of procedure.
621. Charles E. Clark to Filmer S.C. Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law.
See text accompanying note 625 infra for extended quotation from this letter.
622. See Leon Green to John Henry Schlegel, June 4, 1975, not that the observation
really needs any support.
623. Put another way, Clark wase not faced with a problem of "wet tinder" such that
his job as dean might have been described as lighting fires. Clark's faculty was more like
late summer chaparral. The danger of brush fires was always present and the major
problem was that like most brush fires the faculty burned very hot, but not for very long-
other than Corbin and Moore, few men on Clark's faculty were known for their sustained
scholarship. But cf. James R. Angell to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 17, 1931, Angell papers
("The moment you appear to falter, or lose heart, your colleagues will instantly be
unfavorably affected.").
624. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975. To some extent I agree, but
the significant point is that in explaining the decline of the Realists' attempts at empirical
legal research Hutchins completely neglected his role in starting that research.
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That was a time of emphasis on "law in action" in place of "law
in books," and perhaps our arguments and money-raising pleas
stressed this then popular approach more than we would now do.
But looking at the studies in perspective I do not believe either
our purposes or our plans could be misconstrued. I expect some
of this is really a reaction that our objectives were too lowly, too
practical to be considered on any philosophical basis. That is a
sounder approach to criticism, for our purpose was quite immedi-
ate and practical. For better or worse that was my turn of mind;
and I am quite prepared to accept responsibility for that, for do-
ing something within our grasp, rather than trying to harness the
stars. 625
Perhaps "practical" is not the best word to describe Clark's limi-
tations, but Clark quite obviously tried to do things within his
grasp and not to harness the stars as Hutchins might have done.
Unfortunately, all that was within Clark's grasp, all that could be
done with some assurance that what was begun would be com-
pleted, was to preside patiently, lovingly even, over the slow wind-
ing down of empirical legal research at Yale. And so that was what
Clark, the good lawyer, did.
Clark's understanding of his own limits is at the same time a
good place to begin to explore the third factor in the decline of
empirical research at Yale: the by no means accidental limits that
the nature of the research enterprise placed on its own capacity
for survival. Empirical legal research began as a practical, reform-
minded enterprise for all those engaged in it, as this recounting
of their research attempts to show. It lacked any grand theoretic
justifacatory structure. Rather, it proceeded on the basis of intui-
tions about the legal world gathered, as Clark noted, in the course
of teaching and practice. 28 Yet it is possible to intuit in the ac-
tions of Hutchins, Clark, and Douglas, if not a grand theoretical
structure, at least a lower level one. These three scholars wished
somehow to combine law reform and social science in order to im-
prove law and legal education, or in more abstract terms, to cross
the progressive reform tradition with the emerging social science
tradition to form a hybrid that might invigorate what Leon Green
aptly described as a legal world gone "stale.2627
625. Charles E. Clark to Filmer S.C. Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law.
See also Charles E. Clark to Ruth Field, n.d., Clark papers, Law, [written in response to
Simpson & Field, Law and the Social Sciences, 32 VA. L. R.v. 855 (1946)] which is, however,
not as percipicadous about the law school's role in the Institute.
626. Charles E. Clark to Filmer S.C. Northrup, Jan. 10, 1948, Clark papers, Law.
627. Interview with Leon Green, June 19, 1975; Leon Green to John Henry Schlegel,
June 4,1975.
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"In two ways the idea was a plausible one. First, each of these
three men looked quite naturally to the progressive reform tradi-
tion. Each was a part of the liberal wing of the legal profession,
as well as of the legal teaching profession, 28 and the progressive
reform tradition had always been a home for liberal politics, for
Reform. At the same time, all three were university academics
who looked quite naturally toward the university community of
which they were, or at least hoped to be, a part. Since gathering
facts had always been part of progressive reform, and since the
university had its own store of social fact gatherers, it was quite
natural to seek the facts from the people whose business it was to
collect the facts, especially since the social sciences were in origin
part of the progressive reform tradition.620
Second, in less personal terms the combination also made
sense. The process by which each of the social sciences split off
from an undifferentiated social science, and thus from activist re-
form, had left behind law, medicine, and divinity as the rather
hollow core of social science, and thus as the major heirs of pro-
gressive reform.630 Divinity, always a respectable academic disci-
pline, was rapidly receding in importance in the secular academic
community. Daniel Coit Gillman, Abraham Flexner, the American
Medical Association, and the Carnegie Foundation had seen to it
that medicine became an academic discipline too, and in so doing
used the same general tactics that the social sciences had used:
isolate the amateurs and adopt the language and manners of
natural science.""- Law, in contrast, had taken a significantly dif-
ferent route when it became an academic discipline. While the
new law teachers moved quite vigorously to isolate the amateurs
628. As evidence for this proposition, if any be needed, one should note the support
of Hutchins and Clark for Sacco and Vanzetti. See Charles E. Clark to Leon Green, Mar. 11,
1959, Clark papers, Law (it was Hutchins "who got me into trouble with the Sacco-Vanzetti
case'); text accompanying note 100 supra. W. DOUGLAs, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974) is
littered with evidence.
I believe that the Realists were generally the political left wing of the teaching
profession, although surely no more than mildly left of center on a national spectrum,
and that this fact is one of the items that distinguishes the movement. Proof of this
assertion will be presented in forthcoming articles.
629. T. HAsKFLL, THE ]EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977).
630. I infer this from T. HASKELL, supra note 629; it is he who emphasizes a
generalized "Social Science" as the root of all the social sciences and more importantly
emphasizes the relationship between the rise of the university and the differentiation of the
social sciences as academic disciplines.
631. See R. STEvENs, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1971).
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by insisting on the importance of "full-time" teachers 2 they
grabbed on to science in a wholly different sense than did all of
the rest of the new academic disciplines. The reasons for this choice,
however interesting, are for present purposes irrelevant. What is
relevant is that, as developed by the generation of scholars that
came to intellectual maturity before the First World War, legal
science was scientific by the most imperfect of analogies. Only by
assuming the existence of an immanent law could the search for
that law in the reported instances of its application be considered
a scientific enterprise. Moreover, making such an assumption, the
new legal academics were ignoring the tendency of all of the other
offspring of social science to look for the social or biological origins
of human artifacts. By thus choosing to follow a more ancient con-
ception of "science" as "rational" rather than "empiric" activity,
these men allowed legal science to be left behind in the rush to
create academic disciplines to populate the halls of the new uni-
versity, the surviving rationalistic, historical, deductive intellec-
tual dinosaur in the community of scholars. Were one embarrassed
or puzzled by being part of such a dinosaur, or only intrigued by
the rest of the university as it passed by, as surely Hutchins and
Clark, if not Douglas, were, reuniting academic law with its suc-
cessful former cohorts might have been a way to overcome em-
barrassment or, more simply, to join the parade.
Although the idea of crossing the progressive law reform tra-
dition with the social science tradition may have seemed plausible
at the time, in fact it was not. Law reform and the social sciences
had shared a common root in the social science of the late 19th
century, but their paths in the 20th century had been very differ-
ent. While the agenda and methods of the legal remnant of the
progressive reform tradition remained roughly the same as they
had been in the late 19th century, the social sciences changed radi-
cally. Causality became less of a surface phenomenon; method and
peer acceptance became more important as a test of truth; reform
receded as an objective in the near term; departmental politics
replaced national politics.6 3 In all likelihood these changes were
a social precondition to acceptance of the social sciences into the
632. Auerbach, Enmity & Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners 1900-1922 in 5
PEmsi. Am. hIsr. 551, 551-53 (1971) emphasizes this fact as he describes the process by which
law teaching became an academic discipline.
633. See generally T. HAsKELu, supra note 629; M. FURNER, ADvocAcy AND OBJEavrrY:
A CIusIs IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1865-1905 (1974).
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university. The divorce of research from an immediate political
program provided political insulation for the university and as-
sured the political acceptability of its activities to the community,
both of which were necessary before the new university could
be allowed to exercise a substantial degree of autonomy when per-
forming the critical social function of educating the children of
the middle class. But even if seen more narrowly as elements neces-
sary to the assertion that the social sciences had adopted the scien-
tific ideal, these changes made reform just about the least important
aspect of social science. However, for the legal heirs of the pro-
gressive reform tradition, reform was the point of any enterprise.
Thus at loggerheads, it soon became apparent that neither group
would compromise and that anyone who wished to cross the two
traditions would have to pick a way between them.
As Hutchins, Clark, and Douglas tried to pick that way, they
soon learned that all by itself social science would be a difficult
horse to ride, at least if law reform was to be its partner in bring-
ing academic law out of the age of dinosaurs. As Douglas remarked
a year or so after he gave up the business failures project, "All the
facts which we worked so hard to get don't seem to help a hell of
a lot.' ' 4 If what was wanted was the facts on which to base the
argument for reform, quantitative empirical research either pro-
duced too many, as in the courts studies, or worse, a very few at
an enormous cost, as in the business failures or auto accidents
projects. And then there was the matter of time. Of the completed
studies the shortest, auto compensation, took three years, and the
median time was nearly five years. It did not help the cause of
empirical research to learn so immediately how time-consuming
and also costly the careful collection and preparation of field data
in fact was. Nor was it helpful to walk squarely into the technical
revolution in social science methodology; it surely was dishearten-
ing for law professors to learn at the outset that they needed tech-
nical skills they had had no reason to acquire, in order to do work
that, when first thought of, had seemed little more difficult or com-
plicated than calling up a friendly banker to learn a little some-
thing about commercial practice. In short, the match was wrong.
Hindsight suggests that such a mismatch was not wholly un-
predictable. While in some respects law and the social sciences
developed very differently as academic disciplines, in other ways
634. William O. Douglas to Robert M. Hutchins, Apr. 7, 1934, Hutchins papers.
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their development was quite similar. While law remained a part,
possibly the only part, of the progressive reform tradition, the aca-
demic lawyers by and large fell away from that tradition.e 5 True,
they talked reform and some, like Pound and Frankfurter, seem
even to have participated in some, but the average legal academic
of the early 20th century was busy ordering legal doctrine and
assembling casebooks. Like their social science brethren they too
had grown away from directly tinkering with the body politic.
While this development cannot possibly be attributed to the im-
peratives of the scientific ideal, it was probably as much a precon-
dition of university citizenship for the new legal academics as for
the social scientists, and for like reasons. As a result, control of law
reform in the progressive tradition remained largely within the
profession, in the hands of the leaders of the bar like Wickersham
and Ballantine.
While "reform" might have been a broad umbrella, in pro-
fessional hands it was not, but rather was quite obviously directed
toward "safe" channels, whether from a limited social vision, from
solid political preference, or from a Kolkoesque desire to avoid
worse alternatives. Thus, reform remained a surface notion in
which all, or most, of the defects in the law were procedural or
remedial; the courts, congested; and the rules, uncertain; and in
which higher standards for admission to the bar were the cure to
both overcrowding and unethical practices by lawyers. Quite ob-
viously, this view aided the social and economic position of both
these lawyers and their clients. More importantly, because these
professionals were the heirs of the progressive reformers, in most
quarters theirs was the view of law reform. They thus defined what
research was sensible to pursue and what results were intelligible,
and through informal relationships with major funding sources
they could help to make their opinions about sense a reality.
Clark and Douglas felt the limits that the profession's defini-
tion of reform placed on research quite directly when trying to
explain the absence of court congestion, when trying to outline
the contemporary significance of the diversity jurisdiction, when
justifying all the work done on the auto compensation study, and
while seeking funds for the bar survey. Douglas reflected these
limits when giving up the business failures project. If one consid-
635. Here, I disagree with Auerbach, supra note 632, at 553-61, who emphasizes a
commitment to reform as an integral part of the process by which law teaching became an
academic discipline. For me Auerbach's analysis places entirely too much weight on
professional rhetoric and too little on the day to day activities of law teachers.
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ers the attempts of both men to do empirical research as part of a
more general attempt to institutionalize the doing of such research,
still other aspects of the limits of the profession's definition of re-
form appear. 36 And taken together the examples suggest why the
mismatch of reform and social science was not unpredictable. If
one's object was to invigorate a legal world gone stale, the social
science tradition was surely impotent, for although it was a poten-
tial source for an accurate perception of social conditions, its pros-
pect was almost wholly passive. At the same time, the progressive
reform tradition, at least in the hands of its legal heirs, was a mir-
ror image of the impotency of the social science tradition, for al-
though determinedly activist, its view of reform was largely
divorced from any even marginally accurate perception of social
conditions. Thus, both the defectors from the progressive reform
tradition and its legal heirs suffered the same fate; and legal aca-
demics, caught between the two traditions in such a way as to have
the worst of both worlds-a passive prospect and a poor perception
of social conditions-might well have wondered whether a social
and political structure that had thus neutralized both traditions
was likely to be supportive of an attempt at hybridization that in-
tended to unite the activist aspect of the legal remnant of the pro-
gressive reform tradition with a potentially accurate view of the
social conditions of legal institutions. 37
636. The profession's definition of reform pointed toward a mode of research consist-
ing of individual studies either brought to a conclusion or not, depending on the patience
of the researcher and the exigencies of the campaign for reform. But it is difficult to see
how such an "occasional" enterprise might have been perpetuated, for to do so one would
have had to institutionalize not a tradition of doing a particular kind of work, but a
tradition of doing any work that seemed appropriate to a given reform objective-hardly
the kind of thing out of which departments or even Institutes are made.
637. Support for this understanding of how the mismatch between the progressive
reform tradition and the social science tradition was a primary factor in creating the
inherent limits on the survival of the Realists' research enterprise can be found in the
vaguely contemporary ring to this recounting of the research, as shown by one of the
subsidiary themes isolated at the outset. Viewed as a whole the activities of Clark and
Douglas made up a massive interdisciplinary research project. In it they met the usual
problems of research design, data interpretation, temporal constraints, and monetary
limitations. While faced with all these technical problems, the two men also had to face
the desire of each intellectual unit in the supposedly joint activity to impose its view
of the nature and meaning of the research. Each group, first, the progressive law reformers,
then the social scientists, thereafter, in the Institute episode, both the lawyers and the
social scientists, and finally, the funding sources, had its own vision of the world and
insisted on enforcing that vision, largely because in the modem balkanized intellectual
world only that vision was intelligible to those holding it. In such a world working
together really means coordinating disparate visions as an exercise in the art of the
possible-essentially the role that Clark learned to play and played most successfully in
the bar survey.
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While the three factors of time, person, and nature of the
research enterprise had the greatest impact on the decline of the
Realists' efforts at empirical research, one should not ignore the
fact that these were wholly fortuitously combined with a rise in
the heat of political battles after the onset of the Depression and
a concomitant increase in the opportunities to participate in
those battles after Roosevelt's election. This development only ac-
centuated the difficulties with the nature of the empirical research
enterprise. As Clark and Douglas fell away from empirical research
projects they, and others similarly inclined, could and did fall
into advocating or participating in reform-often the same reforms
that had animated their earlier research. Thus, these scholars
could feel as if they were not changing their concerns or abandon-
ing their beliefs and, at the same time, smoothly change their ac-
tual activities to accommodate new circumstances. That fact was
ultimately the most unfortunate, at least for empirical research.
The new "political" activities both required less elaborate fact-
finding and proved compelling enough that, except for Moore
who was always the "scientist" and only in late desperation tempted
by Washington's panjandrums, none of the Realists really missed
the old enterprise. Consequently, there was little if any interest
among these men to revive empirical studies when economic and
political conditions had become more favorable to such an enter-
prise. What was left behind was a pile of dusty studies and the
notion far too prevalent today that social science is all very inter-
esting and ultimately very relevant to legal problems, but that
until the social scientists spend some time examining legal prob-
lems, the study of law can go on as it has, data free and value
laden.
To suggest that the decline of the Realists' attempts at em-
pirical research in law was the result of accidents of time and place
and the not so accidental nature of the research enterprise itself
is simultaneously to suggest, if only faintly, that the story of those
attempts, Fowles-like, might have had a different ending. And I
mean to suggest just that, for although it has been suggested,68
and not without some justification, that the Realist movement be-
gan its fragmentation and decline with the deanship crisis at Co-
lumbia in May 1928, the significant event was surely a year later.
638. W. TWINING, KARL LLEiWELLYN AND THE REAuSr MovEMENT 81 (1973).
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Whether that event be seen as Hutchins' resignation and Clark's
selection as his successor in April 1929, or the great stock market
crash several months later is unimportant, but up until that
event, given the relevant social and academic background, there
was at least a chance that empirical research in law would have
been a major part of American legal scholarship and thus of
American legal education. Given Hutchins' wish to put the law
school in a center of graduate and professional education, and his
friendship with Winternitz, the "might have been" law school
probably would have resembled medical education more than
Cook's Institute at Johns Hopkins. Empirical research would have
been a part of the work of the faculty and graduate students, but
not of the students who would benefit from the increased knowl-
edge and then head for professional careers. But the matter turned
out otherwise. Whether legal education is better or worse for that
fact is an open question, but if what "might have been" had been,
Realism would have become a very different force in legal thought,
and legal thinkers would know a lot more about the world of their
thought than they do.
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